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POLITICAL AND CIVIL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA:

CHANGES AND TRANSITIONS

BY PAUL KARIUKI, STANLEY EHIANE AND BHEKITHEMBA MNGOMEZULU


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Political and Civil Leadership in Africa: Changes and Transitions

Paul Kariuki, Stanley Osezua Ehiane, and Bhekithemba R Mngomezulu

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Contents

Foreword i
Prof David Sebudubudu

Author Biographies iii

Abbreviations and Acronyms vii

Contextual Background ix
Bheki R. Mngomezulu, Paul Kariuki & Stanley Osezua Ehiane

Chapter One: Extension of Presidential Terms of Office and Their Implications for Political and Civic Leadership in Africa: Pre and Post-Independence Era 1
Esther Adebimpe Ofusori

Chapter Two: The Socio-political Impact of the Void Left by Weak Relations Between Civil and Political Leadership in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Botswana and South Africa 23
Bheki R. Mngomezulu

Chapter Three: Examining the Role of Civil Society in African Transitional Politics: A Comparative Analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic 45
Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu

Chapter Four: Political and Civil Society Elites, Governance, and Service Delivery: Lessons from Kenya and Rwanda 73
Wanja M. Douglas

Chapter Five: Mitigating the Challenges of Political Transition in Nigeria and Ghana 93
Maria Lauda Joel Goyayi

Chapter Six: Impact of Political and Civil Leadership on Political Changes and Transitions in North Africa: Egypt and Tunisia Case Studies 111
Temidayo Ofusori

Concluding Remarks 135
Bheki R. Mngomezulu

Foreword

The conjectural literature has shown that leadership is consequential to the success or even failure of any country, yet it is often taken for granted, especially in developing countries. Despite leadership being such an important determinant, there is a dearth of political studies that seek to conceptualise and offer an in-depth understanding of leadership. The African continent, in particular, is replete with examples of leaders who failed to model their countries despite the potential they held in terms of the resources they command. In the last 50 years or so, African countries, like the rest of the world, have experienced the winds of change that led to transitions in civil and political leadership in several countries. In most instances, these transitions initially brought a sense of hope, but they came and went without transforming the lives of the majority, in turn giving rise to disenchantment and resentment. As a result, these transitions have not brought any meaningful and tangible benefits for the majority of people. This calls for the need for scholars to continue to interrogate the concept of leadership to understand why these transitions failed the way they did.

Scholars have generated several volumes dedicated towards transitions in Africa, especially on the causes and challenges that attended these transitions on the continent. However, there is limited literature focusing on political and civil leadership in Africa, thus downplaying a critical aspect that impacts transitions in Africa. This book, *Political and Civil Leadership in Africa: Changes and Transitions*, is opportune and appropriate in that it unravels and presents a persuasive account of the complexities associated with civil and political leadership in Africa. This volume interrogates the dichotomy, the interactions and the power struggles between civil and political leadership and why this has led to political instability in some cases, which is critical to understanding the nature of leadership that is prevailing on the continent. This has in turn given rise to pressures for reform. To this end, the book examines the contributions of leadership to development. The book offers examples of successful and challenging transitions across the continent – thus showing the importance of leadership in development.

I would like to appreciate and indeed congratulate the authors for generating such a compelling and persuasive volume that students of political science, those interested in the study of leadership,

researchers and practitioners would find useful and relevant, especially at a time when transitions in Africa are considered to be regressing, stalled and even deferred. I thus approve and recommend this volume to the reader, as it offers a compelling account of the subject of political and political leadership in Africa.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
APC	All Progressive Congress
APGA	All Progressive Grand Alliance
AU	African Union
CJID	Center for Journalism Innovation & Development
CPP	Convention People's Party
CRA	Commission for Revenue Authority
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution
EACC	Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission
EC	Electoral Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FBOs	Faith-Based Organisation
INEC	Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission
KANU	Kenya African National Union
MCAs	Member of County Assembly
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisation
NPP	New Patriotic Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PPP	Progressive People's Party
RCD	Constitutional Democratic Indicator
RGS	Rwanda Governance Scorecard
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
SDP	Social Democratic Party
UDA	United Democratic Alliance
UGT	Tunisian General Labour Union.
WGI	World Governance Indicator

Contextual Background

Bheki R. Mngomezulu, Paul Kariuki & Stanley Osezua Ehiane

Leadership is irrefutably a very complex phenomenon; one that should not be interpreted simplistically without considering its nuances. Part of the reason is that this concept is defined from different perspectives, including the attributes of individual leaders (Rotberg, 2003; Peele, 2005). Apart from the different definitions associated with this concept, leaders tend to lead differently, with different styles of leadership, earning them different labels based on how they lead. Thus, reference is made *inter alia* to various styles of leadership. These include, but are not limited to, democratic leadership, autocratic leadership, transactional leadership, transformational leadership, laissez-faire leadership, and many other leadership styles. Within this context, a distinction is made between civil and political leadership. This is the dichotomy which the present book focuses on.

Initial observation leads to the conclusion that the African continent has experienced significant changes in its civil and political leadership connections, with political change and transition in the recent past. At times, civil and political leadership compete for supremacy. When this power struggle ensues between the two types of leadership, the public suffers. As the saying goes, "When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers." For example, a feud between a traditional leader and a councillor could stall development. The former is the custodian of the land while the latter has access to financial resources. For development to happen, they must always work together for the betterment of society.

As a norm, transition is not a bad thing – provided it is done properly and with good intentions. In some cases, there are regular presidential elections in countries as per the constitutions of those countries. However, there are also instances where irregular transitions happen. This speaks to the mode of operation, not the act itself. In the recent past, tensions have arisen between presidential successors and their predecessors, making the transition uneasy. The "blame game" has gained currency. Recently, in South Africa and Zimbabwe, Presidents Ramaphosa and Mnangagwa claimed to be bringing what they called "The New Dawn" to their respective countries (Mngomezulu, 2023). They did this to embarrass Former

Presidents Zuma and Mugabe. This was even though they were still going to implement the same policies of the ANC and ZANU-PF. Here, the political leadership had a rift. When the civil leadership joins this debate, the discussion takes a different turn.

In other instances, the transition is followed by political instability. Whenever this happens, the civil and political leadership blame one another for the resultant political turmoil. Corruption, abuse of power, lootocracy, nepotism, human rights violations and other causal factors have triggered political changes and transitions in many African countries. Moreover, in other cases, people rise against the state establishment in demand of democracy or accountability by the political leadership. Countries such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), eSwatini, Zimbabwe, and many others have experienced political commotion aimed at changing governments. Furthermore, relations between civil and political leadership in Africa generally have often threatened state security, thereby negatively undermining prospects for African development (Ake, 1996; Wyrebek, 2022; Scott, 2023). In response, the state resorts to draconian ways of containing the situation. These include the suppression of public opinion and people's democratic rights. Actions such as the imposition of a "state of emergency," and shutting down social networks or the internet, are used to silence the citizenry. In such instances, civil leadership challenges the political leadership.

Therefore, this book seeks to analyse these interactions between and among civil and political leadership and their impact on political changes and transitions in the African continent. Among others, the book assesses the role and impact of civil and political leadership in political changes and transitions in Africa; the relations of civil and political leadership between them and state security agencies, and the impact this has on political outcomes; political governance and transition; external influences on political changes and transition in Africa; and other factors that affect political change and transition in Africa. Where examples from other countries are cited, this is done for comparative purposes only.

Structurally, the book has six chapters in which the themes enumerated above are enunciated and expounded by various authors. To assist the reader, the synopsis of each of these chapters is presented below.

Chapter One discusses the extension of presidential terms of office and their implications on civic and political leadership in Africa. It reminds us that civic and political leaders in Africa occupy key positions in different sectors. These include presidents, deputy presidents, ministers, and ordinary members of the government sector. In these capacities, they are responsible for shaping government, governing their countries, and overseeing the development and progress of a country. The chapter notes that the duration of presidential terms in Africa varies from one country to the other. It then proffers the view that extending presidential terms of office can affect both civic and political leadership, thereby threatening democratic principles and accountability. In other words, this leads to political instability. Some countries fight extensions through public protests and legal confrontations where civic leaders become visible, while others extend their terms with little or no resistance. Noticeably, there are African countries which do not have limits on presidential terms. Consequently, their presidents often serve indefinitely for a long period. The chapter acknowledges that the extension of presidential terms is a violation of democratic principles. This is so because democratic governance involves periodic election of new leaders when the current leader has completed their term. Term extensions can undermine the democratic process and stand against the rule of free and fair elections. In addition, extending presidential terms can suppress the growth of new civic and political leadership because younger generations may find it challenging to participate in political processes when leadership is dominated by a few individuals over an extended period. Data and information in this chapter are sourced from the internet, books, and online literature. This chapter addresses the roles of civic and political leadership in Africa, the duration of presidential terms in some countries in Africa, the effects of extending presidential terms on civic and political leadership in Africa, and, lastly, ways of addressing the effects of the extension of presidential terms on the African continent.

Chapter Two discusses the socio-political impact of the lack of close cooperation between the civil and political leadership in African societies. This theme is expounded through a case study of Botswana and South Africa. It is a Southern African contribution to the book's theme on civil and political leadership in Africa. The chapter argues that one indubitable fact is that leadership is a very complex phenomenon that calls for adaptability, constant capacitation of the leaders, dedication, diligence, and a clear vision, among other things. It warns that should any of these and many other characteristic traits

be deficient or absent in a leader, it is inevitable that leadership suffers immensely – with devastating effects on those who are supposed to be led. One observation made in this chapter is that in the African context, there has been a constant cry of leadership deficit. This assertion is buttressed by intermittent wars, lack of development, instances of corruption, attempts to cling to power beyond the constitutional mandate, and election irregularities. The chapter continues to aver that other factors such as nepotism and the unwillingness of the leadership to embrace meritocracy when appointing office-bearers have contributed immensely to some of Africa's challenges. Another equally important factor cited in this chapter is the lack of cooperation between the civil and political leadership. It laments that instead of working together as a team, these leaders perceive each other as enemies. Sometimes they are pitted against each other by those they lead or by private companies. Against this backdrop, using the case study approach, the chapter enumerates factors which keep civil and political leadership apart. It then proffers ideas on what African governments could do to address this issue. The chapter concludes that strong relations between civil and political leadership are critical in ensuring the betterment of the lives of the African people in all spheres. Lastly, the chapter recommends that these relations should be constantly nurtured and strengthened for posterity.

Chapter Three explains the growing pressures for political reform and ever-increasing demand for political change, particularly in developing countries. The chapter observes that civil society continues to play a crucial role in lobbying, advocacy and mobilising citizens to take mass action. In Africa, however, the chapter notes that the contribution and impact of civil society to governance, politics and political transition outcomes is increasingly compromised, undermined and impeded by the widespread capture of civil society organisations by overly powerful and influential political figures and institutions, as well as the persistence of a toxic political environment that is not conducive for lobbying and advocacy, and the complete disregard for the inputs and contributions of civil society in political processes. Despite all these challenges, the chapter notes that civil society organisations in Africa continue to play a vital role to influence and shape the direction, form, and nature of political change before, during and after political transitions. Using a comparative analysis of the DRC and CAR, this chapter examines the role of civil society in African transitional politics. Specifically, the analysis makes use of secondary data sources in the form of books, journal articles, media

reports, government reports, biographies, and other documentary material to establish the extent to which civil society organisations have influenced the direction and outcome of transitional politics in the DRC and CAR as they play their adversarial, collaborative and communication roles in these two countries. The concepts of *civil society* and *political transitions* provide a conceptual framework for analysis. Findings from the analysis assist in providing an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of civil society contributions to political transitions in the DRC and CAR.

Chapter Four discusses the differences between Kenya and Rwanda's political and governance systems. Whereas Kenyans feel democratic but angry due to harsh economic realities, the Rwandese people seem to be enjoying the autocratic fruits through improved service delivery and economic stability. One observation in this chapter is that comparisons of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), populations, cultures, resilience, and per capita incomes alone have not sufficed to tell the real stories of the discrepancies witnessed between these two economies. This chapter sets out to find answers in the political systems and governance structures, paying attention to the role that citizens play in determining their fates in claiming their legitimacy as the sovereign determinants of the quality of services they receive from their elected leaders and governments. The chapter critically elucidates the nature, quality, and role of the political class, thought leaders, and civil society elites in governance and service delivery. The chapter uses available survey data on the quality of democracy and governance in Africa by Afrobarometer, World Governance Indicators, empirical reviews of country-specific literature, historical case studies of elites at the helms of leadership, and cross-examining of sociodemographic indicators as proxies for good governance and democracy. Through a blend of quantitative and thematic analyses and approaches, the chapter provides a crisp analysis of the realities that Kenyans and Rwandese citizens have to grapple with, even as they clamour for improved political climates where they can hold their civil and political elites to account for the delivery of quality public goods, and a conducive environment for the provision of private goods. In culmination, it is expected that the lessons drawn from studying the two countries will provide a succinct nexus among governance, democracy, elites, and service delivery. These lessons yield recommendations that other African countries can adopt, cognisant of the fact that politics, good governance, elites and public service delivery are inseparable allies.

Chapter Five presents transition periods in political leadership as critical junctures that can significantly shape the trajectory of a nation's development and stability, particularly in Africa. The chapter answers the specific question; how do governments in Africa mitigate the challenges threatening collaborative efforts as far as political leadership is concerned? It examines strategies employed in navigating such transitions, drawing insights from the experiences of Ghana and Nigeria, two prominent countries on the continent. The chapter observes that transitioning political leadership in Nigeria and Ghana is often marred by complex challenges, including political tensions, socio-economic disparities, and institutional weaknesses. As Ghana and Nigeria mirror challenges typical to most African countries, the chapter contends that taking stock of their experiences and strategies in use shall inform a wider political leadership arena of African countries. The chapter further argues that mitigation of these challenges requires a multifaceted approach tailored towards the specific context of each nation. By analysing key historical events, governmental structures, and socio-political dynamics, this chapter aims to elucidate effective approaches to managing leadership transitions in African contexts. Specifically, the chapter examines the intricacies of fostering a culture of inclusive governance and stakeholder engagement, strengthening institutional resilience, investing in transparent electoral processes, and prioritising socio-economic development to shed light on how the wider African continent can learn and address existing political leadership challenges. With technology emerging as a transformative tool, the chapter centres its discussion on how embracing technology and innovation assists in employing the multifaceted approach to mitigate the obstacles and foster a smoother political transition.

Chapter Six examines the distinct but interconnected aspects of governance that play crucial roles in shaping societies. The chapter observes that North African countries, including Egypt and Tunisia, have experienced periods of authoritarian rule, often characterised by a concentration of power in the hands of a few political figures. Egypt and Tunisia have experienced challenges in promoting meaningful political and civil leadership. Egypt, on the one hand, has experienced shifts in political leadership, including the 2011 ousting of President Hosni Mubarak and subsequent political transitions, while Tunisia, on the other, has undergone a more successful transition towards democracy following the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Although the challenges experienced threaten collaborative efforts as far as their political and civil leadership is concerned, these challenges have,

however, been mitigated through various means. In consideration of the above-mentioned, this chapter aims to determine the impact of civil and political leadership on political changes and transitions in North Africa, taking Egypt and Tunisia as case studies. The chapter therefore examines the role and impact of civil and political leadership on political changes and transitions. It continues by exploring the relationship between civil and political leadership as well as the factors influencing them. It then highlights the relations of civil and political leadership with state security agencies and their impact on political outcomes. This chapter adopts a systematic literature review of relevant academic literature and books on the impact of civil and political leadership on political changes and transitions to achieve its objectives. The chapter concludes by reviewing political governance challenges and their mitigation strategies as well as external influences on political change and transition.

Flowing from the discussion above, several factors emerge. Firstly, leadership is an important phenomenon in any country. The country's success or failure depends on the type of leadership it has. For this reason, leadership is at the centre of the survival of any country across the globe. Secondly, while this book focuses on Africa, the issues raised transcend geographical boundaries. The various themes discussed in the six chapters are the essence of what happens when civil and political leadership pull in different directions. An adversarial relationship between the two types of leadership produces negative results. By contrast, a symbiotic and/or friendly relationship benefits the country in all spheres of life.

What is commendable in this book is that through its different case studies, it draws examples from different parts of the African continent. This approach assists in painting a broader picture than would be the case if the book focused solely on one country or region. The comparative and case study approaches used in this book are enriching, and present the reader with sufficient material for rumination.

The overall theme of the book has made it possible for the authors to have some leeway while engaging with it from different contexts and different regions. The authors have used the central theme as their anchor point, but successfully presented the offshoots of the theme through real case studies that are country-specific and/or draw from certain regions across the continent. For these reasons, the book will appeal to different audiences across Africa and beyond. As the African continent struggles with its reincarnation and reconfiguration

processes, it is of the utmost importance to take a closer look at leadership. By extension, revisiting the relationship between civil and political leadership is critical. Unless this relation is delineated and understood, it will be difficult to map the way forward for the African continent. Even plans such as Agenda 2063, as espoused by the African Union (AU), will amount to nothing unless leadership is fully understood with all its facets and nuances.

Therefore, this book achieves three aims. Firstly, it provides a theoretical understanding of leadership. Secondly, it traces the historical contexts of how Africa has reached its current situation. Thirdly, and most importantly, the book gives clear pointers on what Africans need to do to map the way forward. The fact that the book covers different parts of the African continent means that each region has something to learn from the cogently crafted arguments

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Chapter One

Extension of Presidential Terms of Office and Their Implications for Political and Civic Leadership in Africa: Pre and Post-Independence Era

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Introduction

Leadership is the ability to influence a group of individuals in order to achieve set goals (Abbas & Asghar, 2010). Political leaders hold formal positions of power within government structures. They are elected or appointed to represent and govern the interests of the populace. Their authority is derived from legal and institutional frameworks. Civic leaders, on the other hand, operate outside formal political structures (Abbas & Asghar, 2010). They lead non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups, or grassroots movements. Their authority often comes from their ability to mobilise people and resources around specific causes or issues (Ward & Marable, 2003). Since time immemorial, Africa has experienced a combination of different types of leadership, ranging from traditional to colonial rule, followed by modern democratic governance (Ayee, 2013). Before the 1950s, most African countries were under colonial rule, and traditional forms of governance varied greatly among countries (Young, 2012). Leadership structures were largely dictated by colonial powers, which set the stage for post-independence political dynamics (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012). Following the wave of independence that swept across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, many newly independent nations adopted democratic constitutions with fixed presidential terms. Leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya were among the first presidents of their respective countries (Prempeh, 2017).

