Re-casting of Post-colonial states as the under-belly of procedural democracy in Africa

By: Dr Jason Musyoka (Ph.D.)

South Africa’s upcoming elections from continental perspective

On November 1^st  2021, South Africa will head to polls, to elect those who will govern them locally. It is of course a significant exercise, considering that the weekend of 18^th and 19^th September, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) will embark on voter registration drive, with over 23,000 voter registration station open worldwide. In the same light, over 48,000 electoral officials have been trained to manage voter registration. The government approximates the expenditure on the forthcoming elections to R2 billion-the second largest of the ten chapter nine institutions. Any exercise and expenditure of such magnitude is self-evident, that elections are a serious enterprise.

South Africa joins 25 other African states which will have held elections in 2021, at least 14 of them being local or regional elections, akin to South Africa’s local government elections. For some citizens (and most analysts) in the continent, the numeracy of these elections is democratic progress,-if we follow the procedural democracy as a point of departure.  The advocates of procedural democracy argue that because of pluralism and dissent, following through an election procedure is the best way of achieving political stability.

The merits and shortfalls of procedural democracy : Lessons from Schumpeter and Dahl

In the 1940s, Joseph Schumpeter underscored the importance of defining democracy in empirical sense, by adopting a precise but narrow idea of democracy as a governance mechanism for electing leaders who would in turn make decisions on behalf of the people. This empirical turn to defining democracy was expanded by the zeitgeist American political scientist Robert Dahl’s who had a lot to say about the merits of procedural democracy. His treatment of pluralistic democracy as a kind at close proximity to ideal democracy, warrants attention here.  Dahl outlined five factors upon which functional democracy should hinge on. These are (a) political equality (b) effective participation (c) enlightened understanding (d) agenda control and (e) inclusiveness of all adults. He admitted that the final factor (inclusiveness of all adults) is impossible to achieve. Nevertheless, for Dahl, these five criteria define a near-perfect procedural democracy. Finally, Dahl points out that geographical size, pluralism (or diversity) within a given society along with population density,-all these matter in determining efficiency and effectiveness of democracy.

What the above might mean for our society today is that a perfect democracy does not exist anywhere on earth,-even for Dahl. Infact, in his later years, Dahl himself had become disillusioned with democracy especially after the fall of the Berlin wall, and the subsequent hijacking of the meaning of democracy as only what was approved by the west. Dahl cautioned that any conceptualization of democracy needed to hold a moral mirror as it were, as a way of recognizing its shortfalls, and therefore working to perfect its flaws.

The lingering question for Dahl,-and for us is this: how can we claim that a democracy is indeed working? Dahl is well known for posing this question in a more succinct way than I do above: “in a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?” .

Anticipating accusations of engaging in fault-finding rather than problem solving, Dahl pre-emptied a response by settling for a form of democracy where multiple elites exercise their power. He labelled this kind of governance polyarchy,-that is, a system of government in which power is invested in multiple elites located in different sectors, and therefore introducing competition of group interests. This kind of system, Dahl continued, is better equipped to deliver on public goods such as equality and freedom. There are several competing schools of thought, which contend with Dahl’s polyarchy, but it is not my intention to treat them here.

On shadow African states and the re-casting of post-colonial vestibules.

Several blind spots exist in procedural democracy in Africa, notwithstanding regular elections. In  expanding on the caution provided by Dahl, and pointing out the flaws which attend procedural democracy,  this year (2021), Cheeseman, Wakenge, Rolls, Sishuwa and Zamchiya (2021) published a volume relevant to this blog piece, on shadow states in Africa.  Drawing from cases of  five African countries namely, DRC, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, these authors argue that their case studies reflect thick private networks which easily replace fragile state institutions, advancing their interests and the interests of key governors. These networks involve banking, and corporate sectors, and in some cases extends to parts of the media. The ultimate objective of shadow states is to enable political monopoly, and in so doing, silence dissent. The above-mentioned authors make a useful observation,-that all their case studies of shadow states reflect an interesting trend of popular leaders, who won elections by majority but opted to subdue dissent, along with militarising of engagements with citizens.  Conspicuously missing in Cheeseman et al’s analysis is Ethiopia, which has recently fallen spectacularly from a global darling to a shadow (and pariah) state. Also missing in the volume is Mali, which experienced a coup in 2020, and Guinea, of which ECOWAS is currently (September 2021) engaging the region in search for meaningful transition after a coup.

Notably, most African states easily claim procedural democracy.  They satisfy at least effective participation, and agenda control,-two of Dahl’s criteria of functional democracies.  A polyarchy in Dah’s sense assumes that representation of elite interests from various sectors is entertained, or at the very least, not militarily suppressed. In our continent, elites are well represented in democratic systems. Except that the kinds of relationships and reciprocities which occur, are underpinned by clientelism rather than a robust  plurality of thought and political expression.  Clearly,  the residues of post-colonial predatory tendencies are still salient, as is the case with the shadow states identified by Cheeseman and others above, and the additional ones I have noted.

In sum, if it comes down to a choice between procedural and substantive democracy (one whose success is measured by delivery of material socio-economic benefits to the greater populace), then procedural democracy is not well suited for this continent. For this reason, Rwanda is increasingly popular not so much for procedural democracy but for substantive democracy. Thus, while there are at least 95 elections in the continent between 2018 and 2022, and while most of these elections conform to basic election rules, poverty and inequality, sub-national political conflicts, silencing of the media, intimidation and assassination of opposition parties, dominate political discourses across the continent.  Our continent remains progressive in so far as procedural democracy is concerned, but deeply troubled from substantive democracy lenses.

The undercurrents of procedural democracy in South Africa

With South Africa’s local government elections scheduled for November 1^st, 2021, it is worthwhile to consider the extent to which, beneath the surface, South Africa’s democracy conforms to Dahl’s ideas, but exhibits fatal flaws reflects the same tendencies of post-colonial African states. On 14^th September 2021, the Daily Maverick featured an article titled ‘KZN killing fields: Political murders surge as November 2021 polls draw near’. The article reported that between January 2016 and June 2017 (the local government elections were held on August 3^rd, 2016), there were at least 33 political assassinations in KwaZulu Natal alone.  It warned of a repeat of such trend during this election year. This is not a phenomenon exclusive to KZN. There are several other media outlets which reported trends of intimidation and assassinations, in various other provinces.

To return to Dahl, the political hostilities in South Africa rely on networks of interests, which support the dominant interest namely, to win elections quoquo modo necessarium (by all means necessarily). Or in words attributed to Nicollo Machiavelli (although the notion appears to date from Greek tragedy), il fine giustifica i mezzi,-the end justifies the means.  Elitist Interests are always at work.  The alliances forged by these interest groups determine the stability of democracy.  If we take two of Dahl’s concerns (pluralism and geographical size), then the political intolerance experienced in the run up to elections in South Africa recasts the ghouls of post-colonial  African states. If the surface is procedural democracy, then the continent in general and South Africa in particular has made significant progress. If substantive democracy is the underbelly, then Africa in general and South Africa in particular are deeply troubled, still.

Dr. Jason Musyoka is the CEO of The Frontline Group and a senior Researcher at the Department of Political Science.