By: Stef Terblanche
Over the years democracy as an institution of government by the people for the people has often been accused of having inherent weaknesses that sometimes produce unintended bad consequences. It can even be its own worst enemy when it’s abused by bad actors to attain absolute dictatorial power, with many such examples over the past century and more, in some ways even going back to Julius Ceasar and the Roman Republic.
But even so, its apparent vulnerabilities fail to overshadow its more widely spread power to bring about fairer, more just and caring societies; a power that can also force recalcitrant political entities and individual practitioners to adapt and change… for the common better of the people.
Are we seeing one such moment in our own history right now? A moment in which the African National Congress (ANC), South Africa’s ruling party of the last 30 years and now the lead party in a multi-party government of national unity (GNU), is being forced to reform itself and perhaps some of its policies for the better? Or if it’s not quite reforming is it at least willing to rethink some of its more controversial positions at this juncture? It certainly seems so.
Of course, the GNU has been in existence for only just over two months now and it’s far too early to pronounce a definitive judgement on the direction the ANC might be or not be taking within this new dispensation forced upon it by the people. Or more correctly, forced upon it by a small majority of voters as there were actually more voting-eligible people who did not vote than actually voted if we also count those who did not register.
Perhaps that’s one of democracy’s weaknesses in that a little more than half of a voting minority – 58.6% – can determine the fate of the entire majority. But is there any better system around? And if this democratic expression is responded to and managed responsibly and correctly, surely the non-voters may reconsider and eventually join the voting minority to create a participating majority. For people to buy into it, democracy must be attractive and not seen to be failing.
Nonetheless, in a single election on 29 May, the democratic power of the people changed the fate of the ANC and the political trajectory that brought us to that point. And already there are some welcome signs in what this change may be positively bringing about in return.
Before this election the ANC had been a leftist-leaning, at times pragmatically compromising party with arguably a socialist programme premised on its controversial National Democratic Revolution (NDR) doctrine supplemented with periodic instalments of its Strategy & Tactics offering. Sometimes it spoke more socialism than actually doing socialism, and vice versa. In many respects after 1994 it was a party searching for its true ideological identity. The pre-1994 one did not always fit so well in a modern, democratic and post-Soviet Union world.
But in the meantime, that did not prevent it from clinging to much of its socialist roots. Its inexperience in government simultaneously showed like soiled underwear while the human and moral quality, or lack thereof, of many of its practitioners increasingly undermined the good of the people. Through its policy of unqualified cadre deployment, it sought total control of all the levers of state power. And it also followed an often racially discriminatory programme ostensibly to correct the racial imbalances and ills of the apartheid past.
In a number of instances elements of its socialist redistributive ambitions and its quest for centralised control seeped through into its various policy and legislative positions, forced upon us top-down without much or any public consultation. A recent example is the National Health Insurance Act. Arguably, many citizens may have benefitted or stood to benefit from some of this, but equally so, many were being or stood to be excluded and adversely affected – not a justifiable part of the ideal bottom-line of any true democracy, one might argue.
By and large, the ANC had unfettered power to do as it pleased, only occasionally held in check by the independent courts and the Constitution. As a consequence of its seemingly unfettered control of state power and resources, during the latter half of its 30-year rule, wholly unwelcome and widely despised state capture, corruption and appallingly poor political and administrative management plunged the country into crisis. Despite at times very noisy public opinion, the ANC seemed tone-deaf and simply steamrolled ahead. Empty, unfulfilled and belated promises of improvement later became part of the political fare, the failure of these to materialise worsening the already destructive status quo.
Very fast South Africa was becoming one of the worst examples of democracy and government gone wrong – until the power of democracy and the people spoke as they had always been intended to, putting their foot down on May 29 in no uncertain terms.
While many unsolicited clichés have been attributed to these events after the fact, such as the nice sounding one that the people decided no party should have a majority as if that could be determined by the voters in advance, the matter of the fact is: by hook or by crook, on May 29 the voters took away the ANC’s unchallenged power. They demanded change…and got it.
To fully appreciate what that change may be bringing about, we need to revisit the past 30 years, lest we forget and miss where we might be headed now.
The first 13 years of post-1994 democracy under Mandela and Mbeki
This was arguably the bloom period of ANC majority government, first in a self-imposed GNU under Nelson Mandela, and then under the ANC by itself led by Thabo Mbeki. In these 13 years, South Africa enjoyed:
However, by 2007 the SA Communist Party (SACP) became dissatisfied with what it viewed as Mbeki and Manuel’s neo-liberal policies, successful as they were, referring to it as the “1996 class project” and, with help from other actors in the ANC-led Alliance, removed Mbeki and eventually replaced him with Zuma. What followed were years of destruction.