In the era of independence, there was a shift towards democratic forms of government, in which regular elections were

held by countries in order to choose their leaders (Renwick, 2010). However, challenges such as corruption, political instability, ethnic tensions, and economic inequality have been obstacles to effective leadership and governance in many African nations (Oko, 2008; Fagbadebo, 2019). These challenges have often been exacerbated by factors such as weak associations, lack of infrastructure, and external interference (Oko, 2008). In spite of these challenges, some African nations still experience effective leadership, economic stability, economic growth, and social development under visionary leaders (Renwick, 2010). These leaders have focused on building strong institutions, unity, encouraging cooperation, and pursuing policies that prioritise the needs of the people (Hansen, 2009). Additionally, there is a growing recognition of the importance of youth leadership and women's participation in African governance (Mindzie, 2015). According to Madala (2018), young leaders and women are gradually playing more active roles in politics, civil society, and business, bringing new perspectives and priorities to the table (Madala, 2018). In Africa, leaders such as presidents have a term limit for service (Mangala, 2020). These limits can range from the short term to life, depending on the constitution of that country. Only about 33 out of 48 of the newly approved constitutions made provision for presidential terms of office (Omondi, 2015; Mangala, 2020). In the early 1990s, only six African countries had presidential term limits in their constitutions, with a maximum of two terms in office (Omondi, 2015; Mangala, 2020). In order to be able to serve for a longer period of time, about 30 countries contemplated removing term limits from their constitutions in 1998 (Omondi, 2015). Also, some of the appointees in some of the African countries tried to change the constitution to qualify them to be re-elected for a third term (Omondi, 2015). Some succeeded, while others, like Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, Fredrick Chiluba in Zambia, and Bakili Muluzi in Malawi, did not succeed in effecting changes to their constitution (Omondi, 2015). It is worth noting that presidents do not extend their terms of office without an election. In most cases, elections are held and appointees win without stress (Omondi, 2015). However, extending presidential terms can have significant implications on civic and political leadership, thereby reducing citizens' motivation and engagement with the political process, and decreasing prospects for meaningful change. Reactions to the extension of presidential terms can vary widely, and not all attempts to do so have the same consequences. Some countries have successfully resisted such extensions through legal

challenges, public protests, or international pressure. There is a view that extending presidential terms can provide political stability and promote continuity in leadership and policies (Versteeg et al., 2020). This is because it allows leaders to spend more time implementing long-term policies and programmes without the disruptions caused by frequent elections. However, extending presidential terms can lead to increased political instability because opposition groups may view term extensions as unfair, thereby leading to protests or coups against the incumbent president (Carbone & Pellegata, 2020).

Countries who engage in extension of presidential terms may face international scrutiny and criticism (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004). This can affect their relationships with democratic nations and international organisations, thereby leading to sanctions or decrease in foreign aid (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Omondi, 2015). Enforcing and strictly establishing constitutional limits on presidential terms can help prevent leaders from staying in power indefinitely and encourage political diversity (Omondi, 2015). Also, creating public awareness such as civic education about the importance of term limits, and the risks of their extension, can empower citizens to understand their rights and the significance of leadership change (Alex-Assensoh, 2005). This can foster greater political participation and advocacy for democratic norms by the citizens. This chapter addresses the roles of political and civic leadership in Africa, the duration of presidential terms in some countries in Africa, the reasons for extension of terms, the challenges of preventing it, the effects of extending presidential terms on political and civic leadership in Africa and lastly, ways of addressing the effects of extension of presidential terms of office in Africa (Couto, 2010).

Historical Background of The Extension of Presidential Terms of Office in Africa: Pre- and Post-Independence Era

The extension of presidential terms of office in Africa has been a recurrent issue with significant political and civic implications from the 1900s to the present day. In the pre-independence era, the concept of extending presidential terms of office in Africa did not exist as it does today. This is because African nations were primarily under colonial rule and did not have independent presidents or democratic systems (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012). Before colonial rule, African societies were governed by a variety of traditional rulers. Leadership often took the form of kings, chiefs, or councils of

elders, whose authority was generally rooted in custom, lineage, and local traditions. In the colonial rule era, leadership structures were largely dictated by colonial powers, which set the stage for post-independence political dynamics (Ocheni & Nwankwo, 2012).

Post-Independence Era

Following the wave of independence that swept across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s, many newly independent nations adopted democratic constitutions with fixed presidential terms. Leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya were among the first presidents of their respective countries (Angelo, 2020).

After gaining independence in the 1950s and 1960s, many African nations established constitutions that often included term limits for the president as a measure to prevent authoritarian rule. However, the immediate post-colonial period saw the rise of single-party states and military coups, leading to prolonged leadership tenures and, in many cases, the suspension or manipulation of constitutional term limits (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004).

During the Cold War Era, many African leaders received support from either the Western or Eastern unions, often allowing them to maintain power without significant internal opposition or concern for democratic norms. Leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC), and Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, managed to stay in power for decades. In the 1990s, at the end of the Cold War and the era of democracy wave, many African countries changed to multiparty systems and adopted new constitutions that reinforced presidential term limits (Reno, 2013).

In the early 2000s, as some African leaders reached their term limits, the trend of attempting to extend presidential terms through constitutional amendments began to emerge. Leaders such as Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso amended the constitution to extend his stay in power and set a precedent for others. In the late 2000s, some leaders, such as Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and Chad's Idriss Déby, successfully extended term limits. These amendments often faced domestic and international criticism but were justified by leaders on grounds of maintaining stability and continuity.

From the 2010s, the trend continued, with notable examples such as Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi. Some leaders were faced with significant opposition and protests as

seen in Burkina Faso in 2014 when Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign because he tried to alter the constitution (Waugh, 2004).

In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni initially was praised for bringing stability to Uganda. He has been in power since 1986 but in 2005, he successfully amended the constitution to remove term limits in 2005 and the age limit in 2017, allowing him to run for additional terms (Ginsburg et al., 2022).

José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola served as president from 1979 to 2017. Dos Santos stayed in power for nearly four decades by delaying elections and manipulating political processes. His long rule led to significant corruption and inequality, despite Angola's vast oil wealth (Koch, 2012).

Robert Mugabe led Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2017, initially as prime minister and then as president. His tenure saw multiple amendments to extend his rule, culminating in a near 40-year reign before his ejection (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015).

The first President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, served from 1990 to 2005. The constitution was amended to allow him a third term, after which he stepped down. While his extended term did not lead to significant unrest, it set a precedent for potential future extensions. In Rwanda, Paul Kagame has been in power since 2000. A 2015 referendum allowed him to extend his presidency beyond the two-term limit, potentially until 2034. Likewise, in Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara sought a controversial third term in 2020, arguing that a new constitution reset his term count, sparking political unrest (Van Baalen & Gbala, 2023).

There are various methods of extension adopted by leaders in office. Some of the methods include:

Constitutional Amendments: The most common method involves amending the constitution through parliamentary votes. These amendments can either remove term limits entirely or extend the number of terms a president can serve.

Judicial Interpretations: This involves the use of favourable court rulings to interpret term limits in a way that allows leaders to run for additional terms. Courts in some countries have been criticised for lacking independence and being influenced by the executive branch.

Referendums: Incumbents organise national referendums to seek public approval for constitutional changes, such as in Burundi under Pierre Nkurunziza and in Rwanda under Paul Kagame. Referendums

have been used to legitimise the extension of terms, although the fairness of these referendums is often disputed. Governments have sometimes used state resources and media to sway public opinion in favour of term extensions (Waugh, 2004).

Political Repression: This occurs when the state's apparatus is used to intimidate, arrest, or eliminate political opponents and activists, thereby reducing resistance to term extension efforts. Examples include Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi (Kelecha, 2021).

State of Emergency: States of emergency have been declared to crack down on opposition and justify the extension of terms, as seen in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia (Kelecha, 2021).

Election Delays: Postponing elections has been used to extend the current term under the pretext of national crises or emergencies, as seen in the DRC with Joseph Kabila (Kullenberg, 2019.

Fraudulent Elections: Rigging elections has been used to secure another term, as has been alleged in countries like Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015).

Political Leadership in Africa

Political leadership in Africa is a complex and dynamic phenomenon shaped by historical legacies, socio-economic conditions, and global dynamics (Carbone & Pellegata, 2020). Effective leadership requires good governance, commitment to democratic principles, and inclusive development that addresses the diverse needs and aspirations of African citizens (Thelma & Chitondo, 2024). Political leadership in Africa varies from one country to another, with some countries engaging in various political systems and others adopting democratic principles. However, countries that practise democratic principles often encounter challenges such as electoral fraud, political repression, and limited civil liberties. Some African countries have experienced prolonged periods of authoritarian rule characterised by strongman leaders who concentrate power in their hands, suppress opposition, and often prolong their rule through manipulation of elections or constitutional amendments (Dulani & Tengatenga, 2020). Despite challenges, many African countries have undergone democratic changes, with regular elections and peaceful transfers of power. However, these changes are often tentative, and can be reversed due to factors such as weak institutions, corruption, and political violence.

Ethnicity and tribalism is the order of the day in some political systems, where leaders mobilise support along ethnic lines, leading to division, conflicts, and of undermining national unity and stability (Berman, 1998). Another form of leadership is youth and women leadership, where there is a growing recognition of the importance of youth and women's participation in politics. Young leaders and women are increasingly advocating for their rights and playing active roles in politics, civil society, and business (Mindzie, 2015). Some African political leaders have adopted regional integration and cooperation as a means of addressing common challenges such as poverty, conflict, and underdevelopment. Regional organisations like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) play crucial roles in promoting peace, security, and development across the continent (Eugene & Abdussalam, 2022).

In some situations, external influences such as former colonial powers, international organisations, and foreign powers, often influence African politics through aid, trade, and geopolitical interests. While external assistance can support development efforts, it can also undermine sovereignty and create perpetuate dependency (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004).

Roles of Political and Civic Leadership

Political Leadership

Political leaders are responsible for making policies and addressing the needs and challenges of the country, such as economic development, healthcare, education, infrastructure, and security. They also decide on how resources are allocated within the country. This includes the allocation of budgets for social services, infrastructure projects, and public investment (Couto, 2010).

Other roles of political leaders include representing their constituents on both national and international platforms, advocating for the interests of the citizens in diplomatic negotiations and international forums, and ensuring compliance with the rule of law of the country. This is achieved by fostering transparent and accountable government institutions, as well as promoting democracy, human rights, and the protection of civil liberties (Couto, 2010).

Civic Leadership

Civic leaders serve as intermediaries between citizens and government officials. They identify the needs and priorities of the community, advocate for community interests and facilitate dialogue between different stakeholders. Advocating for social justice, human rights, and democratic principles is another crucial role of civic leaders. They also organise protests, campaigns, and other forms of activism to address societal issues and hold political leaders accountable (Couto, 2010).

Civic leaders engage in capacity-building activities to empower individuals and communities to participate actively in civic life. This includes providing education and training on topics such as civic engagement, leadership development, and grassroots organising (Couto, 2010).

They also monitor government actions and policies to ensure transparency, accountability, and adherence to the rule of law. By conducting investigations and making use of watchdogs, they curb corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations (Couto, 2010).

Presidential Terms of Office in Africa

A presidential term of office is the duration for which a president of a country spends in office in accordance to the constitution of that country. In Africa, presidential term limits vary from country to country due to differences in constitutions, political systems and historical backgrounds. Presidential term limits have been a subject of debate and contention in many African countries because they reflect a mixture of democratic norms, historical legacies, and political dynamics. Some countries adhere to term limits and regular electoral processes, while others face challenges related to political transition, authoritarianism, and constitutional manipulation. Below are some terms used regarding the duration of office of the president:

Terms used in extension of presidential terms

Term Length: In Africa, presidential terms range from four to seven years; some countries have longer terms, while others have shorter terms. In Nigeria and Ghana, for instance, presidential terms are four years, while in South Africa, it is five years. In Algeria and Zimbabwe, presidential terms were seven years before recent

constitutional amendments (Vencovsky, 2007). As of January 2022, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea held the title of the longest-serving president in Africa. He came to power in a coup in 1979, making him one of the continent's longest-serving leaders (Martino, 2023). In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, 78, has led his country for 36 years since January 1986. He was re-elected in January 2021 for a sixth term after a contested campaign. A Supreme Court ruling to abolish an age ceiling of 75 allowed him to stand once again and continue serving (Martino, 2023).

Term Limits: This is a legal constraint on the number of terms an elected person can spend in an elected position. Term limits in a presidential position serve as a means of restriction of monopoly, in which a president remains in office for life. Term limits may be a lifetime limit or a limit on the number of consecutive terms (Vencovsky, 2007). Many African countries adopted term limits to prevent lifetime presidential terms. There have been instances when leaders have ignored term limits or attempted to amend constitutions in order to extend their stay in office. Examples of such countries are Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda (Vencovsky, 2007; Tull & Simons, 2017).

Single-Term Presidencies: These are aimed at promoting political turnover and preventing the consolidation of power. Presidents are limited to serving only one term in office in single-term presidencies. Examples include Ghana, Mozambique, and Senegal (Tull & Simons, 2017).

No Term Limits: Some African countries have no term limits, or their term limits have been removed. This enables their presidents to serve for an indefinite number of terms. Examples include Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo (Tangri, 2006; Tull & Simons, 2017).

Transitional Arrangements: In certain cases, transitional arrangements have been implemented to facilitate political transition processes. This may involve interim or transitional governments with specific mandates and timelines, as seen in countries like Liberia and Sudan (De Groof, 2019).

Constitutional Amendments: Changes to presidential term limits often involve constitutional amendments, which can be contentious processes. In some cases, leaders have faced opposition or protests for attempting to amend term limits to extend their time in office (De Groof, 2019).

Election Processes: Election processes for presidents vary widely across Africa, ranging from direct popular votes to indirect or parliamentary systems. Elections can be marred by irregularities, fraud, or violence, affecting the legitimacy of the outcome and the stability of the political system (Omotola, 2010; Ayanleye, 2013).

Reasons for the Extension of Presidential Terms in Africa

Desire to Maintain Power: Incumbent leaders often seek to extend their terms to maintain political control and continue their policies. This desire for prolonged power can be fuelled by personal ambition, ideological goals, or fear of losing influence (Pakulski, 2012).

Economic Interests: Leaders in power may have significant economic interests, including access to state resources, patronage networks, and business ventures that they wish to protect and expand (Pakulski, 2012).

Weak Democratic Institutions: Lack of strong institutions may be one of the reasons for the extension of presidential terms. Many African countries have weak democratic institutions that fail to check the power of the executive branch effectively (Landau & Dixon, 2015).

Constitutional Manipulation: Leaders often manipulate constitutions through amendments or referendums to remove or extend term limits. This is facilitated by weak institutional checks and balances (Landau & Dixon, 2015).

Historical Norms: The historical precedent of extended or lifelong presidencies in some African countries sets a cultural norm. Leaders like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe or Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now known as the DRC) established long-term rule as a norm (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2021).

Legal and Political Reprisals: Former leaders often face the threat of legal prosecution, political persecution, or loss of personal wealth and safety once they leave office. Extending their terms can be seen as a way to ensure personal security (Byman, 2022).

Security and Stability Concerns: Some leaders argue that their continued leadership is necessary for national stability, especially in countries with ongoing conflicts or fragile political environments. They present themselves as indispensable for peace and continuity (Byman, 2022).

Challenges of Halting Presidential Term Extension in Africa

Halting presidential term extensions in Africa presents several complex challenges. These challenges are deeply rooted in the political, social, economic, and historical contexts of the continent. Lack of effective opposition or weak opposition parties is one of the challenges encountered. In many African countries, opposition parties are fragmented, underfunded, or suppressed, making it difficult to mount a credible challenge to term extensions (Dixon, 2019).

Repression of dissent is another challenge, with governments often using the state apparatus to suppress dissent, including censorship, imprisonment of opposition leaders, and intimidation of activists (Earl et al., 2022). In some instances, manipulation of electoral processes is used, including rigging elections, voter suppression, and tampering with results. This undermines efforts to prevent term extensions.

Many African leaders exhibit authoritarian tendencies, using their control over the state apparatus to suppress dissent, manipulate legal frameworks, and consolidate power. This includes deploying security forces to intimidate or eliminate political opponents of the ruling party, ensuring favourable outcomes. Also, democratic institutions such as the judiciary, legislature, and electoral commissions are often weak and lack independence. They are unable to effectively check executive power or enforce term limits. Lastly, extensive patronage networks, where loyalty is rewarded with access to state resources, create a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. These networks can co-opt potential challengers and reinforce the leader's grip on power (Earl et al., 2022).

Implications of Extension of Presidential Terms of Office

The extension of presidential terms of office can have a serious effect on the politics, socio-economic development and governance of a country. It goes against the idea of regular, free, and fair elections. Democratic governance relies on the periodic renewal of leadership through elections, and term extensions can undermine the democratic process. It is essential for countries to adhere to constitutional principles, respect term limits, and ensure transparent and accountable governance to uphold democratic values and promote the well-being of their citizens. However, there can be positive implications of extending presidential terms of office.

