A democracy comes of age; important guiding fundamentals have emerged

By: Stef Terblanche

By the weekend following our May 29 elections, it was clear: South Africa would henceforth be a different country politically to the one of the previous 30 years since Nelson Mandela had first led his African National Congress (ANC) into power in 1994 following the momentous fall of apartheid.

And yet, will there be much that will really change to any large or speedy degree in governance and for people on the ground in 2024 as there was in 1994?

For that we will have to wait and see what emerges from the current discussions among the political parties on who will form the next government and how power will be distributed. Elections were one thing, but now forming a functional government, is completely another. Perhaps more so than the elections themselves, these discussions that have started, have moved the country into the danger zone.

Uncertainty still prevails at this very moment as parties continue to talk and negotiate around forming a government, a dozen challenges remain lodged with the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the comeback king Jacob Zuma has already issued threats of mayhem, and so forth. Constitutionally the parties have 14 days after the election to come up with a new president (and by extension a new government) failing which, new elections may have to be held.

Once the parties agree on a new president – to be sworn in by the Chief Justice – one can safely assume that they will also have found agreement on a power-sharing governing arrangement involving two or more parties at the national level, with similar situations having arisen in three provinces – Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Northern Cape. The modalities of agreements in these three provinces, will most likely be dictated by what takes place at the national level. However, all three these provinces have specific characteristics and political peculiarities that will come into play, so it won’t be a case of one size fits all.

What is clear already, however, is that from this point on, responsibility and accountability will be shared among a broader, more representative spectrum of political parties, the exact combination and mechanisms of which are yet to be determined. Governing parties will be subjected to greater scrutiny, held more accountable, and will more easily be pushed out if they don’t perform. That alone should generate much hope for a better future among all South Africans.

As things stand now, the talks on forming a government could be concluded tomorrow or any time over the next two weeks, providing a measure of certainty on the way forward. Or the talks could disintegrate and drag on for weeks, even months, with legal challenges, and with even the possibility of a constitutional crisis or fresh elections if the talks collapse and no-one is able to form a government. On the positive side, President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his closing remarks to the Independent Electoral Commission’s (IEC) Results Operation Centre in Midrand, as well as numerous leaders of other parties, all agreed now is the time to put their differences behind them and the country first and work together to find a workable agreement as to how best to serve the people going forward. They all acknowledged that the voters want power to be shared with no one party being dominant.

In line with this voters’ sentiment, we don’t have to wait around for what may or may not occur from these power-sharing discussions; the outcome of the elections has already produced a number of fundamental underlying points that will or should guide and determine the current state of play and the anticipated way forward regardless of who or which parties will be in govermment. If we adhere to or remain mindful of these fundamentals, it should considerably strengthen our democracy going forward as well as how we engage with each other politically.

Important underlying fundamentals

Therefore, to fully understand where we are and how we might proceed, we need to consider these important points – the underlying fundamentals that have emerged:

