An unwieldy national executive born from a rather unholy marriage of convenience – but it might work

By: Stef Terblanche

“The message delivered from the South African electorate has been heard loud and clear. No political party achieved an outright majority, and citizens want politicians to cast aside their differences and work together for the benefit of the people.”

With these words – the new favourite political cliché politicians have been trotting out ad nauseam since May 29 – President Cyril Ramaphosa finally announced his multi-party cabinet after almost a month of squabbling over power and positions and keeping South Africans and the world in suspense. It was an agonising exercise by political parties that mostly gave little thought to the ‘benefit of the people’ or the good of the country and the economy as they jostled for position.

Let me pour cold water on the false euphoria that greeted Ramaphosa’s announcement. It’s time to get sober and real about the latest edition of the ‘South African democracy’, which, as I have said before, is an evolutionary work in progress and not some grand revolutionary, post-watershed new dispensation. It remains also a contest for power, and is an adjusted reality forced upon disparate contestants not of their making nor that of the voters. It was little more than a coincidental outcome of elections that rearranged the pieces on the political chessboard – fortuitously so for the political parties that now enjoy varying measures of power but much less so for the overall body politic. We will win some and lose some, while the potential for disruption will always loom large.

But let’s first lay this fallacy to rest. The people did not speak. Only a minority of eligible voters came out to vote; the lowest voter turnout since the advent of democracy in 1994. Some 39 million people in South Africa are eligible to vote; over 11 million of them did not register to vote; and out of the 27.7 million registered voters, only 16.2 million voted on May 29.

Whether the majority who failed to vote stayed away out of protest over the poor state of domestic affairs (a legitimate form of voting that would have been an indictment of the ANC), or whether they had simply lost faith in the system, or whether they were lazy or just couldn’t care, we will probably never know beyond what some surveys may try to tell us. I certainly never encountered any voters before the elections who said they were going to vote like this or like that or not vote at all in order that no political party receives a majority, and the parties will thus be forced to work together for the good of the people! That’s just a mythical cliché; putting nice words to a coincidental result. It’s little more than political spin to hide an unpleasant and dangerous reality while creating a deceptive virtual bubble in which our perceptions of our troubled politics can try to move us forward.

For Ramaphosa and the ANC, stating it like that helps cushion the blow of a very hard landing suffered with the ANC’s massive defeat, while it stakes a claim to continued political relevance of sorts for him and the ANC. For the dozen mostly very small erstwhile opposition parties now smoking their political cigars in the cabinet boardroom of power, it also staked their claim to some kind of relevance and to being included in the national political action, the power and perks at a higher level than they had previously ever thought possible. Prior to the election result being known, very few people thought ‘government of national unity’; most people were fixated on ‘coalition’, in most respects a very different thing.

For Ramaphosa and the ANC’s leadership, a GNU also offered a way out of a very tricky situation. They wouldn’t have to choose between a radical socialist workers’ party and a centre-right pro-business and markets party as coalition partners and be accused of some or other ideological bias or vested interests and risk further tearing the ANC apart; with a GNU they could simply extend an invitation to all parties, remain aloof and avoid the fallout. Yet even with the GNU emerging, that accusation of bias was levelled to a lesser extent against Ramaphosa and the ANC in respect of the participation of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) by the parties that had (initially) opted not to join the so-called unity government.

An ominous forewarning of things to come?

Back to the cabinet. Instead of the announcement of the new cabinet heralding some kind of real political relief and a sense of certainty, permanency and progress – other than such temporary gratification as it provided ‘the markets’ until they find their next alarm – the entire process was rather an ominous forewarning of things to come. It’s going to be a rollercoaster ride. There can be no doubt about that. Politicians “casting aside their differences and working together”? What planet are we living on. There are a number of pertinent relevancies that should be considered, to which I shall return shortly. But let’s first look at the composition of the new cabinet.

Ramaphosa and other commentators are quite right in labelling it ‘historic’.  South Africa has never before had a cabinet composed of members from so many different political parties, different policy perceptions, and different ideological persuasions. That in itself will immensely complicate working together in harmonious agreement, and the provisions of consensus or sufficient consensus to which the parties signed up in the statement of intent when they joined the GNU, will be severely tested in months or years to come depending on how long the GNU will remain intact.