Below are the positive and negative implications of the extension of presidential terms:

Positive Implications:

- Continuity and stability: Extending presidential terms can provide stability by allowing leaders more time to implement long-term plans, policies and programmes without the interruption of frequent elections (Baker, 2002).
- Development and Progress: Longer terms may enable leaders to focus on development agendas that require sustained efforts over time, fostering economic growth, infrastructure development, and social progress (Chansa, 2020).
- Leadership Experience: Extended terms may allow leaders to accumulate more experience and expertise, potentially enhancing their ability to govern effectively and navigate complex challenges (Baker, 2002).
- Strategic Planning: Longer terms can facilitate strategic planning and implementation of policies aimed at addressing deep-rooted issues such as poverty, education, healthcare, and corruption (Chansa, 2020).
- Negative Implications:
- Violation of Democratic Principles: the extension of presidential terms can lead to the violation of democratic principles when power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual or political party. This may also lead to weakening of democratic institutions and suppression of political opponents. Opposition groups, civil society, and citizens may resist attempts to extend terms, leading to protests, strikes, or even violence (Amoah, 2023).
- Risk of Authoritarianism: Extending presidential terms can pave the way for authoritarianism, where leaders amass excessive power and suppress dissent to maintain their grip on power. This can result in human rights abuses, censorship, and a lack of accountability (Amoah, 2023).
- Economic Impacts: Political uncertainty and instability arising from attempts to extend presidential terms can have negative consequences on economic growth and investment. Businesses may hesitate to invest in countries with uncertain political environments, leading to reduced economic activity and employment opportunities (Amoah, 2023).

- Social Cohesion: Extension of presidential terms can exacerbate social divisions and tensions, particularly if it is perceived as favouring certain ethnic or political groups. This can undermine social cohesion and fuel inter-group conflicts, exacerbating existing cleavages within society (Siegle & Cook, 2021).
- International Relations: Attempts to extend presidential terms can strain diplomatic relations with other countries, particularly if they are perceived as undemocratic or in violation of constitutional norms. International organisations and foreign governments may impose sanctions or withhold aid in response to such actions (Amoah, 2023).
- Crises: Extending presidential terms without popular support or through unconstitutional means can lead to a crisis of legitimacy, where the government loses credibility and public trust. It can also trigger political unrest, protests, and even violent conflict, destabilising the country and the region. Political unrest and protests can undermine the effectiveness of governance and hinder efforts to address pressing challenges such as poverty, corruption, and insecurity (Wiebusch & Murray, 2019).
- Model for Future Leaders: Extending presidential terms sets a precedent for future leaders to follow suit, potentially perpetuating a cycle of authoritarianism and political manipulation. It can weaken democratic norms and institutions, making it difficult to establish a culture of democratic governance (Chansa, 2020).
- Impact on Civic Leadership: Extended presidential terms can suppress the growth of new civic and political leadership. Younger generations may find it challenging to engage in the political process when leadership is concentrated in the hands of a few individuals over an extended period. This can limit the emergence of fresh ideas and perspectives (Chrislip & O'Malley, 2013).
- Concentration of Power: Extended presidential terms often lead to the concentration of power in the hands of one individual or a select group. This concentration can result in lack of checks and balances, potentially leading to authoritarian tendencies and a weakening of other branches of government (Chrislip & O'Malley, 2013).
- Erosion of Rule of Law: The extension of presidential terms may involve changes to the constitution or legal frameworks (Versteeg et al., 2020). When these changes are made to suit the interests of those in power, it can undermine the rule of law. The perception that the legal system is manipulated for political gain can erode public trust in institutions (Versteeg et al., 2020).

- Potential for Political Instability: Attempts to extend presidential terms can lead to political instability, as opposition groups, civil society, and the general public may resist such moves. Protests, demonstrations, and conflicts may arise, threatening the overall stability of the country (Versteeg et al., 2020).
- Economic Consequences: Political instability resulting from attempts to extend presidential terms can have economic consequences. Investors may become wary, and economic development initiatives may be hampered, negatively affecting the overall well-being of the population (Chansa, 2020).
- Lack of Accountability: Longer terms can diminish the mechanisms of accountability as leaders become less responsive to the electorate, leading to unchecked corruption.

Building Effective Leadership in Africa

Promoting meaningful leadership that advances nation-states and the well-being of their citizens involves several key factors. These factors contribute to building effective governance, fostering social justice, and ensuring the health and stability of a nation. These factors are as follows:

Transparency: Effective leaders must be transparent. Ensuring that government decisions, processes, and actions are open to public scrutiny fosters trust among citizens and helps prevent corruption. Leaders must be accountable to the public and legal systems. This includes mechanisms like regular elections, checks and balances, and independent oversight bodies that hold leaders responsible for their actions (Hesselbein & Goldsmith, 2006).

Inclusive Participation: A meaningful leadership structure allows for the active participation of all citizens in political processes. This includes ensuring equal representation of marginalised groups and promoting diversity in leadership roles (Hesselbein & Goldsmith, 2006).

Rule of Law: Effective political and civil leadership relies on a robust legal system where laws are clear, consistently enforced, and apply to everyone, including leaders. This ensures stability and predictability in governance (Hesselbein & Goldsmith, 2006).

Ethical Leadership: Ethical leaders act with integrity, honesty, and a sense of duty. They prioritise the public good over personal interests,

promoting policies and decisions that benefit the majority (Lawton & Páez, 2015).

Social Justice and Equality: Leadership should aim to reduce inequality and promote social justice. This involves addressing systemic discrimination and ensuring equitable access to resources and opportunities for all citizens (Hesselbein & Goldsmith, 2006; Lawton & Páez, 2015).

Vision and Innovation: Effective leaders have a clear vision for the future and embrace innovation to address complex challenges. They are adaptable and willing to implement new policies or practices to meet changing needs (Johansen, 2012)

Effective Communication: Good leaders are effective communicators who engage with citizens, listen to their concerns, and explain policies clearly. Communication fosters public trust and strengthens the relationship between leaders and citizens (Chrislip & O'Malley, 2013).

Collaboration and Consensus Building: Leaders who collaborate with stakeholders and build consensus across political, social, and economic divides create a more stable and harmonious society (Johansen, 2012).

Strong Institutions: Meaningful leadership is supported by robust institutions, including independent judiciaries, free press, and civil society organisations. These institutions act as pillars of democracy and provide checks on executive power (Hesselbein & Goldsmith, 2006).

Education and Civic Engagement: Educated and engaged citizens are more likely to hold leaders accountable and participate in the political process. Promoting education and civic engagement creates a more informed populace that can contribute to effective governance (Chrislip & O'Malley, 2013).

Addressing the Effects of Extension of Presidential Terms on Political Systems in Africa

The extension of presidential terms of office in Africa can have significant impacts on democratic governance, political stability, and social justice. It is therefore imperative to address the effects of the extension of presidential terms on political system in Africa. Strengthening democratic institutions such as independent electoral commissions, the judiciary, and legislatures can help reduce the

effects. Independent electoral commissions ensure that free, fair and transparent election are conducted. By protecting such bodies from political interference, the credibility of election processes can be ensured, which in turn can foster trust in the democratic system. This can also reduce the risk of electoral fraud and manipulation, promoting genuine representation of the people's will.

Empowered legislatures are essential for effective governance and accountability. Strengthening the judiciary's autonomy and capacity helps in delivering timely and impartial justice, thus fostering public confidence in the legal system, reducing corruption and arbitrary use of power. The role of the legislature is to ensure proper lawmaking, provide adequate resources, and enhance transparency and inclusivity in legislative processes. A robust legislature acts as a counterbalance to executive power and ensures that policies reflect the diverse interests and needs of the population. Other remedies are:

- Advocating for legal frameworks that limit presidential terms and enforce accountability for leaders who attempt to change these laws (Moe & Gilmour, 2015).
- Working with international and local observers to ensure electoral transparency and integrity (Alvarez et al., 2009).
- Implementing robust mechanisms for monitoring and addressing electoral fraud, intimidation, and violence (Alvarez et al., 2009; Birch & Muchlinski, 2018).
- Supporting civil society groups, legal associations, and watchdogs that monitor governance and challenge unconstitutional actions (Alvarez et al., 2009).
- Using regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS to exert pressure on countries extending presidential terms (Birch & Muchlinski, 2018).
- Strengthening civil society organisations through funding, training, and protection from repression can help build a robust civic space that advocates for democratic norms and holds leaders accountable (Alvarez et al., 2009).
- Promoting a vibrant opposition: supporting the development of strong, cohesive opposition parties that can present credible alternatives to incumbents is essential. This includes ensuring fair access to media and resources (Teddy & Vhutuza, 2017).
- Raising public awareness about the importance of term limits and democratic principles through education and independent media can build public support for democratic governance (Benson & Powers, 2011).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the transition from traditional to colonial and then to independent governance laid the groundwork for the contemporary issues surrounding presidential term limits and extensions in Africa. Extending presidential terms may offer certain advantages in terms of stability and governance continuity; however, it can also pose significant risks to democracy, accountability, and political freedom. The decision to extend terms by leaders should be approached cautiously, with a strong commitment to upholding democratic principles, respecting constitutional limits, and ensuring robust mechanisms for accountability and checks on executive power. In Africa, the extension of presidential terms has been a contentious issue with varied implications across different countries and contexts. The future of political and civic leadership in Africa will depend on the ability of leaders to address the continent's unique challenges while exploiting its opportunities for growth and development. Halting the extension of presidential terms in Africa faces numerous challenges, which are deeply rooted in the political, economic, and social fabric of the continent. These challenges can be broadly categorised as political, institutional, sociocultural, and external factors. By addressing these challenges comprehensively, it is possible to create a more conducive environment for upholding presidential term limits and fostering democratic governance in Africa. There will be a need for inclusive governance, commitment to democratic values and human rights, and effective institutions. Proper strategies must also be employed to contribute to creating a political and civil leadership structure that advances nation-states and ensures the well-being of their citizens.

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Chapter Two

The Socio-political Impact of the Void Left by Weak Relations Between Civil and Political Leadership in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Botswana and South Africa

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Introduction

Leadership is a serious business, and venturing into this terrain must be a conscious decision. Leadership is one of the critical elements for growth and development (Leftwich, 2009; Lyne de Ver, 2009). It needs vision, sacrifice, tolerance, dedication, determination, diligence, and a clear understanding of macro- and micro-politics. Any leader who lacks these characteristic traits is bound to fail. A leader who is not open to fresh ideas cannot go far. Dialogue is a prerequisite for successful leadership. Generally, "Leaders often display the all-too-human characteristic of talking only or mostly to people with whom they agree. Yet, to be effective as a leader in many circumstances requires reaching out and engaging in dialogue with those who one may fundamentally disagree with and may even view as an enemy" (Perreault, 2012, p.237).

Corroborating these views, Mandela (1998, cited in Hatang & Venter, 2011, p. 147) stated that "real leaders must be ready to sacrifice all for the freedom of their people." Without sacrifice, no leadership will survive (Carter, 1998, pp. 96-112). Such sacrifices entail being amenable to and accommodating new ideas. Therefore, civil and political leadership must find each other and work together, not for their own sake but for the sake of their followers. Their personal egos and self-interests should take a back seat. Failure to do so could inevitably have a negative socio-political impact on people's lives. When this happens, prospects for revolt against the leadership would be significantly increased.

African countries in general, and Southern Africa countries in particular, have suffered immensely due to lack of cooperation between civil and political leadership. As these two types of leadership pull apart, the masses feel the pinch. As the saying goes, "when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers."

Against this backdrop, the present chapter discusses the socio-political impact of the void left by weak relations between civil and political leadership in Southern Africa. To achieve this goal, Botswana and South Africa are used as case studies. This was a deliberate choice. Botswana used to be a British Protectorate before obtaining independence in 1966. South Africa was under British rule between 1795 and 1803, and again from 1806 until 1910. Between 1910 and 1960, Britain still had some influence on South Africa. It was only in 1961 that South Africa became a republic and officially cut ties with Britain.

Therefore, comparing and contrasting Botswana and South Africa when discussing relations between civil and political leadership will shed light on the complexity of this subject and demonstrate its socio-political impact on different communities. As shall be discussed below, Botswana personifies success. South Africa, however, is an example of how things can easily go wrong if there is a leadership crisis or a leadership deficit.

In explicating issues of civil and political leadership, the chapter looks at the need for having a common purpose or working towards achieving a common goal – not just by the leadership per se but also by the public which works with such a leadership. Ewald (2001, p.5) espoused the view that "civil behaviour and intent is supported when parties share a common ground, have common values, and are motivated to preserve that commonality." This view is corroborated by Shils (1997) who vehemently argues that any hope for success in achieving any goal requires enough commitment by all parties involved to periodically put the common good above self-interest. In other words, any leader who is worth the label should aspire to put other people's interests first, not to advance self-interests. Therefore, whether one falls within civil or political leadership, the same agenda of serving people's interests should be the one which guides the leadership's actions.

The reality is that "civility is threatened when there are perceived inequities, unequal access to resources, where conflict is high, dogma or ideological politics present, and individualism is

excessive or strongly encouraged" (Ewald, 2001, p. 5). Implicit in this statement is that any leadership which places itself and its interests highest on the agenda sets itself up for failure at best and digs its own grave at worst. This applies to both civil and political leadership.

However, as discussed later in this chapter, civil leadership is closer to the people compared to political leadership. This is because the former spends more time with the people at the local level. It is for this reason that civil leadership is easily acceptable to the masses compared to the political leadership. But this does not mean that civil leadership should not constantly do self-introspection to check if it has not derailed from its founding principles. Community leadership development programmes "often strive to cultivate civic leadership as an approach that involves citizens in activities and efforts which serve the common good" (Wahl, 2012, p.v). The saying "nothing about us without us" is applicable here. Agency is not outsourced to the leadership. People also participate. Therefore, the juxtapositioning of the two types of leadership is important.

Structurally, the chapter will first focus on conceptual definitions. This will set the scene so that the reader has a good appreciation of what is meant by some of the key concepts used in the chapter. Once this goal has been achieved, it will be necessary to explain why it is necessary for the two types of leadership to work together. The argument to be advanced here is that each type of leadership serves a particular purpose. This section will be followed by a comparative analysis of Botswana and South Africa. This will be done to provide concrete examples on the theme of the chapter. This section shall be followed by some discussion on what needs to happen going forward to narrow the gap between civil and political leadership and why. This penultimate section shall be followed by concluding remarks.

Conceptual Definitions

In the realm of research, conceptual definition is generally accepted as conventional or standard practice by many researchers. This is because there is always the temptation to assume that concepts are self-explanatory and thus need no explanation to assist the reader. This usually happens where concepts have been used regularly to the extent that their meaning is assumed to be universal. Whether the usage is right or wrong does not really matter. The assumption is that everyone knows what each concept means, thus nullifying any

argument for the need to define it. The reality, however, is that this is not always the case. Some concepts are context-specific. As soon as the context changes, so does the meaning of the concept used. Secondly, there is the time factor. The meanings of certain concepts are time-specific. Over time, some concepts assume different meanings which must be captured. Thirdly, readers and listeners do not constitute a homogeneous group. Therefore, their level of understanding is not the same. While it is true that some readers and listeners might understand what each concept means, others might not. To accommodate everyone, it is advisable to explain key concepts in any writing to place everyone on the same wavelength. This is the basis for inserting this section in the present chapter and placing it at the beginning so that all readers can move forward together. The concepts defined in this section are leadership, civil leadership, and political leadership.

Leadership

Defining the term "leadership" is not a simple exercise. Part of the reason is that there is no one-size-fits-all definition (Peele, 2005; Lyne de Ver, 2009). This means that some definitions are predicated on certain assumptions and premises. For example, when defining this concept, some authors place emphasis on certain attributes of both leadership and leaders (Rotberg, 2003; Peele, 2005; Leftwich, 2009). This leads to context-based definitions that cannot be deemed to be universal. Confirming this view from a health profession perspective, Woods (2010, p.1) recalled that "at one time, I thought I knew a great deal about the topic of leadership, personally falling prey to the very sort of linear logic that hamstrings thinking and innovation in health care." This was a clear admission that it is foolhardy to assume that one fully understands the meaning of a concept in all contexts. By constantly educating oneself, one can grow and know better. It is important to admit that some conceptual definitions are context-specific and cannot be generalised or assumed to be self-explanatory or to be mistaken to carry the same meaning all the time. Anyone who falls into this trap stands to lose.

But, while the arguments espoused above are valid, they do not totally rule out the possibility of having at least some overarching definitions of concepts which many could subscribe to. For example, Yukl (2006, p.8) defines leadership to mean "the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do

it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives." Implicit in this definition is the view that despite placing emphasis on different types of leadership, there is at least a common understanding of what this concept entails at a macro level. Corroborating this view, Northouse (2010, p.3) defines leadership as "a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal." Therefore, leadership is about having someone to chart the way for others to follow.

The common denominator in these definitions is that someone takes the initiative and does something for the collective. Those who share the leader's views embrace such views and voluntarily agree to work with the leader. How the individual leads, determines the leadership style. At times leadership is provided by a group, such as a political party, a clan, or company. In all these scenarios, the leader provides direction while the followers follow voluntarily. Whenever the leader forces others to follow, this is referred to as coercive leadership, as opposed to democratic leadership which entails freedom to choose.

Civil leadership

Civil leadership is not completely different from leadership in its general sense. It is a specific form of leadership which distinguishes certain leaders from others. The purpose of civil leaders is to lead like any other leader does. However, civil leaders are private individuals who advance public affairs. Unlike political leaders described later, civil leaders operate outside government as a political institution. They are personally motivated to lead society, exercising public leadership differently from their political leadership counterparts. Thus, civil leadership contributes immensely to a better society outside of political formations. These leaders usually mobilise people and resources for good causes. They put societal interests first. In most cases, civil leadership pays particular attention to urgent socio-political challenges. These are some of the reasons why they are sometimes referred to as "prominent citizens" due to their popularity in society (De Waal, 2014).

Suffice to say that civil leadership does not come from political formations but from different places, including philanthropists, celebrities in society, and volunteers. Some come from non-profit public organisations, grassroots, or the business sector. In a nutshell, the role of civil leadership in society is equally (if not

more) important as that of political leadership. Its advantage is that it is not attached to or controlled by political parties. Therefore, civil leadership cannot be underestimated when dealing with socio-political issues.