• Demand for change. The driving force behind the 2024 elections has been a demand for “change” – a rather abstract and poorly defined call to action that by the next elections in 2029 will have again matured or metamorphosed into something different, perhaps then into a more sharply defined clarion call around specific issues. We are not at the absolute end of one era or phase or dispensation or at the beginning of another; we are merely in the midst of an ongoing dynamic democratic evolutionary process.
• A dynamic ongoing evolutionary process. South Africa has not so much entered a “new era” as many are asserting – instead, like any other healthy democracy, ours is not a static one, but an ever evolving, fluid and dynamic phenomenon that is always progressing through different stages and phases with overlapping familiarities alongside new possibilities that open up. The baton has been passed for the next leg of the race but essentially the players, the problems, the challenges and opportunities are still the same. For most people, little if anything will change on the ground any time soon. When we woke up after May 29, we still had high unemployment, crime, loadshedding and all the other problems. These will take a long time to go away, if at all. Revolutions, coups, national conventions, palace revolts and military invasions bring about fundamental change and new or different eras and dispensations; democratic elections produce fresh legs and ideas, course and pace adjustments, and sometimes systemic alterations. Important is how the race is run from this point on; that is what could be changing soon and could in the longer run, produce its own hopefully good results. But for now, don’t anticipate any overnight miracles or major changes.
• Changing political profile and expectations. Key to the above is the changing political profile and expectations of the electorate, the citizenry, which is no longer the same as it was in 1994, or in 2014, or even in 2019. By the next elections in 2029 the profile will have adjusted once more and many of the current dynamics and expectations will to some degree have shifted again, causing us to rechart the course on which the country has set sail.
• End of the de facto one-party or one-party-dominant state. These elections have also broken the total and sometimes abusive dominance of one single political party of the entire political environment through its control of the executive and the legislative branches, the latter which functioned as little more than the party and the executive’s rubber stamp. The de facto one-party state or one-party-dominant state is no more, which is a huge relief and a breakthrough for this young democracy This has unlocked and broadened important participatory opportunities for all political communities and groups across the political spectrum that were always theoretically available in our Constitution like its drafters had intended but were stifled because of single-party dominance. This will most likely advance greater transparency, consensus, consultation and accountability as well as political inclusivity, which is why the drafters of the Constitution settled on a party-list proportional representation electoral system. That system, more specifically its accountability and access to it, have now been further enhanced and expanded by the addition of allowing independent candidates to also stand for election – an addition that is still a work in progress. Over time this aspect is likely to find greater traction.
• More balanced, diversified policy and legislative processes likely. Meanwhile, the policy and legislation arena is about to experience a significantly altered period in which increased checks and balances will enter, and in which no political party or combination of parties will have the absolute upper hand or a blank check it can fill out as it wishes. This should be welcomed by all moderate, pro-democracy forces, investors and the markets. Against the above background, and with the new division of seats among parties, and with no party having an outright majority in the National Assembly, the policy and legislative dictates of the executive will now be open to effective challenges in the National Assembly, greater scrutiny and adjustment, or even rejection. At the same time, with the ANC having majorities in 5 provinces and as it will possibly be a partner in a provincial coalition or two, it is likely to be the dominant player in the National Council of Provinces. The balance of power in the executive and the legislature will not necessary be the same or be aligned and will be subjected to changing dynamics at times so that no one party can randomly impose its will on others. So, for example, situations will arise where the national executive drafts legislation based on its internally agreed-upon policy position; sends it to the National Assembly for refinement, a vote and approval, and where it may have to undergo significant changes or even be rejected and sent back; but once it is passed in the National Assembly it will be sent to the National Council of Provinces for further approval, where it may again undergo revision and be sent back to the National Assembly for suggested changes to be made. This will most likely significantly complicate the legislative process but will also promote more intense scrutiny, deliberation, consultation, consensus and common-ground agreement and balance. Furthermore, limits already placed by the Constitution on certain types of legislation will, in a more diversified legislative process, add further limitations and checks and balances, thus overall, the legislative process is likely to produce more balanced end results based on maximum consensus across a wider spectrum of participation representing diverse interests and ideas.
• The maturing of our democracy. One of the biggest takeaways from these elections, is not so much the massive fall from grace of the ANC after 30 years of rule, much of it on the wrong side of moral and historical judgment, but rather the fact that South Africa’s democracy has now fully matured, coming of age. Even so, in the space of one single day, a party that had ruled the country without question or much opposition for thirty years, was unceremoniously booted out of office. South African voters have shown that they will be patient for a long, long time without resorting to violence or going to the streets, but when their patience has been exhausted, they will seek change through the ballot and show no mercy. In the process the country has been left with a collection of political parties, none possessing the majority needed to take the ANC’s place. And although we are not yet fully out of the woods, commendable was the orderly and peaceful manner in which the elections occurred, allowing the IEC, various international observer missions, foreign diplomats, most local political parties, as well as the domestic and international media to declare the elections to have been peaceful, free and fair. Just as commendable was how the outgoing ruling party, the ANC, gracefully accepted defeat and prepared to hand over the governing baton to whatever will follow. All of this is almost as impressive a political testimonial and statement as were the 1994 elections that transitioned the country from apartheid to democracy without widespread violence or a civil war.
• Some inherent dangers. As mentioned already, the process of negotiating the next format of government among various political parties is in itself fraught with danger and could badly unravel at any moment if cool heads and the best interest of the country as a whole don’t prevail. However, so far it seems the centre is holding and that in respect of the elections themselves and the immediate transitionary aftermath before we arrive at a new governing dispensation, play is proceeding smoothly, and the ball is being passed around without serious disruption. The only jarring note has come from Jacob Zuma and his uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MK) who, instead of revelling in their phenomenal, unprecedented success are issuing all kinds of ominous threats and warnings if they don’t have their way. Even the previously often unruly and raucous Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which lost considerable ground, seems uncharacteristically restrained and respectable in comparison. So far most other parties have stood together in condemning such Big Man behaviour and it should be clear to Mr Zuma that 14.58% of the national vote and 46% of the provincial KwaZulu-Natal vote, spectacular as it may seem, still represent only a minority. So, Zuma and the MK should not delude themselves that they can dictate to the majority or plunge the country into unrest if they don’t have things their way. Also of much concern is the diminishing participation in or support for our national democracy and its elections, with only 58.64% of registered voters having voted this time, down from 66% in 2019. Since the 86.87% voter turnout recorded in 1994, this figure has been on the decline, reaching its lowest point in national and provincial elections this year. In the municipal elections of 2021, only a meagre 45.86% of registered voters botghered to vote. This year, far more eligible voters chose not to vote than those who actually were registered and voted. This is particularly concerning when it comes to the youth, now distinctly making up the largest potential voting bloc in the country. Research done some time ago suggested that a growing segment of South Africans – particularly among the youth – were willing to forfeit the Constitution, and the multi-party democracy and its institutions if it would bring them jobs, safety, eductaion and other improvements. Seemingly playing into this sentiment has also been Mr Zuma who, should he come to power, has promised to tear up the Constitution, take away the powers of the independent judiciary and replace it with an African justice system, and nationalise land, banks and mines, among other archaic and wholly undemocratic and unconstitutional measures. But largely underlying Zuma and the MK’s views on these matters, has been their introduction of the politics of revenge and retribution, the assertion that force can be used to achieve goals, and the notion that democratic systems and checks and the rule of law are unnecessary and should be discarded, all to enhance their own power and control – in other words, a silent coup. The fact that such a sizeable segment of voters supported Zuma and the MK despite his undemocratic and destructive tendencies, should have alarm bells ringing everywhere.
• A return to ethnic identity politics? A number of commentators have raised concerns that these elections brough with them a return to divisive ethnic identity politics. That may be so, but it has always been a feature of the post-1994 South African political landscape and is not in every respect necessarily a bad thing, or even that divisive. It could even promote harmony and peaceful co-existence. And it is something that was arguably even intended by the drafters of the Constitution as it gives minorities an effective voice without them simply being swamped by the majority. In this context then, we saw the phenomenal rise of the MK party, mainly on a tide of pro-Zuma support combined with a wave of Zulu ethnic nationalism. Similarly, we saw the rise of Gayton McKenzie’s Patriotic Alliance (PA) on the back of a predominantly coloured vote, McKenzie having persuaded coloured communities that other political parties don’t have their interests at heart. The EFF maintains a distinct pan-Africanist/black African nationalist outlook. Equally so, the DA still appeals strongly to whites across the language spectrum, and the Freedom Front Plus attracts specifically white Afrikaners. The African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) appeals to Christians of all races, and Aljama-Ah is a party for Muslims. Also in the mix are parties for socialists, workers, pan-Africanists and others, so it shouldn’t really surprise anyone that there are also parties for specific race, ethnic, cultural or religious groups in a country with so much diversity.