The next 17 years of post-1994 democracy under Zuma and Ramaphosa
The aftermath of the ANC’s 2024 defeat
By May 29 this year, the people of South Africa had had enough – the ANC received a beating at the polls, shedding 17 percentage points from its 57% in 2019 to 40% in this year’s elections. And from its peak of almost 70% in 2004, the ANC had by now shed almost 30 percentage points. Seeing its support sliding further in opinion polls in the two years leading up to these elections, the ANC miscalculated the public mood and responded by hastily passing into law some of its more radical policy options. This failed to prevent its loss of power.
To remain relevant with a continued stake in governing South Africa, it was forced to enter into a GNU with 9 other parties – the Democratic Alliance (DA), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), GOOD Party, Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus), Patriotic Alliance (PA), Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), United Democratic Movement (UDM), RiseMzansi, and al Jama-ah. One party had left it.
To his credit, and perhaps also humbled by defeat and sensing that he had a second chance to finally deliver on his 2017 promises and leave a better legacy, Ramaphosa resisted pressure from within his own party and Alliance for a coalition with the radical EFF and instead opted for a GNU that included the liberal, moderate and centrist market- and business-friendly DA and IFP as the two “anchor tenants” alongside the ANC. The formation of this GNU created an invigorating new sense of optimism in South Africa and abroad, and the markets responded positively with the rand strengthening significantly.
Arguably, all of this was bound to have a moderating influence on the Ramaphosa-led ANC. So, after the prosperity of the first 13 years and the destructive chaos of the next 17, could it be that South Africa finally stands on the verge of that elusive “new dawn”?
Is the ANC busy reforming in a shift towards the moderate centre?
As mentioned before, it’s too early to tell with certainty or if so, the extent, but there certainly are signs of something being underway in the ANC. If not a moderating reformist trend, then at least a rethink of some policies and more leftist/radical positions.
For their own political survival in a governing capacity, Ramaphosa and the ANC are arguably reliant on the cooperation of the moderate centre parties in the GNU. These parties offer a sizeable and influential counter balance to the ANC and the other small parties of a more left-leaning persuasion. All the parties, including the ANC, have signed up to make consensus decisions, which means for the first time in almost three decades the voice of moderate centrist parties will carry significantly more weight. This will influence the policy direction of not only the GNU, but by necessity also that of the ANC, and may act as a brake on the radical, socialist or populist tendencies of the more left-leaning parties of the GNU.
So, what has the ANC committed to so far?
These are just some of the early reformist benefits arising from the formation of the GNU and the ANC committing to them – there are more. But suffice it to say, that these already bode extremely well for recovery and growth, for business, trade, investment, jobs, pverty alleviation and development.
Of course, there are always dangers too that could disturb the balance and upset such a trend, not least of all coming from within the ANC but even more so from its Alliance partners, bringing back the spectre of the 2007 removal of Mbeki. Two jarring developments that seem to go against the grain of this hypothesis concern signs that, following the tensions between the EFF and MKP lately, it appears the EFF is moving closer to the ANC and the IFP, at least in KwaZulu-Natal where the MKP is strongest. This may have future implications for the composition of the GNU.
The other issue concerns Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi insisting on TV that he would not scrap Section 33 of the current National Health Insurance Act which states that medical aids in their current form will be scrapped, even if it means the collapse of the GNU. This refers to strong opposition from the DA and several other parties in the GNU to this particular clause. Motsoaledi somewhat arrogantly asserted, “We (the ANC) are not in an alliance with the DA; we just went into the GNU because the situation demanded it…” Whether Motsoaledi will be supported by Ramaphosa in his stance, remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, while the radical left is in disarray, it’s a fluid situation that could again change and yet produce a threat to the GNU in its current form. Also, differences in the ANC over the form and makeup of the GNU, could open wider divisions in the ANC in future. However, so far none of these potential threats have manifested themselves in any major or meaningful way. So, by all indications, South Africa may just be finding itself on the verge of a new inspirational era of progress, growth and prosperity, led by a reform-minded Ramaphosa and ANC in a largely centrist GNU. What we may be seeing, is democracy positively at work… in real time.
Stef Terblanche is an independent Cape Town-based political analyst and journalist.