Linked to civil leadership is civil society which is understood to mean "voluntary self-generating and organized non-state organizations" (Molutsi, 1995, p.5). In both civil leadership and civil society, the idea of voluntary participation is at the centre. There is no political motive which drives the political leadership to serve society primarily for political reasons or for political expediency. Civil leadership focuses primarily on advancing civic interests. The term "civil society," which produces civil leadership, is understood to mean an arena in society of voluntary collective action around shared purposes, interests, and values. It is "the sphere of uncoerced human association between the individual and the state, in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively independent of government and the market" (Edwards, 2011, p. 4). What is clear from this definition is that civil society takes a proactive approach to addressing societal issues. By extension, the civil leadership becomes proactive in addressing issues that affect their society, assisting government through a symbiotic relationship.

Political leadership

Political leadership cannot be defined outside of government as a political institution. Unlike civil leadership, this type of leadership refers to the impact on decision-making as well as political outcomes which result from any action that is taken by someone who holds political office. In other words, while leaders in this leadership category also come from the community, their route is different in the sense that they come through political elections and/or appointment. As such, they do not necessarily report directly to communities as do their civil leadership counterparts. Instead, they report to the political institution (party or government) which they are part of. Even their mandate is derived from such political institutions. Their leadership style may embrace one or more of the following: autocratic leadership style, democratic leadership style, laissez-faire leadership style, paternalistic leadership style, transactional leadership style, and transformational leadership style. In the main, party interests tend to supersede community interests.

In terms of proximity to the people, political leadership is not as close to communities as civil leadership is. This should not come as a surprise. Holding a leadership position among political leaders is usually tied up to the time a political party remains in office. This is usually five years. It is for this reason that the way the political leadership conducts itself is not always the same as how the civil leadership executes its mandate. The latter is free from political pressure exerted on the political leadership. Instead, it gives community interests priority.

Be that as it may, these two types of leadership must find each other and work together to address socio-political issues. The reasons for this call are outlined in the next section below.

The Basis for Collaboration Between the Civil and Political Leadership

As a norm, collaboration makes things easier. Resources and ideas are shared to accelerate change. Despite the differences outlined above, the common factor between civil and political leadership is that they both aim to address social, economic, and political issues in their communities. They may differ (either slightly or significantly) in their approaches, but the end goal remains the same. Primarily, people want service delivery. Whether this is provided by civil or political leadership is immaterial. If services reach the people, they are happy. If these services are delayed simply because the two types of leadership pull in different directions, communities become innocent victims and suffer the consequences of hostile relations between the two. The void left by lack of cooperation between the two types of leadership has negative consequences on communities. It stalls progress and has the potential to trigger political turmoil and/or economic instability caused by social unrests.

On the political front, people need leadership. The enactment of legislation and the formulation of policies to guide action call for astute leadership. These documents provide the legal framework which guides both civil and political leadership as they execute their different mandates. Therefore, the coexistence of civil and political leadership is ideal. In the South African Constitution, for example, Chapter 2 on the Bill of Rights lists several services which the citizens are entitled to. These include access to housing, healthcare, food, water, social security, education, etc. (The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). For these services to reach their intended

beneficiaries, there is a need for the civil and political leadership to cooperate.

General observation leads to the conclusion that "many countries in Africa, have failed to realise development largely because they suffer from leadership deficit" (Sebudubudu & Mokganedi, 2012, p. 29; Mngomezulu, 2018). Included in this indictment are countries endowed with mineral resources that thus have the potential to develop, but fail to do so due to lack of leadership. This means that having mineral and financial resources cannot be a guarantee of the country's upward mobility or development. If there is a leadership deficit, development becomes a mirage. By extension, if the civil and political leadership pull in different directions, development will remain a far-fetched dream. These two types of leadership should complement each other. Their relationship should not be adversarial. Under civil society theory, civil society organisations obtain and retain autonomy from the political leadership, which is usually linked to a governing political party (Fine, 1992).

Looking at this theme from an international perspective, a study by De Waal which included 30 Dutch civil leaders concluded that civil leaders predominantly had a special value pattern of their own when compared to political leaders (De Waal, 2014). Among the top ranked of this type of leadership (civil leadership) were values such as freedom of choice and entrepreneurship, stability, and respect, as well as solidarity with self-actualisation. At the centre of these findings was the civil leadership's determination to embrace a "help" culture which was predicated on enabling people to help themselves. The civil leadership was prepared to capacitate communities so that they could play their role in their own development instead of waiting for government to perform this role on their behalf.

The political leadership operates on a slightly different mandate in the sense that political leaders take the responsibility to help the electorate and the wider community through various government projects. While this is good in principle, the danger is that should a political leader renege on his or her promise to help communities, nothing will happen. In other words, services will not reach the people as should be the case. At times, some in the political leadership provide services in a partisan manner. Anyone who is not aligned to a particular political party is left unattended to when services are delivered to communities. It is partly for this reason that the two types of leadership should work together to complement each other's activities and close any gaps. If the political leadership

makes financial resources available, the civil leadership will ensure that such financial support reaches all the intended recipients – the community.

Another finding in the study by De Waal that strengthens the case for collaboration between the civil and political leadership was that civil leaders were found to be socially grounded and civil-oriented (De Waal, 2014). This means that this type of leadership enjoys public trust more than its political leadership counterpart. While this finding was specific to the Dutch case study, it transcends geographical boundaries in terms of its applicability. Therefore, if the two types of leaders were to be both adversarial and confrontational, communities would suffer. Conversely, if they were to work together, communities would benefit. In instances where the political leadership becomes selective and divisive, the civil leadership would earn the support of the community by embracing everyone. This would pit the two types of leadership against each other to the detriment of society. It is for this reason that the two must find each other and work as a collective, as opposed to being competitive when executing their mandates.

Therefore, there are ample reasons for these two types of leaders to work together. The prospects of achieving more are heightened by their collaboration, not their competition. This is what should be happening, because both types of leadership have one goal in mind – to better the lives of the people.

Whenever there is a void left by weak relations between the two types of leadership, the socio-political impact becomes dire. As discussed under the conceptual definitions section above, a leader rallies support and leads the way. In the absence of a leader there is a void and therefore no direction. The political leadership plays its role of implementing laws and policies which guide any form of action to be taken while delivering services to the people. For its part, the civil leadership articulates the needs of the people because it is closer to them – and lives with them every day to better understand what their issues are. Working together, these two types of leadership have a greater chance to achieve more for their communities than if they compete against each other, hence the need for collaboration versus competition.

A comparative analysis of South Africa and Botswana on leadership issues

All countries have both civil and political leadership. What differs is the magnitude of the level of activism by each of these two types of leadership. Botswana and South Africa are no exceptions in this regard. These countries are worth comparing for several reasons. Firstly, historically, they were both associated with Britain, albeit in different contexts. Botswana was a British Protectorate like Lesotho and eSwatini (previously known as Swaziland) since 1885 before obtaining independence in 1966. South Africa was ruled by Britain on several occasions before becoming a republic in 1961 and leaving the British Commonwealth.

Secondly, both countries are endowed with mineral resources. A total of about 80 percent of Botswana's economic wealth is generated from diamonds. The remainder comes from other sources. South Africa's economy is diversified. Among other sources, its wealth is generated from gold, diamonds, platinum, and agriculture, to name just a few.

Intriguingly, while the picture painted above is that the scales of economic growth are tilted in favour of South Africa, Botswana's economy is strong. The pula trades higher than the South African rand. There is an observation that "Botswana has been able to transform itself from a position of desolation at independence to one of an upper middle-income country by the1990s. It is today held as an economic and political success story that can offer lessons to other African countries" (Sebudubudu & Magnedi, 2012, p. 29). This economic growth is attributed to good leadership and good policy decisions.

Civil and Political Leadership in Botswana

General observation leads to the conclusion that at independence in 1966, there was little or no hope from the erstwhile British rulers that Botswana would survive as a viable independent country. Within this context, as the nationalist political leadership pushed for the country to ask for political independence, the country's critics described it as either brave, at best, or foolish at worst, to make such a call (Masire, 2007). Corroborating this view, another author recalled that on the eve of independence, Botswana was "a ramshackle collection of different districts loosely held together by an under-financed

administration and united economically by little more than poverty and drought…." (Henerson, 1990, p. 43).

These comments and observations lead to the conclusion that the political leadership of Botswana did not inherit a vibrant political entity. On the contrary, they took over an economically weak country with no prospects for growth. It was the political leadership which demonstrated its ability to propel the country to stardom. Decades later, Botswana is still doing well economically compared to many countries in the Southern African region. Even when the political situation seemed to be derailing somewhat, the country's economic policies seem to have worked well even under different administrations. Although Botswana ranks 25th in Africa in terms of economic growth, its economy remains stable when compared to that of other African countries. This somewhat low ranking could be attributed to lack of diversity in the country's economy compared to other countries in the region.

Various authors agree that Botswana's political leadership has done well for that country (Fombad, 2005). In many circles, Botswana is described as Africa's oldest and most consistent democracy. In appreciation of the country's stable democracy, in 2008, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation awarded Botswana's President Festus Mogae the Ibrahim Prize for excellence as a head of state. This was a humbling gesture which many African leaders can only yearn for but will never achieve. Moreover, Botswana has performed well in many governance indicators. For example, in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, Botswana is ranked high in various areas or indicators such as government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption (KaboyaKgosi & Marata, 2012).

Another reason that Botswana's leadership is credited for good governance is the fact that it uses proceeds from diamond (which is the main revenue generator) to invest into extensive social expenditure to protect its less affluent citizens. This demonstrates a leadership that values its citizenry's interests above its own. It should not come as a surprise that Botswana is one of the highest per capita spenders on education in Africa. Even with regards to access to water and health facilities, Botswana continues to do very well. It is partly due to these reasons that Botswana is described as "a unique case in Sub-Saharan Africa" (Somolekae, 1998, p.5).

Across Africa, the relationship between the civil leadership in the form of chiefs and the political leadership has been largely adversarial. After independence, the political leadership temporarily destroyed the institution of traditional leadership. Later, the institution was reinstated out of necessity (Oomen, 2005). However, in Botswana, chiefs as an epitome of civil leadership were embraced in the system. Here, "power was fused in one office, that of the chief" (Somolekae, 1998, p.5), albeit with some limitations. Matters which affected the tribe were addressed at a village assembly called the kgotla. This arrangement made it possible for other forms of leadership to participate in the country's governance. Importantly, service delivery was enhanced through this arrangement.

According to liberal democratic theory, the state serves as the mediator of various struggles from civil society groups. The distinction between civil and political is artificial. It is based on theory and methodology, but not on firm reality (Molutsi, 1995).

A general observation is that the role of civil society in Botswana's political discourse has been largely neglected. There are no reasons immediately available to explain this situation. The dearth of literature providing an analysis of relations between civil and political leadership or the role of civil society in Botswana's democracy points to a lack of focus on this theme. The only three types of civil society groups enumerated by Oslen (1994, p. 3) are:

1. Groups which emerged and developed as primary self-help organisations that were established to promote the welfare, interests, and beliefs of their members. These included churches, burial societies; social and sporting clubs and youth organisations.
2. Politically active organisations that provided services to members, particular minorities, or vulnerable groups, and sought to actively influence government policy. These organisations included trade unions, women's rights groups, environmental action groups, and international human rights organisations.
3. The ad hoc or issue specific groups that emerged spontaneously in reaction to a particular issue of concern. These included environmental groups which came about in the Northwest district of Botswana following the government's plans to dredge the Okavango.

As the categorisation and mandates of these groups change, the need to study them further becomes real. Only through such empirical instigation can we better understand the role of the civil

leadership in Botswana's democracy. Failure to do so would lead to wrong conclusions such as the assumption that there is no civil leadership in Botswana. Another possibility would be to think that the three types of civil society groups are the only ones found in the country. The reality is that some of them start as issue-based organisations but end up prolonging their visibility beyond that issue. In other words, they change from being ad hoc to becoming permanent organisations.

Between 1993 and 1994, a study by Holm, Molutsi and Somolekae (Holm, 1996) concluded that civil society in Botswana was weak in relation to the state. It further concluded that civil society in general was primarily concerned with promoting the interests of their members and not so much with their relationship with the state. This marked a deviation from what civil society organisations, or the civil leadership, does or how it engages with the state in other countries. What further weakened civil society organisations (and by extension civil leadership) in Botswana was the fact that the state portrayed them as either determined to promote foreign interests in the country or having been infiltrated by opposition political parties to destabilise government and advance the interests of those opposition political parties. This insinuation was not backed up by any empirical evidence. However, it served the purpose of weakening the civil leadership in Botswana, as some people were scared to be active participants, afraid of being chastised by government authorities or those aligned to the political leadership.

Intriguingly, Botswana's political leadership sometimes participated in the establishment or formation of civil society organisations for its own purposes. Two examples are the Botswana Civil Service Association and the Botswana Teachers Union. After observing this practice closely, Molutsi (1995, p.57) concluded that "through this corporatist strategy, the state has appropriately defined the role and functions of each organization and circumscribed these such that it becomes easy to label and isolate others as political. This strategy succeeded for many years because the state was a primary source of finance for these organizations."

While it is true that this strategy served the government or the political leadership well, it also had its own disadvantage for the political leadership. For example, by not having an independent civil leadership, the political leadership robbed itself of the opportunity to hear an outside voice which would have provided constructive criticism. Even the state-sponsored organisations were less useful

to the political leadership (if at all). Firstly, the resources were not adequate. Secondly, their leaders were prohibited from working full-time in the organisations' offices. This meant that there was no one who was totally dedicated to the affairs of the organisation. In other words, there was no civil leadership to give direction and guidance. Lastly, until the 1992 Amendment was introduced, the minister was allowed to send his representative to attend all executive meetings of the Trade Unions. This meant that everything that was discussed in those meetings was also known to the minister even before the civil leadership could formulate a list of demands to present them to the minister.

Ideally, trade unions could seek advice from or affiliate to international trade unions. To be able to track the movements of these trade unions, the political leadership prescribed that any trade union wishing to affiliate to an international federation had to first seek permission from the minister, who was the political head. Consequently, for years, Botswana did not sign International Labour Organisation conventions, which were binding to all member states. It was only from 1997 that Botswana joined other countries in this regard (Somolokae, 1998).

It could be true that civil society activism in Botswana is not as vibrant as it should be. However, this is not tantamount to saying that no civil society or civil leadership exists in this country. There is still more work to be done to arrive at better and well-informed conclusions about the civil/political leadership dichotomy or binary. The general view is that "one important fundamental preoccupation of constitutionalism is the avoidance of governmental tyranny through the abuse of power by rulers pursuing their own interests at the expense of the life, liberty, and property of the governed" (Fombad, 2005, p.301). For Botswana to ensure that there are improved relations between the civil and political leadership, this view must be embraced and acted upon. Failure to do so would result in strained relations. This would lead to negative socio-political impact.

Civil and Political Leadership in South Africa

As South Africa prepared for the transition from apartheid to the current political dispensation, the issue of human rights took centre stage. This was to be expected. Under the apartheid regime, human rights had been grossly trampled upon. To ensure that these rights

were jealously guarded, everything had to be done to bring the civil and political leadership closer. Chapter 2 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) presents the Bill of Rights as the cornerstone of democracy in this country. Specifically, Section 7(1) states that "it enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality, and freedom." Therefore, whether the leadership falls under the "civil" or "political" categories is immaterial. Both types of leadership are protected by law. Aligning himself with this view, Jordaan (2019, p.173) observes that "an initial glance at South Africa's identity suggests that it is likely to be an international defender of civil and political rights." By extension, the civil and political leadership is also protected in South Africa.

As a norm, the public sector comprises of administrators and politicians. These "should work cooperatively and mutually towards the promotion of common good for all citizens" (Mehlape, 2018, p. 1). The idea is to create synergy on how the civil and political leadership work.

Since the advent of democracy in 1994, civil leadership in South Africa has been warmly welcomed and supported by the political leadership. Writing a foreword to a document published by the National Development Agency, Bathabile Dlamini, Minister of Social Development, stated the following: "The National Development Agency (NDA) was established primarily to grant funds to civil society and community-based organisations to meet the development needs of our communities in a democratic state" (Dlamini, 2016, p. ix). She cited the National Development Agency Act (No 108 of 1998) as the guiding legislation.

In unpacking the state of civil leadership in post-apartheid South Africa, it is important to note that "the civil society as a whole in South Africa has reinvented itself over the past years since the democratic dispensation" (Magongo, 2016, p.1). This reinvention included both the civil and political leadership. Unlike under apartheid where the civil and political leadership had adversarial relationships, under the new political dispensation the two found each other. They moved toward playing a complementary role. It was for this reason that the political leadership was prepared to provide financial resources to the civil leadership to enable it to contribute towards ensuring democratic consolidation.

The transition period was not an easy one. It involved negotiations, bargaining among different institutions, resource mobilisation, and so forth. The challenges that the new political leadership had to contend with included "asserting political control over a public service that had been instrumental to implementing apartheid laws" (Levy et al., 2021, p.29). Among the questions that were asked at the time were the following: "What are the common elements that will pull us together in the democratic society we are operating in? How do we strategise to obtain a cohesive approach towards a national development agenda that is just, fair, and effective? How do we relate to democratic government to ensure that we have a progressive democratic society? How do we remain relevant in the new dispensation?" (Magongo, 2016, p.1).

Unlike in Botswana, where the civil leadership was coopted by the state or was subjected to state control, in South Africa the situation has been different. When the political leadership realised that the civil leadership was struggling to keep its head afloat due to several internal challenges, it resolved to come on board. In this regard, the political leadership, through the institution of government, passed the Non-Profit Organisation Act (No. 71 of 1997). The stated objective of this Act was "to improve the legislative environment for non-profit organisations as a strategy to support transformation in South Africa."

What is clear from this objective is that the political leadership did not perceive the civil leadership as either a threat or a competitor. Instead, collaboration between the two types of leadership was deemed healthy and necessary to strengthen or consolidate democracy in South Africa. Corroborating this view, Magongo (2016, p.2) averred that "the intentions of this Act are to ensure that the sector operates in a just and fair environment". This was a direct opposite of the route taken by the political leadership in Botswana of either co-opting or overregulating the civil leadership.