Another historical first is the sheer size of Ramaphosa’s new national executive, which, apart from policy and ideological differences, will make it unwieldy, tension-filled, and hard for even the toughest, most decisive president to control – not a quality we generally associate with Ramaphosa. At last count, if my sums are correct, there are now 32 departments with 33 ministers plus the president and deputy president, making it 35 members of cabinet, with 43 deputy ministers, bringing the total of the national executive up to a staggering 78 members.

This is two persons short of the 80-member National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, a body that also seldom is fully in agreement and one which Ramaphosa at the best of times has difficulty in always bringing around to his way of thinking. In the past it has been riddled with factional divisions resulting in power struggles. In the national executive one can envisage similar disagreement and discontent, here also along policy lines but in this instance informed by party political directives. Now Ramaphosa will have to fight his battles on two fronts in two very large, competing powerful bodies. Ramaphosa’s only saving grace will be that cabinet meetings generally will exclude the presence of deputy ministers who are not members of the cabinet but rather of the larger national executive.

Before the negotiations that preceded the formation of the cabinet, Ramaphosa had vowed to reduce the number of executive positions. But he said, when announcing the cabinet, this had not been possible as he had to ensure that the national executive was inclusive of all the parties to the GNU – which was true to some extent – while he also rationalised the splitting of previously merged ministerial portfolios into separate ministries to “ensure that there is sufficient focus on key issues” – which was partially deceptive spin. The more persuasive reason for reconfiguring some ministries was probably to avoid giving control to other parties, most notably the DA, over key areas of policy and governance, and thus ensuring continued ANC control over those.

For example, the portfolio of Agriculture was allocated to the DA with its leader John Steenhuisen as the minister, while the politically more important or sensitive part of the former combined ministry, namely Land Reform and Rural Development was allocated to the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) with its leader Mzwanele Nyhontso as the minister. True, he’s not ANC, but he and his party are strong advocates for progressive land reform, including expropriation without compensation (EWC), appropriately in line with ANC policy and recent legislative developments. By appointing Nyhontso to this position Ramaphosa conveniently killed two birds with one stone. Steenhuisen and the DA on the other hand oppose much of ANC (and PAC) policy in this regard. Furthermore, having a socialist minister from the political leftwing who favours EWC and land redistribution in that position, could also help take off some of the pressure on Ramaphosa and the ANC coming from the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF).

In another example, the ministry of Correctional Services was allocated to the centre-right FF Plus under Pieter Groenewald as its minister, but the politically more key ministry of Justice and Constitutional Development was separated from it and retained by the ANC under Thembi Nkadimeng as its minister.

In other instances, logical rationalisation dictated, such as in merging the ministries of Electricity and Energy under the ANC’s Kgosientsho Ramokgopa and separating it from the new ministry of Mineral and Petroleum Resources under the ANC’s Gwede Mantashe. This was also the case when Ramaphosa did away with the previously controversial ministry of Public Enterprises that used to fall under the equally controversial Pravin Gordhan, now retired from the political centre stage. Coordination of the relevant public enterprises will now be located in the Presidency with some line functions going directly to the relevant ministries.

Looking at the executive as a whole, it seems Ramaphosa and the ANC’s NEC managed to give effect to a fairly equitable distribution of positions in terms of gender, age, provinces, ethnicity and political parties. Overall, the executive seems to be a younger one than the one before. Most provinces and regions, and therefore also ethnic considerations, seem to have been accommodated, although one was struck by the large number of newly appointed ministers and deputies hailing from Limpopo while ethnic Zulus no longer dominate like they once did under previous administrations. Although Ramaphosa considers himself to be a native of Soweto born to Venda parents, he has strong roots in Limpopo as well as many political allies there within ANC context and owns significant property there. Also, as a by-product of the DA’s participation in the GNU, the national executive now has more white faces than it has had at any other time since 1996 when Nelson Mandela’s GNU ceased to exist, and the new constitution took effect. That gives practical effect to the ANC’s mantra of non-racialism through no fault of the ANC.

The ANC’s decades-long alliance partner, the SA Communist Party (SACP), is also well represented and punching above its weight as always. As a party it has always piggybacked on the ANC, has never fought any election in its own right, and yet wields much influence in the ANC. In many respects the SACP is to the ANC what the Afrikaner-Broederbond used to be to the erstwhile National Party in the apartheid era.