What comes next?

Now we ride out the negotiations phase, hope it will find peaceful consensus around a government to be formed, and pray that the danger period will pass without incident. The era of the ANC claiming to be the sole legitimate representative of the people, has been abruptly and decisively ended. It’s often flaunted credentials as the party of liberation, suddenly no longer count for much. With a younger generation who never lived through apartheid now firmly in the ascendancy, the ANC should have known this day would be coming but chose not to acknowledge it until it was far too late. President Ramaphosa’s Tintswalo has come back to bite an ANC that does not own her generation, unlike what Ramaphosa tried to intimate in his 2024 state-of-the-nation address. Now South Africa moves on… hopefully to a better place.

For parties now engaging in governing and power-sharing deliberations, there are basically three options on the table:

A coalition government, in which two or more parties join forces to achieve a governing majority over 50% and agree on the distribution of power, positions and responsibilities among themselves. Coalitions work well in a number of countries and South Africa has for some time now also been heading in this direction, starting with the 2016 municipal elections.

A government of national unity, in which a large number of the biggest parties come together to govern for the common good of the country and not for the mere sake of power, and they agree among themselves how best to achieve this and what each party’s role and stake will be. Policy and legislative determination is achieved through consultation and consensus. This is by far the most inclusive most representative form of government, but often a problematic one when it comes to reaching consensus and agreement around critical matters.

A minority government based on a confidence and supply agreement. In this format an outright majority is not required and, for example, the ANC with its current 40% of National Assembly seats, could continue to govern as a minority government, but will rely on periodic pre-determined support from another party or parties, e.g. the DA, when voting on critical matters, e.g. such as electing a president, making specific changes to the Constitution, or in respect of the Budget and other money bills, and so forth.

Parties are currently engaged in these kinds of talks. Without playing the guessing game or pre-empting any possible outcomes, based on known factors and conditions it would seem that any coalition or similar agreement between the ANC and ambitious radical leftwing parties like the EFF and MK, would be prone to more squabbling and instability than would an arrangement be between the ANC and the moderate, centrist DA. The latter would also be much better received by investors and markets. But these decisions are up to the parties, and South Africa waits with bated breath for the result.

Stef Terblanche is a Cape Town-based political analyst and journalist. His opinions are his own and not necessarily those of the DDP.