While it is true that the state or the political leadership has consciously invested in the sustainability of the civil leadership and civil society organisations, the latter have become weak for different reasons to those obtaining in Botswana. Instead of the civil leadership being weakened by the political leadership, in the South African context weakness has been engineered internally. Magongo (2016, p.3) captures this situation elegantly when he observes that,

The civil society sector has over the past 10 to 15 years deteriorated in its effectiveness to support development discourse in South Africa. This sector has been disenfranchised by its weak regional and national structures. Over the past decade, we have witness very few powerful NPOs taking the state into task. These powerful NPOs have been created by a weak centre that does not hold.

This means that civil society in general and civil leadership in particular have become weak because of internal challenges, not through oppression by the political leadership.

Despite having strong relations between the civil and political leadership, and despite being endowed with many mineral resources, South Africa has not been doing well economically. The country's economy has been experiencing slow growth compared to that of Botswana. Although South Africa has been ranking third in Africa in terms of economic growth after Egypt and Nigeria, her growth rate has been very low. This is linked to the country's leadership. At times, South Africa formulates economic policies which look good on paper. But they are not properly implemented for them to achieve the intended results. Importantly, there is no adequate monitoring and evaluation. These weaknesses point to poor leadership or leadership deficit as alluded to earlier. Therefore, strong relations between the civil and political leadership are good and contribute to political stability. However, these should not be misconstrued as a panacea for economic growth.

Prospects for Future Planning in Bridging the Gap Between the Two Types of Leadership

Firstly, it should be noted that interest between state and civil society relations is a recent phenomenon dating back to the 1980s. It was prompted by the state's failure to provide development (Somolokae, 1998). An ineffective state was then rendered dispensable. Civil leadership replaced it to bring services to the people.

Against this background, going forward, a decision must be taken on two issues, Firstly, the state could be capacitated so that it could reclaim its position as leader of society. This would render the civil leadership irrelevant. Secondly, civil leadership could be resourced so that it could continue serving society better – especially given its proximity to communities. Any decision in this regard would have to consider financial implications and efficiency.

Since the polarisation of the state and civil society is a recent phenomenon that only started in the 1980s, it should still be possible for the state to perform its development role as it did from the 1960s and 1970s when most African (and Southern African) countries obtained political independence. Where things went wrong, these can still be corrected with the benefit of hindsight. Until the final decision is made, the civil and political leadership must learn to coexist. Their relationship should be complementary, not competitive, or adversarial. The two countries used as case studies in this chapter (Botswana and South Africa) are not an exception in these propositions. They should reflect on their past experiences, take stock of what has happened (good or bad), and decide how they want to move forward. History is always the best teacher. Those who do not learn from their past mistakes are bound to repeat them to their own detriment.

Conclusion

Relations between the civil and political leadership should be kept sacrosanct for them to produce the intended positive results. If these relations are weakened or become adversarial, service delivery is negatively affected. Moreover, improvements in the politics of the country are adversely affected. The political leadership has the responsibility to lead the country and to provide services in a nonpartisan way. In cases where the political leadership fails to deliver in its constitutional mandate, the civil leadership comes in to fill the void. Any adversarial relationship between these two types of leadership affects the country economically, socially, and politically. If the civil leadership is coopted by the political leadership, the results are negative. The former loses independent influence while the latter robs itself of an opportunity to get an independent opinion with constructive criticism.

The two case studies of Botswana and South Africa have assisted in illuminating our understanding on how these two types of leadership operate. Importantly, these examples have also demonstrated what happens if either of the two types of leadership is compromised. Any void left by sour relations between the civil and political leadership negatively affects the country in different life spheres.

Drawing from the two experiences discussed above, this chapter provides the lens through which countries can assess civil

and political leadership with the view to plan their future. What is clear from this discussion is that if the political leadership delivers on its constitutional mandate there would be no need for the civil leadership to intervene. It is after the political leadership has failed that the civil leadership intervenes. Even if these two types of leadership do not agree on what needs to be done and how, it is of cardinal importance for them to find each other for the sake of communities. As demonstrated in the case of Botswana, if civil leadership is coopted by the political leadership, it is weakened to the point that it becomes irrelevant. A vibrant civil leadership is good for both the political leadership and society at large. This is one lesson that should remain in everyone's mind each time these two types of leadership are considered.

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Chapter Three

Examining the Role of Civil Society in African Transitional Politics: A Comparative Analysis of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic

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Introduction

Post-independence Africa has witnessed a general expansion of civil society, as manifested in the emergence of several civil society organisations (CSOs) in many countries. This was precipitated at the turn of the 21st century, as globalisation signalled the dawn of political openness, with more external CSOs spreading their presence and operations in Africa. The rise of civil society in Africa has been a double-edged sword. On one hand, CSOs have been influential in promoting socio-economic and political change (as CSOs played active roles in promoting democracy, good governance and development through lobbying, advocacy, technical assistance, service provision and capacity building). On the other hand, CSOs have been considered to be imperialist tools and instruments that challenge the role of "undesirable" states and governments, hence the instrumental role of the civil society in or overthrowing and replacing "unpopular" regimes in some African countries. Generally, this has triggered different approaches by various African governments in dealing with civil society, with some governments supporting and co-opting civil society in the governance process, while others repress and suppress it. Despite all these challenges, CSOs in Africa continue to play a vital role in influencing and shaping the direction, form and nature of political change before, during and after political transitions. The two countries that will constitute the focus of this analysis, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), have gone through tumultuous and tempestuous periods of

conflicts and political transitions. The DRC had a political transition between April 2003 and July 2006 following the Second Congo War (1998–2003), and the political transition was presided over by the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, with Joseph Kabila Kabange as the president. The political transition in the CAR occurred between January 2013 and March 2016, and was presided over by the National Transition Council (NTC), with four successive presidents, namely Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia (August 2013–January 2014), Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet (January 2014), and Catherine Samba-Panza (January 2014–March 2016). This chapter uses secondary data sources to comparatively examine the role of civil society in the transitional politics of these two countries, specifically focusing on the three main categories of the roles and functions of civil society propounded by Victoria Graham, as cited in De Jager et al. (2015: 174), namely, adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions. In terms of organisation, the chapter is divided into five sections. The first section will present the background and context to the political transitions in the CAR and DRC, while the second section discusses the conceptual framework and literature review relating to the broader role of the civil society in governance processes and political transition dynamics. In the third and fourth sections, the role of civil society in the transition politics in the DRC and CAR is examined. A comparative analysis of the roles of civil society in the two countries is presented in the fifth section, before the conclusions and recommendations are presented in the final section.

Political Transitions in CAR and DRC: Background and Context

The CAR and DRC have had challenges of political instability and conflict since they secured their political independence from their respective colonial governments. The DRC attained its political independence from Belgum in June 1960 after enduring over seven decades of colonial subjugation that started in 1885 when King Leopold II founded and presided over the Congo Free State (Kisangani, 2016; Vanthemsche, 2012). Likewise, the CAR gained political independence in August 1960, having been under French colonial rule since 1903 when France annexed the colony of Ubangui-Shari/Oubangui-Chari (Vlavonou, 2020; Wohlers et al., 2015).

Political Transitions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Post-independence DRC has witnessed long periods of conflict, power battles, upheavals and the consequences of geopolitical clashes in the Great Lakes Region. The series of post-colonial conflicts are often traced back to the power battles that characterised the liberation war in the DRC that culminated in the assassination of Patrice Emery Lumumba, the first prime minister of the then Zaire (Kisangani, 2016). As shown in Table 1 below, the DRC has had five regimes since independence, that is, the Joseph Kasavubu regime (1960–1965), the Joseph-Desire Mobutu regime (1965–1997), the Laurent-Desire Kabila regime (1997–2001), the Joseph Kabila Kabange regime (2001–2019), and the Felix Antone Tshisekedi Tshilombo regime (2019 to the present).

Table 1: Regimes of Republic of the Congo (1960–1971), Republic of Zaire (1971–1997) and DRC (1997–Present) since independence

Timeframe	Leadership/Presidents	Political Party
1960-1965	Joseph Kasavubu (with Patrice Emery Lumumba as prime minister)	Alliance of Bakongo/ L'Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO)
1965-1997	Joseph-Desire Mobutu	Popular Movement of the Revolution/ Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR)
1997-2001	Laurent-Desire Kabila	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFLC)/ Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre

Timeframe	Leadership/Presidents	Political Party
2001–2019	Joseph Kabila Kabange	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy/Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (PPRD)
2019–Present	Felix Antone Tshisekedi Tshilombo	Union for Democracy and Social Progress/ Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS)

Source: Author's construction based on various sources

It was during the immediate post-independence DRC that several army mutinies emerged, with Moise Kapenda Tshombe – a Congolese businessman and politician who ran several businesses in Kataga Province in eastern DRC – mobilising an insurrection demanding for the secession and autonomy of the eastern province and accusing Lumumba of communist sympathies (Quinonez & Murillo, 2021). With the declaration of State of Katanga independence in 1960, the situation in DRC degenerated into a crisis, resulting in the deployment of Belgian troops by the Belgian government ostensibly to "protect Belgian citizens" and mining interests, and the passing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 143 (S/4387) which authorised the deployment of around 3 500 troops to the DRC under the United Nations Operation the Congo (ONUC) (Gilbert, 2023; Tudor, 2022; Masau et al., 2023). Later, the DRC had to endure over 30 years of military rule by Joseph-Desire Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko) who carried out a military coup in 1965 (Vanthemsche, 2012).

The DRC was a theatre of conflict and humanitarian crisis in 1994 when millions of refugees fled the Rwanda–Burundi conflict. This was exacerbated by the spillover effects of the Rwandan genocide of 1994, wherein over 800 000 minority ethnic Tutsis, as well as moderate Hutus and Twa, were killed; with refugees fleeing into eastern DRC, while later, other Hutus fled Rwanda when a new Tutsi government assumed power (United Nations, 2024). This was part of the cause of the First Congo War (1996–1997) as Rwanda and Uganda invaded eastern DRC to capture perpetrators of the genocide (the '*Interhamwe*' or the Federation for the Liberation of

Rwanda) (United Nations, 2024a). A coalition, comprising armies from Uganda and Rwanda, assisted Laurent-Desire Kabila – then opposition leader – in defeating Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997.

After the First Congo War (1996–1997), the Second Congo War (1998–2003) ensued, which led to the assassination of Laurent-Desire Kabila in 2001, and the succession of Joseph Kabila. This had started when Kabila unceremoniously ordered Ugandan and Rwandan forces out of eastern DRC, as he feared that they would annex the mineral-rich eastern territory, which then triggered an insurrection of rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda in DRC. However, with the support of SADC countries, including Angola and Zimbabwe, the DRC managed to repel the rebels (Bakamana, 2021; Tamm, 2019).

Between 2002 and 2003, the DRC signed several peace agreements with Rwanda, Uganda and rebel movements in an attempt to find an everlasting solution to the DRC conflict. These include the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of July 1999 (between Angola, DRC, Namibia, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe); the Pretoria Peace Accords of July 2002 (between DRC and Rwanda), and the Sun City Peace Agreement of April 2003 (between the government of DRC and several rebel groups that constituted the Inter-Congolese Dialogue). The UN Security Council also established the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) through UNSC Resolution 1279 in November 1999 to observe the ceasefire in DRC, and later expanded the MONUC mandate to include offensive operations against rebel groups in eastern DRC and renamed it the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) through UNSC Resolution 1925 in May 2010. However, it is the Sun City Peace Agreement of April 2003 that culminated in the transitional or interim government in DRC that ruled from April 2003 to July 2006, with Joseph Kabila as the president and leaders of the former rebel groups as vice presidents. This ultimately paved the way for the DRC's first democratic elections in 40 years.

Notwithstanding the signing of the Sun City Peace Agreement in 2003, the conflict in the DRC continues, especially in eastern Congo where several old and new armed groups engage in conflict and terrorise civilians. The United Nations (2024b) reports that at least 122 rebel groups are fighting in DRC, and these include the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. which calls for an "inter-Rwandan dialogue"; the Allied Democratic Forces which promotes Shari'a law in Uganda; the Lord's Resistance Army, formed by members of the Acholi tribe in Uganda; the National Liberation Forces, which is a Burundian rebel group; the March 23 Movement

(M23) rebels, which fights for the control of Goma and surrounding areas in eastern DRC; and the Mai-Mai Militias, formed to defend local communities and resist the invasion of Rwandan forces, and to fight Rwanda-affiliated Congolese rebel groups. In terms of casualties and humanitarian consequences, the DRC conflict is reported to have resulted in the death of approximately 6 million people since 1996, and resulted in over 6 million people internally displaced (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Political Transitions in the Central African Republic (CAR)

After attaining political independence from France in 1960, the CAR has been engulfed in political turmoil and confined to the lowest ranks and rungs of the global socio-economic development ladder. It is not surprising that currently, the country has consistently been ranked among the top 10 poorest countries in the world by almost every socio-economic development indicator (see Concern Worldwide, 2024; United Nations Development Programme, 2024). Hence, the successive regimes in CAR appear to have failed to bring political stability and socio-economic development to the country. From 1960 to the present, CAR has been presided over by 10 regimes, as presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Regimes of the Central African Republic (1960–2024)

Timeframe	Presidents	Political Party
1960–1966	David Dacko	Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa/Mouvement pour l'évolution sociale de l'Afrique noire (MESAN)
1966–1979	Jean-Bédel Bokassa	Military/MESAN
1979–1981	David Dacko	MESAN
1981–1993	André-Dieudonné Kolingba	Military/Central African Democratic Rally/Rassemblement Démocratique Centrafricain (RDC)

Timeframe	Presidents	Political Party
1993–2003	Ange-Félix Patassé	Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People/ Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple Centrafricain (MLPC)
2003–2013	François Bozizé Yangouvonda	Military/Independent
2013–2014	Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia	Military
10–23 January 2014	Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet	Military
2014–2016	Catherine Samba-Panza	RDC
2016–Present	Faustin-Archange Touadéra	Independent/United Hearts Movement/ Mouvement cœurs unis (MCU)

Source: Author's construction based on various sources

Whereas some of the leadership transitions have been constitutional, CAR has experienced several attempted military coups d'état, with three of them being successful, leading to unconstitutional changes of government in the country (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). The successful military coups were in January 1966 and September 1981, which both dethroned President David Dacko, and March 2003, which removed President Ange-Félix Patassé from power (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). Other unsuccessful military coup attempts were witnessed in the years 1974, 1975, 1976, 1979, 1982, 1996, 2002, 2003, 2015 and 2021 (Cline Center for Advanced Social Research, 2024).

It is, however, the political transition events between the years 2013 and 2016 that constitute the heart of analysis of this chapter. The aggression of the Seleka CPSK-CPJP-UFDR rebels in the CAR in March 2013 forced the then President François Bozizé Yangouvonda to flee to exile in Cameroon through the DRC (Ndiyun, 2023; Glawion & Le Noan, 2023). This led to the deployment of troops to the CAR by France to disarm the Seleka militias which had overrun Bangui, with the UNSC also authorising MINUSCA troop deployment later

in 2014 to complement the African Union peacekeeping mission in the CAR (Rosas & Souza, 2024; Ndiyun, 2023; Glawion & Le Noan, 2023). The post-coup era in the CAR witnessed a political transition from January 2013 to March 2016, presided over by the NTC, with three successive presidents, namely Michel Am-Nondokro Djotodia (August 2013–January 2014), Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet (January 2014), and Catherine Samba-Panza (January 2014–March 2016). The constitutional referendum of 2015 led to the general elections of December 2015 which had no outright winner, resulting in the second round of presidential elections in January 2016 which were won by Faustin-Archange Touadéra (Rosas & Souza, 2024; Ndiyun, 2023; Glawion & Le Noan, 2023). To date, large parts of the CAR continue to be controlled by armed rebel groups, with the country hosting over 20 rebel groups and militias, as conflicts remain driven by the struggle and contestation for power and natural resources among the political elites. Exacerbating factors include weak governance, porous borders, socio-economic inequalities, and geopolitical tensions, hence the continued formation and emergence of "roving bandits" (World Bank, 2022; Glawion & Le Noan, 2023).

Civil Society, Governance and Political Transitions: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

In the history and contemporaneity of democracy and democratisation, civil society has always played a pivotal role in facilitating democratic governance. There have always been conceptual overlaps in defining civil society as a concept, with a number of scholars describing civil society with other notions and concepts of "civic engagement" and "civic space" (Moldavanova et al., 2023; Biekart et al., 2023; Sander, 2023). The World Bank (2007: 1–2) defines civil society as a "wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations". In an almost similar fashion, the United Nations Development Programme (2024: np) considers the civil society includes as a "full range of formal and informal organizations that are outside the state and the market – including social movements, volunteer involving organizations, mass-based membership organizations, faith-based groups, NGOs, and community-based organizations, as well as communities and citizens acting individually and collectively". In contrast, Dant's (2019) view of civil society leans towards a developmentalist

perspective. It, however, resonates with the World Bank and UNDP's definitions, as the author regards the civil society as the crucial "third leg" driving development (the first two being the public and the private sectors), adding that civil society is an operational space independent of the state and the market, and also the glue between the two (Alam, 2023).

While there is variation in the definition and meaning of civil society, there is broad agreement that civil society relates to a broad range of organisations and institutions that are non-state and voluntary in nature, and whose role is mainly centred on lobbying and advocacy for societal needs, interests and aspirations. In democratisation and democratic consolidation processes, civil society plays a crucial role. Victoria Graham, as cited in De Jager et al. (2015: 174), identifies three basic categories of civil society functions in deepening democracy, namely "adversarial", "collaborative" and "communication" functions. The adversarial function entails scrutinising the exercise of power and authority by the state, the collaborative function relates to the inclusion and integration of various sectors of the society, and the communication function encompasses the creation of a platform or link that facilitates engagement between the state and the society (Graham in De Jager et al., 2015: 174). Granted, in executing these functions, civil society continues to face a lot of challenges. In Africa, civil society continues to be confronted with financial sustainability challenges, political interference from funders and governments, ambiguous relationships with the state, capacity constraints, shrinking democratic space, citizen apathy, diminishing confidence and trust by communities, and disillusionment of citizens with community engagement and participation, among others (Kumi, 2022; Graham in De Jager et al., 2015; Smith & Hamel, 2023; Njoku, 2022).