Members of the SACP’s central committee and/or Politburo are present in the new national executive either as ministers or deputy ministers in the ministries of Science, Technology and Innovation; Mineral and Petroleum Resources; Finance; Higher Education; Justice and Constitutional Development; Land Reform; and Police. These are portfolios that were largely kept out of DA hands, and one suspects to some degree probably at the insistence of the SACP. However, an interesting political cohabitation now exists in the Ministry of Finance where the ANC’s Enoch Godongwana is the minister, and the ANC/SACP’s David Masondo and the DA’s Ashor Sarupen are the deputy ministers. That should make for some interesting head-butting along the way.

Most of the positions allocated to the DA places it at best on the fringes of economic decision-making and not at the centre, via its somewhat diluted presence in ministries such as Agriculture; Communications and Digital Technologies; Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment; Public Works and Infrastructure; and via deputy ministerships in Trade, Industry and Competition; Finance; Small Business Development; and Electricity and Energy. Arguably the most significant or powerful position allocated to the DA is that of Minister of Home Affairs (Leon Schreiber), followed by that of Agriculture (John Steenhuisen) and Basic Education (Siviwe Gwarube).

Of the 11 parties in the GNU, six are represented in the cabinet (ANC, DA, IFP, FF Plus, PAC and GOOD) and five are among the deputy ministers (ANC, DA, Al Jama-ah, IFP and UDM). That means in total 8 of the 11 parties are represented in the national executive, while 3 have been left out completely.

Apart from being given a deputy ministership at Finance, the DA was largely kept out of the related cluster of ministries despite it seeking such positions for itself in order to influence economic policy, direction and discourse. Overall, it seems the DA eventually settled for significantly less than it had originally asked for.

Difficult functioning and decision-making could tear it apart

Will this very bloated and very diverse national executive be able to perform much better than its predecessor? That’s an open question. Its very diversity and multiplicity of political parties will make that very difficult. In contradiction of popular perceptions and expectations, the new parties in the executive will not be free to change policy and direction in their portfolios as they see fit. Decisions will still be subject to cabinet debate and voting, while party caucuses and party executive bodies will want their pound of flesh as well. And Ramaphosa as president who presides at cabinet meetings, will or should have a decisive say. Afterall, he is the head of government.

This is where the ANC’s majority at 40%, and the influence and control of its powerful NEC will significantly come into play. During the inter-party negotiations for cabinet positions, it became patently clear that Ramaphosa nor even the ANC’s top seven officials had sole or overwhelming discretionary powers; instead, the NEC played a big role from behind the scenes. After the DA had already accepted an offer from Ramaphosa of certain positions that included Trade, Industry and Competition, it was the NEC that forced him to renege and instead offer the DA fewer and lesser positions outside the centre of the economic cluster, a move that almost scuppered the GNU.

If this kind of negotiating in bad faith with behind-the-scenes interference from the ANC’s NEC is duplicated in the GNU cabinet going forward, it will spell plenty of trouble. The question is, just how unavoidable will such pressures be, not only from the ANC’s party structures but also from those of the DA and possibly the others.

Finally, another as yet unresolved issue is the question of who will make up the Official Opposition in the National Assembly? It stands to reason that parties and their officials cannot be both in government and in the legislative opposition, and yet, it is expected that a number of chairperson’s position of parliamentary committees will be allocated to the parties of the GNU. Already firing some warning shots across the bows of the GNU, are the EFF and Jacob Zuma’s uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MK) who have said their joint Progressive Caucus will fulfil that role. Yet they will only have a minority of the seats in the National Assembly.

In the final analysis, President Ramaphosa has presented to South Africans and the world, a bloated, unwieldy and highly diverse national executive, without any precedent to guide it in its work. Rules will be made up as it goes along, while the propensity for deadlocks and bitter arguments and policy tensions will be significant. Whether this executive will be able to effectively address high unemployment, runaway crime, the horrific cost of living, and water and electricity pressures as demanded by the voters in survey after survey, remains to be seen. But under the circumstances and given the many diverse influencing factors, it’s probably the closest to the best anyone could have hoped for. Providing it gets passed its initial teething troubles, it might just work, but the ride will probably be rough. Time will tell.

Stef Terblanche is a Cape Town-based independent political analyst and journalist.