It has to be acknowledged, as argued by Pinckney et al. (2022), that inasmuch as civil society is expected to be independent, non-governmental and non-state in nature, as well as accommodative to pluralism and diversity, in reality there are CSOs that establish ties and alliances with government players, the state and political parties in such a manner that compromises their independence. Such tendencies are evident even during democratisation and democratic transition processes, when states and political systems experience political change from authoritarian regimes to democratic regimes. In Samuel Huntington's *Third Wave of Democratization*, the three phases of constructing democracy, as presented by Kotze in De Jager

et al. (2015:9–10), usually comprise the *transition phase* (transfer of power from authoritarian rulers to opposition movements through relatively free, fair and credible elections), democratization phase (implementation of democratic reforms that facilitate movement from authoritarian policies to democratic policies) and democratic consolidation (achieving stability and deepening democratic values).

Political transition may either be facilitated through violent power over by military coups, negotiated settlements or smooth elections. However, in Africa, transitions have largely been violent, occurring through military coups or facilitated by election outcomes that are widely deemed as unfree, unfair and incredible. Since 1950, Africa has experienced 109 successful coups or unconstitutional changes of government in over 35 out of the 55 countries on the continent, with the first coup on the continent experience on 23 July 1952 when the national army of Egypt dethroned King Farouk (Duzor & Williamson, 2023). Since African political transitions are punctuated by violent military take-overs, negotiations, bargaining, and compromises, the transition phases and processes often experience intense political conflict, civil unrest, instability, legitimate crisis and uncertainty (Méon & Sekkat, 2022; Pinckney et al., 2022; Kotze in De Jager et al., 2015).

Periods of political transition are highly contested phases in politics. In *A theory of Political Transitions,* Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that the rich elite control societies that are non-democratic, and the disenfranchised poor threaten to wage a revolution so as to contest power and force the rich elite to democratise. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) further argue that states with high inequalities have less chances of consolidating democracy, which results in trends where there is oscillation between regimes. Several studies on the intersection of civil society, political transitions and democratisation have revealed the different roles that civil society plays in political transitions, as well as their varied influences on the political trajectory and respective political landscape in African countries. Elischer (2022)'s study on populist civil society and post-coup politics in Mali argues that following the successful military coup in Mali in March 2012 – which led to the ousting of President Amadou Toumani Toure – there were mixed reactions from civil society. Specifically, as the military established a junta-led National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR) in Mali, there were substantial sections of civil society that advocated for a more assertive role for the military

in Malian politics, and according to Elischer (2022), this stance "posed a challenge to the principle of civilian oversight." Later, when President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita took over after winning the post-coup general elections of 2013, there was an emergence of a powerful alliance of CSOs that were frustrated by the failure of the Keita administration to implement substantive political reforms and initiate socio-economic development (Elischer, 2022:9).

During political transitions, civil society - as one of the core pillars of democratic systems – assists in monitoring peace and governance cooperation agreements as well as overseeing the promotion and protection of human rights, political reforms, peace, security, stability and development. After the successive coups in Mali, that is, the August 2020 coup (which dethroned President Keita) and May 2021 coup (which overthrew President Bah N'daw), Thera (2023) argued that civil society in Mali played a pivotal role in assisting communities and officials in building a shared democratic practice in the midst of the prevailing governance and security challenges. In the case of the April 2019 coup, when President Omar al-Bashir was overthrown by elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), a study by Elbadawi and Alhelo (2023) argued that civil society, especially the Sudanese Professionals' Association (SPA) – itself an umbrella association of 17 Sudanese trade unions – played a pivotal role in mobilising and coordinating anti-government and anti-Bahir protests, riots and civil disobedience, together with other opposition movements. In the post-coup era, the SPA and other CSOs were equivocal about the excesses of the Transitional Military Council and the need for genuine democratic transition and democratisation (Elbadawi & Alhelo, 2023).

This paper reviews civil society's role before and during the transition in the DRC (between April 2003 and July 2006) and in the CAR, between January 2013 and March 2016. The major problem that constitutes the thrust of this research has been the general lack of appreciation of the critical role that is played by civil society during political transitions. What is already known is the fact that CSOs promote democracy, good governance, human rights, peace, and development. However, the nuanced role that civil society undertakes during political transitions, which shapes the shape, direction and outcome of transitional politics, has also differed from one polity to another. This is what this study sought to pursue, with specific reference to the DRC and CAR transitions.

Civil Society's role in the Political Transition in DRC

The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC was signed on 16 December 2002 in Pretoria, South Africa. It was a culmination of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which was facilitated by Sir Ketumile Masire, the former President of Botswana, between the government of DRC and opposition movements, namely the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/National (RDC/N), the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Mai-Mai, the political opposition, and civil society (Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, 2002:2). The transitional government was set up when President Joseph Kabila Kabange was sworn in as the transitional president on the 7th of April 2003, and deputised by four vice presidents, namely, Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (of PPRD); Jean-Pierre Bemba (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC); Azarias Ruberwa (Rally for Congolese Democracy, RCD-G); and Arthur Z'ahidi Ngoma (of the non-armed political opposition).

The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC provided for a power-sharing formula and transitional government in a 2-year transitional period, with parties to the agreement committing to ceasing any form of hostilities. The main objectives of the transition were to reunite, reconciliate and reconstruct the DRC, re-establish peace and security, initiate security sector reforms, prepare for free and fair elections, and implement structures for political stabilisation (Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, 2002:3). In order to work towards the cessation of hostilities, the parties to the Global and Inclusive Agreement made a commitment to cease hostilities through five aspects. These were to cease hostilities and peacefully and equitably resolve the DRC crisis; to create a restructured and integrated national army; to collectively implement the UN Security Council Resolutions for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DRC and to disarm all armed groups and militia; to foster national reconciliation and establish a government of national unity that will organise free and democratic elections after the transition period; and to take necessary measures that guarantee security and safety of the DRC transition leadership, politicians and people living in the DRC (Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, 2002:2-3). In addition to this, there were eight transitional principles that were agreed to by the parties to the Global and Inclusive Agreement to ensure successful

implementation of the Agreement. The principles include the need to ensure appropriate representation of the eleven provinces of DRC and inclusion of women in the transitional governance processes; ensure that the presidium remains in office throughout the transition period; respect all international human rights instruments and democratic values; adhere to the principle of separation of powers in government; ensure consensus, inclusivity and avoidance of conflict in governance; ensure that inclusivity, balance and equity are considered in sharing responsibilities within transitional institutions; and that the principle of amnesty be established in the transitional constitution to ensure that acts of war and political breaches of the law (except war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity) are granted amnesty (Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC, 2002:4–5).

Civil society's role in DRC's transitional politics has to be analysed through the lenses of Victoria Graham's a*dversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions of civil society* (Graham in De Jager et al., 2015: 174). In undertaking the communication function, civil society in DRC had to facilitate communication within DRC and between the society and the state. In addition to this, DRC civil society provided a platform for various groups and citizens to advocate for political, economic and security sector reforms while lobbying the government to ensure that it was responsive to societal needs and interests. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2016) noted that the DRC has a wide range of CSOs that are mainly service-oriented and social movements at national, regional and community levels, and these work on different areas of advocacy, humanitarian assistance, community development, governance, service delivery, atrocity prevention, peace education, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and civilian protection.

Civil society was active in transitional politics in the DRC and managed to engage in *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions in different ways. Koko (2016) argues that the role of civil society during the transitional period in DRC was two-pronged. First, CSOs were directly involved in managing transitional institutions. Second, CSO activists pursued their conventional activities outside the sphere of active politics. In the actual structure of the transitional government of national unity in DRC, civil society was not directly represented in the presidium, which had one president and four vice presidents representing political parties. However, in the national assembly, civil society was allocated 94 out

of the total parliamentary 500 seats (19 percent) while in the senate, civil society was allocated 22 out of the total 120 senatorial seats (18 percent). In addition to this, the position of senate president was allocated to civil society through the appointment of a member of the clergy, Pierre Marini Bodho, who was the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Christ in Congo. CSO representatives were also appointed in several transitional institutions at provincial executive level, senior management positions of parastatals, and diplomatic missions. All the transitional institutions supporting democracy, namely, the Independent Electoral Commission; the National Watchdog on Human Rights; the Media High Authority; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and the Committee on Ethics and the Fight against Corruption, were all chaired by members of civil society. However, as stated by Koko (2016), these transitional institutions supporting democracy – except the INEC and the Media High Authority – could not adequately perform their duties and responsibilities due to financial, logistical, operational and technical constraints and lack of support by the parties to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC.

The communication role was evident even during the ICD, when negotiations for the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC were still ongoing. According to Koko (2016), the inclusion of CSOs in the ICD negotiations ensured legitimacy of the negotiation process and ownership or endorsement of the outcome of the negotiations, which largely contributed to the durability of the peace experienced during the transitional period. Out of the 362 delegates that were part of the ICD, 66 of them were from various CSOs, representing diverse interest groups that included human rights organisations, religious organisations, business organisations, labour unions, women's groups, youth associations, and the private media (Koko, 2016). The inclusion of CSOs in the ICD was a great achievement, and most of the substantial resolutions adopted by the negotiating parties leading to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC were initiated by CSOs (Rogier, 2006).

Kabemba (2004:8) noted that the DRC had several CSOs prior to and during the transitional government of national unity, and that one of the greatest achievements of the ICD that preceded the Global and Inclusive Agreement in 2002 was that it included CSOs working on various thematic areas, including women empowerment, human rights, democracy, community development, and youth empowerment. The author, however, argues that CSOs were

politicised during the transitional government of national unity, as influential CSO leaders were appointed into government institutions, including parliament and senate (Kabemba, 2004:8). In the end, as argued by Kabemba (2004:9), civil society – which had suffered long periods of politicisation and marginalisation under the regimes of Mobutu and Laurent Kabila – lost a great deal of its legitimacy to perform its watchdog role, and became a political actor and "strong contender for political power."

However, some CSOs continued to play their adversarial role and collaborative functions by exerting pressure on transitional institutions such as the executive, parliament and transitional institutions supporting democracy (Kabemba, 2004). For instance, CSOs such as the Women as Partners for Peace (WOPPA) and La Ligue des Electeurs (LE) were critical of the adoption of the organic laws establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in July 2003 and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in June 2004. This, according to Kabemba (2004:8), "crippled" the relationship between the state and society. During the ICD negotiations, there were allegations that the Kinshasa CSOs were manipulated and their influence neutralised, with CSOs from eastern DRC gaining much influence due to regional political tendencies (Kabemba, 2004:9).

During the ICD, some CSOs also played a collaborative function, which, according to Graham in De Jager et al. (2015:174), relates to the advancement of the agenda for inclusion, integration and incorporation of marginalised groups in governance. Pursuant to this, CSOs such as the Association des Femmes du Kivu (UWAKI) organised workshops to discuss and share experiences on how women are integrated into the decision-making positions in the transitional period in DRC, and these workshops were attended by women participants from regional countries such as Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda (Mpoumou, 2004). In addition to this, civil society's adversarial role was apparent during the transitional period, as CSOs exerted pressure on the transitional government through subjecting it to scrutiny, challenging abuse or misuse of power, and monitoring the rule of law and human rights abuses. Policzer (2006), Koko (2016), and Savage (2006) commended CSOs for denouncing human rights abuses and mismanagement of transitional institutions, mobilising the international community to collectively address the humanitarian crisis, and pressurising parties to the agreement to commit to agreed disarmament and

reintegration programmes, and put in place measures to ensure the conduct of free, fair and democratic elections towards the end of the transitional period. In terms of their collaborative role, CSOs in the DRC were constructively involved in mediation, peacebuilding, reconciliation, disarmament and reintegration of combatants, voter education, capacity development and skills development interventions, especially in eastern DRC, which assisted in building trust and unity in communities (International Alert, 2012).

The media, being part of civil society, played its communication role during the ICD and throughout the transitional period. Newspapers such as L'Avenir, La Prosperite, Le Soft, Le Phare, Le Potentiel, Uhuru, Reference Plus, Tempetes des Tropiques, L' Observateur, Salongo, Forum des As, and Vision were all prominent in playing Victoria Graham's adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions. During the transitional period, the DRC had 11 daily newspapers and 213 regional weekly newspapers, with the majority of these newspapers concentrated in the three provinces of Kinshasa, Katanga and Kasai Oriental (BBC, 2006:24–26; Kabemba, 2005:3). The DRC also had at least 53 private television stations and 119 radio stations during the transitional period (Kabemba, 2005: 3–4). Whereas the media played a vital adversarial, collaborative, and communication role in DRC during the transition, the challenge of lack of plurality in ownership and control of media houses undermined the quality of reporting in terms of accuracy of reporting, independence, impartiality, objectivity, truthfulness, professionalism and integrity, as DRC politicians made "concerted efforts to find allies in the newspaper sector", with several media outlets "openly manifesting their political positions" without any attempts to hide their political allies, and some newspapers did not publish political messages and views that were in contrast with their own political ideology (BBC, 2006:27). This was made worse by the fact that even for radio stations, the majority of the private media were affiliated either to churches or political movements (Kayembe & Badoreck, 2005:108).

During the transitional period in the DRC, some sections of the media were heavily criticised for "irresponsible reporting" and disregard of journalism tenets that destroyed the spirit and momentum of the transitional government of national unity. When clashes between militias occurred in the city of Bunia, in Ituri Province in Northeastern DRC, in 2003, the Journaliste en danger (JED) – an NGO watchdog based in DRC – was despondent and

disconsolate in its statement towards the manner in which some newspapers reported the developments:

The media – and they may not even be aware of it – serve as a platform for warlords, who use the rivalry between different ethnic groups in Bunia and the DRC only for their own profit…The hate speeches of the conflict would have had the same effect if the media had not agreed to play the role of mouthpiece for the opposing sides (Fleshman, 2007:np).

Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the media, which compromised its watchdog role as a member of the CSO community during the transitional period in DRC, there were also challenges relating to the media operating environment. Despite the provisions of the transitional Constitution; the media's adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions were also affected by political interference, harassment and threats against journalists, restriction of media coverage and mobility of journalists, media censorship, and lack of press freedom. Fleshman (2007:np) asserted,

In a special report on the DRC in 2004, the CPJ observed that national and local officials sometimes exceeded their authority under the transitional constitution to censor and punish unfavourable or incendiary reporting - taking radio and television stations off the air and threatening legal action against reporters in contravention of the agreement. The [CPJ] also documented instances of continued harassment and assault of journalists by militias and political parties throughout the transition.

Overall, notwithstanding its ability to play the adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions during the transition, civil society in DRC was mainly affected by the inability of most CSOs to avoid political interference. Koko (2016) argues that civil society in the DRC ended up being the "de facto" political opposition, as the sector became heavily politicised, which weakened its "social force."

Civil Society's role in the Political Transition in the CAR

In the CAR, while civil society played its *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions, it was the political environment that largely influenced the impact of these roles and functions on the country's transitional politics throughout the transitional period between January 2013 and March 2016. Just as was the case with the

DRC transitional period, there were armed clashes between ex-Seleka rebels and Christian anti-balaka militias despite the establishment of the transitional government (Africa Renewal, 2014). During the entire duration of the transitional government, there continued to be violence and retaliation in communities, political instability, civil unrest, conflict-induced internal displacement of people, and human rights abuses which violated both domestic law and international law (United Nations, 2014). According to the United States Department of State (2016), the transitional period between 2013 and 2016 witnessed over 800 000 displaced people in the CAR, and some of these fled to neighbouring DRC, Cameroon and Chad, mainly as a result of intercommunal violence and retaliatory clashes between armed militias and communities.

Civil society in the CAR, however, managed to play a watchdog role in exposing violations of the CAR Order No. 005 of 13 April 2013, which established the National Transition Council, the Ceasefire Agreement, and the Libreville Political Agreement of 11 January 2013. In this regard, the media as a key component of civil society was also prominent in providing oversight of the National Transitional Council (NTC). This media includes the newspaper outlets, namely *Le Democrate, Echo de Centrafrique, Be Afrika, Le Citoyen, E Le Songo, Centrafrique Presse, Le Confident*; over 24 privately owned radio stations, mostly run by religious organisations; and one state-run television station (Television Centrafricaine). Ekomo-Soignet (2015) avers that the networks of community radio stations during the transitional period in the CAR created listening committees for people to discuss local issues and assist families in refugee camps to create networks amongst each other. However, as argued by the BBC (2023), the efficacy of the media in the CAR is undermined by the reality that most of the media outlets are "increasingly aligned with national politicians and foreign governments, especially Russia." This undoubtedly affected journalistic independence, impartiality, balance, and the effective communication role of the media as an element of civil society.

Several scholars credit the CAR civil *society's adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles* and functions during the Bangui National Forum in 2015, which contributed towards national reconciliation in the country (Schkolne & van der Merwe, 2023; Murray & Stigant, 2017; Nilsson et al., 2020). The Bangui National Forum was a week-long national conference on reconciliation that was organised by the CAR transitional government in May 2015

to find long-lasting solutions to the country's political instability and conflict. Several civil society representatives (from CSOs, the media, faith-based organisations, refugee populations, women's groups, groups representing various ethnicities, and the diaspora community) participated in the Bangui National Forum, which was made up of over 600 participants, and their input also led to the adoption of several agreements, including the Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction in the CAR, and the Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Repatriation (DDRR), which was signed by nine armed groups in the CAR in May 2015 (Schkolne & van der Merwe, 2023; Murray & Stigant, 2017; Nilsson et al., 2020).

Civil society was also key in playing their *adversarial and collaborative* roles through providing oversight to the implementation of the Bangui National Forum on National Reconciliation agreements. For instance, several CSOs worked in collaboration with the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) to coordinate the release of all children recruited by militia groups, and end the recruitment of child soldiers by CAR militia groups (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). These efforts led to the release of a total of 6 300 children (who served as combatants, cooks, and sex slaves in anti-balaka militia groups, former Seleka fighters and other rebel groups) between May 2015 and April 2016. These children were demobilised, reunited with their families, reintegrated into their respective communities, and provided with psychological counselling services (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2016). It is the inputs of CSOs that culminated in the later establishment of the CAR Special Criminal Court (SCC) in 2018 to investigate and prosecute violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as the CAR Truth, Justice, Reparation and Reconciliation Commission (TJRRC) in 2020 to investigate the truth around crimes committed from 1959 to 2019 and facilitate the restoration of the justice and dignity of all the victims/survivors and national reconciliation. Thus, civil society played a fundamental role in rebuilding peace, fostering reconciliation, preparing for the 2015-2016 general elections, representing views of grassroots communities in national forums, proving capacity building to reintegrated ex-combatants, and the "sensitization of communities, especially given the weak connection between the central government and the population" (Ekomo-Soignet, 2015).

Overall, the National Transitional Council (CNT) that presided over the transitional government of CAR between 2013 and 2016 largely depended on civil society to understand the needs of the communities across the CAR, and various CSOs played a pivotal role in ensuring that CNT had better access to information (Ekomo-Soignet, 2015). Challenges reported by the United States Department of State (2016), such as restrictions on freedom of speech and civil liberties, constraints on media freedom, persistence of conflict and political instability, and others, all created conditions that were not conducive for civil society to play its *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions.

Recommendations and Conclusion

From the analysis of the role of civil society in the DRC and CAR transitional politics, it can be noted that the various forms of civil society played an indispensable role which influenced the direction and outcome of transitional politics. However, what is apparent in the two cases is the fact that inasmuch as civil society undertakes its *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions, it is also incumbent upon transitional authorities to harness the force and power of civil society collective interventions in order to facilitate the achievement of the goals set for the transitional governments. Five key findings emerge from the discussion in this chapter.

Firstly, CSOs have been very prominent in the negotiations towards transitional agreements, and their inputs have shaped the structure, content and scope of the transitional agreements. In the DRC, CSOs participated in the ICD, while in the CAR, several civil society representatives participated in the Bangui National Forum on Reconciliation. Both dialogue processes and negotiations culminated in agreements that determined the direction of transitional politics.

Secondly, whereas civil society is mostly expected to carry out the *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions (Graham in De Jager et al., 2015: 174), the actual inclusion of civil society may make CSOs more impactful in transitional politics, transforming CSOs from being fringe lobbyists to participant players in the co-governance process. It is in the DRC that civil society representatives were allocated seats in the national assembly, senate, several transitional institutions, provincial executive level, senior management positions of parastatals, and diplomatic missions. This provides ownership, inclusivity and a sense of national reconciliation

during transitions. This was not the case in the CAR, where inclusivity was limited, affecting the sense of unity, reconciliation and genuine transition; hence, conflict and intercommunal clashes continued during the transition.

Thirdly, the politicisation of civil society affects the effectiveness of CSOs to execute their *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions. In both the DRC and CAR, some sections of civil society were politicised. As Koko (2016) observed, some CSOs in the DRC ended up being the "de facto" political opposition, as the sector became heavily politicised, weakening its "social force." Such a phenomenon undermines the CSOs' abilities to impartially and objectively fulfil their adversarial, collaborative, and communication roles and functions.

Fourthly, civil society's impact on transitional politics is neutralised by the absence of a conducive political and regulatory environment that undermine CSOs' operations. In both the DRC and CAR, the transitional governments allowed for the harassment and threats against journalists, restriction of media coverage and mobility of journalists, media censorship, and lack of press freedom, all of which limit the effective *adversarial, collaborative, and communication* roles and functions of the civil society.

In conclusion, periods of transitional governments should be considered opportune moments for political stabilisation, national reconciliation and inclusivity, and the start of political, governance, economic and security sector reforms for smooth political transition, as the state prepares for more genuine democratisation and democratic consolidation. The role of civil society should be acknowledged, and the democratic space should be broadened for civil society to effectively contribute towards a smoother political transition.

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Chapter Four

Political and Civil Society Elites, Governance, and Service Delivery: Lessons from Kenya and Rwanda

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Introduction

Good governance is an imperative for Africa because it determines the attainment of all the aspirations of the African people as enshrined in the African Union's Agenda 2063 (Mbaku, 2020). Former Secretary-General of the United Nations, the late Koffi Annan, once noted that good governance is the most vital factor in eradicating poverty and promoting sustainable development in Africa. Good governance determines the prosperity of nations, and we are not short of examples. Quality governance in a country does not only promote service delivery but also contributes significantly to the equality of happiness among the citizens (Ott, 2011). The African Development Bank encourages countries to endeavour to be effective, have in place strong and active civil societies, and encourage a thriving private sector in order to reap the fruits of good governance. For many decades now, good governance has been defined under the auspices of rules, institutions, and practices, ignoring the roles that political and civil society elites play in guaranteeing thriving democracies that provide private and public goods to their citizens.

The main objective of this study is to show that political and civil society elites play a major role in the quality of governance and service delivery in their countries. Political elites wield power that determines how resources are shared and distributed amongst citizens. Civil society elites are partners to governance and play a key role in providing a corrective voice to the governance system to ensure that they implement all their promises within the legal and human right frameworks (Ghaus-Pasha, 2005). In order to illustrate these important links, the study uses Kenya and Rwanda

as two East Africa neighbours that share similarities and contrasts in governance and service delivery. Whereas Kenya prides itself on being an important African democracy where citizens are actively engaged on how they are governed, especially through the electoral process, Rwanda as an autocracy has been reaping the fruits of improved service delivery and economic stability. These striking differences could be attributed to many factors, e.g., political histories, freedom of expression, media freedom, civic space, the electoral processes, and gender representation in government, among other differences. Ultimately, the study contrasts the decentralisation of power between Kenya and Rwanda and considers whether or not such reforms have benefited the political and civil society elites.

This study was guided by the elite theory, which postulates that power in a society is usually held by a small group of powerful minorities who in return rule the majority (Mariotti, 2022). The theory notes that an elite could be a person in the ruling class (the political elites). However, an elite could also refer to a person at the top of social or political hierarchy, meaning that one could find elites in any organisation, and in our case, even in civil society organisations. The aim of this study is to show that in both Kenya and Rwanda, there are politically organised and aligned groups of powerful and wealthy individuals, who are governing the countries and to a large extent determining how resources are shared and services are provided, hence the term "political elites." The political elites thus exert and access power through controlling the means of production and resources in a country. In contrast, when civil societies rise and distinguish themselves as organised and driving a common cause, they then earn their recognition and are called civil society elites. The distinguishing feature here, however, is that while we could have influential civil societies as a group, there could also be leaders or heads of civil societies who use such groups as tools to influence the governance of countries.

In both Kenya and Rwanda, the elite theory shows that political elites have evolved in the way they organise and exert control governance systems. Visibly, families, individuals, political parties, politicians, and civil societies hold power and determine the welfare of the majority (Daloz, 2007). In Kenya, power has been revolving around two main communities since independence, while in Rwanda, power has been in the hands of President Kagame since the year 2000, yet there are stark differences between the countries in terms of corruption, human right freedoms, and service delivery.

Both Kenya and Rwanda embraced decentralisation of power as a way to ensure that resources reached those lower in the social order, thereby improving service delivery.

The new decentralised system in Rwanda helped the government to improve service delivery in key sectors like health, curbed corruption, and improved governance so that the elected leader now has to provide services the citizens want. With the 30 districts as the point of entry for local government, today Rwanda can monitor the performance of each of these sectors. Rwanda's government has also succeeded in having very small administrative units, called cells, that help the government to mobilise communities to participate in government activities, including payment of taxes, thereby promoting inclusion and ensuring that all the citizens participate in the growth of their county (Goodwin, 2022). Hence, decentralisation, supported by governance structures, has continued to guarantee the stability present in Rwanda today (Van Tilburg, 2008).

Kenya acquired a new constitution in the year 2010, after a long struggle with a central power that was invested in the presidency and centralised in Nairobi. The new 2010 constitution devolved the system of governance in Kenya into 47 autonomous governments that are commonly called counties. Each of the counties became a semi-autonomous government, led by a governor and with oversight provided by a county assembly; one that depicted the national assembly. The county assemblies are composed of members of county assembly (MCAs), similar to the members of parliament at the national assembly. Each MCA would be in charge of the smallest administrative unit, called the ward. The governor and his deputy, the senator, the women's representative, and the MCAs are all elected by the people during the national elections, and hence the citizens have the power to put in place a county government that works for them.

This study adopted a targeted literature review to understand how elites in political and civil society spaces influence the governance and service delivery in both Kenya and Rwanda. Guided by the elite theory, the study reviewed historical, current and specific literatures on political and civil society elites in both Kenya and Rwanda. The study also leveraged available data on governance indices, civil society databases, Afrobarometer, world governance indicators (WGI), country-specific case studies, and local data bourses with data on governance and service deliveries,. This was followed by thematic analyses based on the nexuses between the elites and

service delivery, between the elites and decentralisation politics, and exploring the roles of civil society and the challenges they face in fighting for good governance and improved service delivery.

The Political Elites and Service Delivery

In Kenya, the political elites are currently classified into two main classes; the dynasties and the hustlers (Karanja, 2022). The dynasties refer to the political class who have been in power since Kenya gained independence, and are hence the "haves" in society. In contrast, the hustlers are the "have-nots", who have to fight to get power and live. As Kenya gained independence, some key families became known for their wealth and influence, and some political parties like the Kenya African National Union (KANU) became synonymous with communities like the Kikuyu, and with presidents like Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi. The Kenyatta and Odinga families have been household names in Kenya since 1963. In Rwanda, the citizens cannot forget names like Grégoire Kayibanda, Parmehutu, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Pasteur Bizimungu, Frank Habineza, and Paul Kagame. This is because the mention of these names conjures up ideas of power, wealth, and influence, and at times instils fear.

Since Rwanda and Kenya gained independence in 1962 and 1963, respectively, the political power transitions have been markedly different. Whereas Rwanda had only three presidents between 1994 and 2024, President Dr. William Samoei Ruto is now the fifth President Kenya has had between 1963 and 2024. There is so much to learn from these two political systems. President Paul Kagame has been criticised for clinging to power since April 22, 2000. Many still think he should not have run for a third term, and should have ceded power in 2017, guided a smooth transition, overseen the settling of a successor, and ultimately ensured that his legacy was intact (Pruitt, 2018).

In 2016, the constitution of Rwanda was successfully amended, allowing Paul Kagame to run again for president in the guise that that is what the people of Rwanda want of him. Some peculiarities ensued during this time. Kagame was allowed to run for another term of seven years (2017–2024). After 2024, the term limits were reduced to five years, and this also meant he would be eligible to run for another two terms. These constitutional amendments allowed Paul Kagame to be the president of Rwanda for another seventeen

years. The main reason for this special national treatment was because, through the RPF, he had managed to end the genocide and restore peace in Rwanda. Although he does not believe that he is the eternal president of Rwanda, it is hard to ignore the fact he is the real political elite in Rwanda.

History is perhaps what has put Rwanda on the harsh path towards autocracy, and this may be very good for the Rwandese people. In 1973, President Grégoire Kayibanda was ousted through a military coup; in 1994, President Juvénal Habyarimana was assassinated, and in that same year President Théodore Sindikubwabo was overthrown after only 102 days in office. On March 23rd, 2000, President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned from office. The Rwandese people had seen it all, especially during the bloody events that followed and culminated in genocide. There was the need for a leader to unite the country, and that is what Rwanda saw in President Paul Kagame. There was the need to have an elite party that would legitimise the government. Even if the world called Paul Kagame the enemy of unity, and of the future of Rwanda (Lu, 2019), the country has been stable since 1996 and no one can deny that.

Kenya, on the other hand, has only had one unsuccessful military coup of 1982, lasting only hours. Perhaps we had learnt from our neighbours but had not thought of the dire ramifications. Kenya has enjoyed political stability over the years. The only question that one would want answers to is whether this has translated into improved services, compared to Rwanda. Too much peace and democracy can be credited to niceties that Kenyans are not happy with. The political class in Kenya has continued to grow rich while the have-nots have also been increasing in numbers.

History has taught us that experience is the best teacher. Even though Rwanda has an executive that has central power and one that implements projects without much consultation, the results are visible. The people of Rwanda may not be enjoying free democratic space, because it has been misused before, leading to bloodshed. The civic space may not be the freest because there is still ethnic tension between and among communities. The voter turnout for President Kagame was 98.79% in 2017 because the citizens still chose stability over anything else recorded in the annals of history. President Kagame and the RPF have continued to deliver services and citizens can see this; the healthcare system is working, the cleaning and greening of the country is at its best; President Kagame has opened Rwanda to all Africans to come and visit without visas, and without

fear. The world will be taking the dollar, the euro, and the yuan to Rwanda soon and Rwanda's economy will continue to strengthen. If the people of Rwanda see the future that way, then expect President Kagame to be Rwanda's longest-serving president in their history.

The same cannot be said of Kenya. The political elites and elite parties have taken the electoral process as a conduit to enrich themselves. Instead of forming coalitions for development, they form super-alliances as vehicles to get into power and once there, the alliances collapse and everyone has to fight for their space to plunder public resources. This they do without fear, mostly to recoup the resources that they had spent in the elections, or even to ensure that they get rich enough because they are not sure of a second term in office. Whereas the corruption perception index (0 to 100 with 100 indicating a clean country and 0 highly corrupt) of Rwanda as of 2023 was at 53, and the country ranked 49th out 180 countries, Kenya's score was 30 and the country ranked 128th out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2024). The worldwide governance indicators (WGI), with one of the dimensions of governance as the control of corruption, shows that Rwanda in 2022 had a governance system that was 70.3% better in managing power and ensuring that power is not misused for private gain, but for the overall growth of the country, as shown in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1: Control of Corruption Ranks between Rwanda and Kenya, 1996–2022. Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2023

In Kenya, the political class, through the governance system, is shown at 24.1% in the correct use power. This is not surprising, as Kenya has been rocked by scandals that date back to the 1990s, and has been leading on this front (Hope, 2014; Nyingi, 2017). The data in Figure 1 shows that Kenya made the greatest strides in the fight against corruption between 2003 and 2013 under President Kibaki, who is now remembered as the most progressive president that Kenya has had. During his tenure as president, cases of corruption were rare and that made Kenya's economic recovery the most progressive (Gowon-Adelabu et al., 2018).

Kenyan politics is now gradually becoming one of the most lucrative careers and the envy of many young people (King, 2018). Many young people are now trying to join politics so that their futures are assured (Kimari et al., 2020). The youth in Kenya now fear that political patronage and politics of ethnicity are gradually stealing their futures away, and now they also want to join the political elites (Ranta, 2017). Where did the role models in politics go? I grew up aspiring to be a Mandela, Kwamen Nkrumah, a Nyerere, and a Kibaki. But when I look at the current elites, very few can show their faces when they retire, due to their guilt of failing to deliver the services that they promised their fellow local citizens. Some of them use "their time to eat" well, while others struggle to fit into society when they retire poor from politics (D'Arcy & Cornell, 2016).

The political environment in Kenya is friendlier than in Rwanda, where those trying to oppose or run against the RPF find themselves at times serving jail terms, or risking death. In Kenya, the political elites fight each other in broad daylight and brandish guns at one another; the younger crops of politicians call their elders all sorts of names; the opposition can abuse even a sitting president; the media is free to report all this without fear; the media can support any side of the political spectrum, and report everything the government is doing without any restrictions and censorship; Kenyans can spread all forms of propaganda on social media without accountability; and there are no political prisoners or torture chambers anymore. Kenya's political space should have taken service delivery to the next level without any excuses. Yet countries like Rwanda, with only 13.78 million people, make better policy decisions that are people-centred than a country like Kenya, with over 56 million people who demand goods and services.

While we can blame the political elites in both countries for their countries not being where they should be, compared to other

developing or developed countries, we must accept that political elites have also been evolving; in fact, the elites that now matter the most in these countries have also evolved and diversified. Today, political parties have become so influential that every politician aspiring to run for a position must align to a specific political party, and it becomes imperative to pay allegiance to the party at the expense of the electorate. Political parties are now more strategic and have the tyranny of numbers to influence which policies pass and which do not, who is appointed to which influential position, and in many cases to determine which regions get which resources (Maina, 2013).

In Kenya today, the Kenya Kwanza Coalition Government is led by President Ruto. The president is also the founder of the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), a party formed in December 2020 solely as a vehicle to clinch power. In the Kenya Assembly, the UDA party has 145 members of parliament out of 349 total members, with the opposition party, led by Right Honourable Raila Amollo Odinga, having only 86 members of parliament (Republic of Kenya, 2023). In the senate, the UDA has 32 out of the 67 senators. These numbers have been used wisely by the current regime to increase taxes through various bills like the Finance Bill Act of 2023, to influence appointments and vetting of key government positions, and to drive the social health insurance bill and the Bottom-Up Transformation Agenda that President Ruto would like to implement during his tenure. The Kenya Kwanza elites did their homework well, because the agendas of the government were passed with minimum resistance in both the national assembly and the senate. Yet Kenyans wait expectantly for more coalitions every five years. Why? Because our elites want to be on the wagon that looks likely to win the elections. This regular switching of political parties is one of the main reasons for election violence in Kenya, especially in cases where some of the Kenyan communities now have their political parties (Holmquist & Githinji, 2009). This ethnising of political parties now makes Kenya look like a political party state (Widner, 2023).

In Rwanda, the ruling party, RPF, is a coalition of six parties. In the 2017 general elections, the party clinched 40 out of 53 parliamentary seats. The party has 40 out of 80 possible members of parliament in Rwanda and this only cements the power the president has to make decisions. Out of 80 members of parliament, 49 are women, accounting for 61.25% of the Rwandese parliament. These numbers depict Rwanda as a country that has concentrated power in one coalition, and since President Kagame is the leader of RPF,

he has amassed a lot of executive power, making him look like an authoritative leader who leads Rwanda with an iron fist.

It is thus evident that the political elites in both Rwanda and Kenya use party vehicles to exert their political influence. If any politician is not part of the ruling coalition, it becomes very difficult to get resources to their constituents, especially if they are always criticising the ruling parties. This has happened frequently in Kenya. If a member of parliament is not in good standing with the patrons, then they become ineffective on the ground as the resources available to them are rationed and are often delayed, and hence the voters never see the impact of such leaders. In the end, this becomes very costly as they risk not being re-elected again, and their political careers fizzle out. This clearly shows that the political elites have to play their cards well, or they ultimately pay a high price for being independent, and serving their people with honesty (Mboya, 2020).

From the above analyses and comparisons between Kenya and Rwanda, it is clear that the cohesion between and among the political elites usually has dire ramifications for service delivery. As long as the opposition and the ruling party are fighting each other, the citizens suffer. It has become apparent that the political elites can form coalitions to deliver public goods but they can also form coalitions to clinch power, hang on to power, loot national resources, and form strong cartels that rule in perpetuity. That becomes perilous to a nation. Kenya and Rwanda can only hope that the political elites' attitudes change towards empowerment and growth, and create credible policies, because anything contrary will not be good for Africa's governance space (Scholte et al., 2021; Saunders, 2022).

The Wins and Losses of Decentralising Political Power in Kenya and Rwanda

As colonial rule in the majority of African countries ended, African people knew that it was time to lead themselves. For them, freedom meant they would get the power to say what they wanted, receive the services they required, and above all, have the ability to move within and outside their countries without fear of being arrested and detained. Freedom for them was almost equated to improved service delivery. But they might have forgotten one key aspect; that most of the freedom fighters who fought the colonial powers were just mercenaries who had not been trained to lead their countries

to economic recovery. That is why, when the colonial masters left, many African countries were plunged into a leadership crisis that still persists. The leaders who took over either became dictators or authoritarians who ruled their fellow Africans by force. This led to much discontent and many revolts, uprisings, coups and assassinations, and in some countries like Rwanda and Kenya, ethnic tensions that have persisted to the present day. Over time, some of the African leaders clung to power for so long that they had total power to themselves. In Kenya, for instance, it took serious agitations for change to dislodge President Moi from power after he had led the country for 24 years, and still wanted to carry on. In Rwanda, it took coups and assassinations to remove some of the presidents from power. What was even more worrying was that all these leaders had concentrated their powers in political parties, and capital cities became ivory towers. In Kenya, the government since independence sat in the capital, Nairobi, and Kenyans needed to travel to the city to obtain some of the government services; when they got there, they had to cope with long queues, and would be forced to find a place to sleep and return to the queue the following day. Decentralisation of power started becoming a serious topic in both countries. To decentralise power required constitutional reviews and amendments (Cheeseman et al., 2016).

In 2003, Rwanda acquired a new constitution that facilitated political decentralisation, giving citizens the power to vote and amplifying their voices in governing the country. This eroded the capacity for the ruling parties to appoint people to lead, because this was prone to biases that entrenched political cronyism. The Rwandan people would now elect their presidents, the members of parliament, and local leaders through local government elections. Civic participation grew, and the people have been turning out in large numbers to elect their leaders. For example, in the 2010 presidential elections, 97% of the registered voters voted, with 93% voting in the local government elections. These statistics improved in the 2017 elections, where President Kagame earned 98.79% of the total votes (Republic of Rwanda, 2012). The 2017 elections had a turnout of 95.8%.

The now famous devolution of power in Kenya has brought power closer to the people, just as in Rwanda. Today, people are getting resources on the ground. Formerly marginalised areas that never felt the impact of the government are feeling that the government is closer. Resources in Kenya are shared using a well–

crafted formula by the Commission for Revenue Authority (CRA). The formula is usually subjected to very serious national scrutiny, and the members of the general public are asked to give their inputs as to what metrics and variables should be used to share the national bread equally across the 48 governments (1 national and 47 county governments). The current third basis formula (the third formula to be used since devolution came into effect in 2013) will be sharing resources until the financial year 2024/2025, after which the CRA will have a fourth formula to share resources for five financial years, 2025/26 to 2029/30. The third basis formula allocates the shareable revenue based on the following indices: 17% based on the health index, 10% on the agriculture index, 18% on the population index, 20% basic share index, 5% on the urban index, 8% on the land index, 8% on the road index, and 14% on the poverty index. The shareable revenue since devolution started has increased from Ksh. 316.5 billion, to Ksh. 370 billion, to Ksh. 391.1 billion and now, counties are demanding Ksh. 409.88 billion. The fact that Kenya now has the Public Finance Management Act (2012) in place, determining how resources are collected and shared, is great progress in the right direction. Kenyans have been keen to ensure that these resources are prudently used to deliver the services they need. Devolution in Kenya has been implemented with a lot of reservations because not all functions have been devolved. For instance, health policy in Kenya resides with the central government while the provision of basic healthcare services, including recruiting of healthcare personnel through county service boards, is now left to the counties. Although many other functions like education are partially devolved, devolution in Kenya is gradually paying dividends, but not without challenges.

According to the tenth Rwanda Governance Scorecard (RGS) in 2023, the transparency indicator stood at 98.4%, making it the highest-performing indicator in the country. This was complemented by the improvement in the anti-corruption indicator which stood at 78.31%. It was reported that 81% of the Rwandese people were satisfied with how the government was fighting corruption, 90% and 79% felt that corruption was absent in both private and public sectors, respectively, and 83.3% of citizens believed that there was no corruption in the public procurement domains (Rwanda Government Board, 2023). If these statistics are correct, then Rwanda is on a path that not many African countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are on. This is because corruption is a cancer that is eating away the lives of so many generations. With his ruthlessness, President Paul Kagame

is saving the lives of many generations to come in Rwanda, just by ensuring that the resources are not stolen and those caught in corruption cases are jailed. I wish this was the case in Kenya. Why?

As devolution is taking root in Kenya, the new county elites have equally been very busy misusing the resources and using this time to eat their way to wealth and influence (D'Arcy & Cornell, 2016). The first government under devolution witnessed the biggest cases and scandals, as some of the governors colluded with their financial officers to loot resources. By the end of 2023, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) in Kenya was already investigating over 21 sitting and former governors over plunder and theft of public resources that ran into billions of shillings. Most of the cases in court pertain to misappropriation of public funds, conflicts of interest, nepotism, bribery, political patronage, fraudulent procurement processes, having "ghost" workers on the payroll systems, hefty pending bills where local citizens who did business with the counties had not been paid at all, abuse of power, and failure to adhere to the public finance management laws and regulations (Fridah, 2023). The fourth quarterly report by EACC for the period 1st October 2023 to 31st December 2023, released in January 2024, summarised 24 high-level cases of devolution elites who had been implicated in high-end corruption cases, some of whom are still in office (EACC, 202). All these high-profile cases have been submitted to the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) but to date, not even one conviction has occurred. Only staged arrests happen in Kenya, for the media and optics, but sometimes such cases die out due to a lack of testimony and enough evidence. This level of impunity has perpetuated corruption in Kenya. This means that although decentralisation is yielding fruits, these would be greater if there was less embezzlement and wanton corruption.

Decentralisation of power should not be commensurate with decentralisation of sleaze. Decentralisation should mean bringing power and resources closer to the citizens. The devolution of power in countries like Kenya should have meant improved service delivery through increased accountability, as the political elites are closer to the people. Decentralisation, for many countries like Rwanda, should not translate to state capture by local elites that are close to power. Decentralisation of power was meant to ensure that the needs of the citizens were better met, with development of regions being the focus as the grassroots elites understood the plight of their people very well. Decentralisation seems to have helped in

the evolution of new elites that are now lining up to benefit from increased liberalisation and trickling of resources to the citizens (Transparency International, 2021). It may suffice that the citizens stay awake and ensure that they guard their resources from the moment they reach their jurisdictions, because the political class has lost credibility and trust in securing the economic stability and future of the next generations. Who then can save the citizens and decentralisation?

The Civil Society Elites, Their Abilities and Challenges in African Societies

Much of the recent literature has explored specific group elites including the political elites, business elites, power-broking elites, religious elites, and academic and sporting elites, to name a few. The common consensus is the elites will always have control and influence over something that the rest find useful, and hence they have comparative or even absolute advantage in whatever arena they wish to exert influence (Scott, 2014). This concept of elitism can also be extrapolated to the advocacy sector where we find civil societies and activists. Civil societies could be trade unions, churches, special interest groups, the media, students, professional associations and even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These societies endeavour to exert pressure on both government and non-governmental actors, as well as individual elites, to implement the right policies, programmes and projects that improve the welfare of the people (Wanyande, 2009; Maina, 2020). In this space, civil society becomes an elite based on the space they occupy, the issue they are agitating about, the influence they have in being heard, and above all their ability to dominate other civil societies. This dominance could be based on the amount of resources they have access to, and even who is funding their activities.

Civil society elites could also be those civil society organisations with credible sources of information, thereby always putting themselves ahead of everyone else when issues arise. These elites could be so influential that they cannot be ignored by the political, business and administrative elites in their operations, because their statements or noise reverberates far and wide. This then means that they have earned their niche and the work they do has serious impacts. Globally, we have no shortage of these elites, e.g., Plan International, Amnesty International, Oxfam, Global Hand, Danish

Refugee Council, Kenya Green Building Society, World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), International Crisis Group, and Human Rights Watch, among others. These civil society elites that have distinction in their works and influence always find themselves at the forefront in holding governments, world leaders, politicians, and even nations accountable for violating the rights of the people, or even fighting for improvement in the welfare of the citizens, better habitable environments, climate change, wildlife and marine life, and safe political environments. Notably, these elites are, and ought to be, impartial in their works to be effective and live up to their mandates.

In Africa, the civil society elites that have continued to thrive are those that have an international affiliation, for they tend not to be easy to sway and derail, especially in Africa where the ruling elites may not want to be on the spot. Local and grassroots civil society organisations (CSOs), especially in Africa, have not been very effective for various reasons. First, the upcoming civil societies are money-oriented and they follow the money. If they do not have resources, they risk being enticed and misused by the political elites in the promise of resources. This way, they lose their focus and autonomy to do their work. Secondly, political interference and intimidation occur. In Kenya, for instance, I see young CSOs and their leaders threatened with legal suits, such as defamation, whenever they have threatened political elites. Sometimes, CSO offices are torched to instil fear in their leaders; for some, that becomes the last time they raise their voices. Police in Kenya have been used to scatter CSO movements and demonstrations. They teargas and scatter peaceful protests, and use live bullets on activists and demonstrators. Human rights activists have been arrested and charged with tax evasion, and some CSOs have closed down on the pretext of being a threat to national security through perpetuating terrorism and extremism. Thirdly, most countries in Africa do not have strong legal frameworks to accommodate civil society and hence, they lack support.

In Rwanda, President Kagame has been criticised for muzzling not only the media and his close political competitors, but also narrowing the civil society space. Civil society in Rwanda has very little say in shaping the policies of the government because of their ad hoc nature, especially when they have to measure what they say about the workings of government. Furthermore, through enactment of legislation, like that of 2001 that ensured that the government of Rwanda can monitor all the activities of local and international CSOs, the government can investigate the sources of their finance,

and the kinds of projects and programmes they are driving. This has instilled fear in civil activists, and the CSOs therefore become apprehensive about their actions as they do not want to be seen as being against the government, because they will face the wrath of being either closed down, with staff expelled or leaders facing jail terms (Gready, 2010). Furthermore, since 1994, the mistrust among the ethnic communities has made the ground hostile for CSOs to have any impact, even as the country tried to ensure peace (François, 2017).

According to the Rwanda Civil Society Barometer (2023), 50.2% of the sampled CSOs were advocating for social protection, 37.8% for education, 28.6% for health, 9,2% for justice and reconciliation issues, 7.1% for governance and decentralisation, and 0.4% urbanisation and settlements in the rural areas. It was also reported that 50.5% of the CSOs were found in rural areas, 18.6% in urban areas and 30.9% operated in both urban and rural areas. Further, 62.55% of the population reported having participated in CSO activities and programmes in 2023 (Rwanda Government Board, 2023). These reports paint a very rosy picture for CSOs in Rwanda, but the literature, and researchers, tell otherwise. One thing is clear; human rights violations in Rwanda are prevalent; freedom of speech is restricted, and media freedom is gagged. The fact that you will rarely hear Rwandese people speak ill of their government is itself questionable. It is like being in a marriage where both spouses always speak highly of each other, hold hands even in public, and kiss each other but deep down in their souls, they loathe the union and wish they had a space to vent their frustrations.

Civil society is key to guaranteeing good governance in a country. With both Kenya and Rwanda decentralising their political and governance system, this only means a new space for the CSOs. With increasing levels of corruption, this calls for new opportunities and challenges for the CSOs. With the advent of the impacts of climate change, the CSOs in this space have their work well cut out for them. With governments in both of these countries depicting new power dynamics following system and regime changes, the CSO elites also have to monitor these changes. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing many CSO elites in ensuring that good governance prevails is the dynamic nature of the world; in politics, the elites are becoming wiser each day and finding better ways to entice the CSO elites, including gagging them and making their work more difficult each day. This means that the CSO elites have to reinvent themselves

regularly. This may call for retooling themselves to remain relevant in their work. With scarce resources, this has not been easy, and some of the CSOs have gradually lost their effectiveness in executing their mandates.

There are numerous trends emerging in Africa, including regional trading blocks taking root, countries joining the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to trade as one, countries amending their constitutions and legislations, unconstitutional changes in government, political elites refusing to relinquish power, a revitalised African Union that wants to implement Agenda 2063 of the Africa we want, increasing violation of human rights, the onset of the fifth industrial revolution through the escalated quest for digitisation, soaring use of the internet and social media, evolving geopolitics, increasing cases of cyber security and bullying, climate change, the Ukraine–Russia War, declining democratic space, terrorism and extremism, big data, artificial intelligence, United Nations Agenda 2030 though the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), global pandemics, the rising cost of living resulting from global macroeconomic shocks, and emerging global superpowers like the BRICS (Daniel & Neubert, 2019; Arriola & Rakner, 2023). These pose huge challenges to the civil society elites; inadequate resources, resistance in spaces where they have been ineffective, dwindling civic space, lack of political will and support, and lack of expertise in some areas. These challenges are not likely to be reduced soon.

It is therefore a wake-up call to the CSOs and elites in these spaces to wake up and think out of the box so that they remain the backbone they are to African societies. They must also avoid being donor-dependent in mobilising their resources because when such funds dry out, their civic capabilities shrink and they become ineffective. A new model of funding civic works must be thought of, e.g., seed funding, crowdfunding, fee-for-services, civic endowment and trust funds, and partnering with the private and public sectors to raise civic grants. Civil society elites must also ensure they approach the hostile political and legal environments not as competitors with the existing leadership regimes, but as partners, all with the one common goal of ensuring society's welfare through oversight and maintaining checks and balances.

Conclusion

The main objective of this study was to provide a critical and systematic review of Kenya and Rwanda's political and civil society elites, and the role they play in their governance systems to ensure delivery of quality public and private goods. The study found that that nature of the political elites in both countries is determined by their respective histories. Kenya has not been affected by political coups, and hence democracy has thrived, allowing citizens participate in the electoral process where they have managed to change the elites who govern them. This has greatly contributed to the scramble for, and looting of, resources, which has greatly hampered service delivery. Civil society elites in Kenya have been effective because of an enabling legal framework, and therefore have been strong champions of the implementation of the new constitution, providing oversight to the political elites to ensure that they do not abuse power and perpetuate corruption.

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Chapter Five

Mitigating the Challenges of Political Transition in Nigeria and Ghana

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Introduction

The advent of democracy in Africa also highlighted the importance of democratic transition. Democratic transition refers to the process by which a new regime or administration emerges through elections, to take over leadership power. It is a regime transformation process, usually from a non-democratic to a democratic regime, or simply a change of leadership elements, with or without meaningful socio-political and economic reconstruction (Diamond, 2012; Musa, 2022). Notably, the emphasis is on election, with the process legitimising the power change. Owing to the quality of election processes in Africa, peaceful transitions of power between incumbent and opposition has largely remained problematic and rather infrequent over the years. Despite claims of democratic practices, experiences of democratic transitions are few. Electoral processes on the continent are characterised by widespread manipulation by incumbents in efforts to remain in power (Idowu, 2021; Cho & Logan, 2013). Common trends of peaceful and democratic transition across the continent are those marked with transition from the sitting president to the candidate of the ruling political party. In cases where transition of power involves the incumbents and oppositions, the transitions are often forced and met with restrictions (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a; Idowu, 2021a). Generally, smooth political transitions are critical for a nation's stability and development as it builds the foundation for resilient institutions, promotes democratic values, and creates an environment conducive to sustainable economic and social progress. Ndu-Anunobi et al. (2024) note that when power changes hands seamlessly, essential government functions continue uninterrupted, preventing disruptions that can impact economic stability and public services. Consequently, transition periods in political leadership are

critical junctures that can significantly shape the trajectory of a nation's development and stability.

In Ghana and Nigeria, political leadership transitions have been significant and often unrestrained processes shaped by the country's historical, political, and socio-economic factors. For instance, the historical contexts of the two nations provides a backdrop for understanding the complexities and challenges involved in changing and transitioning political leadership in Nigeria and Ghana. Nigeria and Ghana share certain qualities that make both countries comparable. Apart from ranking on democracy, the shared history of the two nations provides a foundation for comparison. While Ghana obtained its independence in 1957, Nigeria became independent in 1960 from British Colonial rule. The early post-independence periods for the two nations was marked by a series of military coups, counter-coups, authoritarian behaviour, and economic struggles leading to political instability (Idowu, 2021a). Despite these challenges, Ghana transitioned back to democratic rule in 1992. Ever since, the nation has held multiple successful elections and peaceful transitions of power between political parties (Idowu, 2021). Nigeria, on the other hand, experienced intermittent periods of civilian rule and military interventions throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In 1999, Nigeria transitioned to civilian rule with the election of Olusegun Obasanjo as president, marking the end of military dictatorship. Subsequent elections in Nigeria have seen a mix of peaceful transitions and contested outcomes (Idowu, 2021a). Both nations have grappled with issues of corruption and governance, ethnicity, and regional dynamics which often influenced leadership transitions and public trust in political institutions (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a; CJID, 2024).

However, Nigeria and Ghana, unlike other countries on the continent, have managed to break the trend and over the years, peaceful power transitions between incumbent and oppositions government have been witnessed. Ghana is one of the most highly-ranked democracies in Africa, with 6.30 overall democracy index points, and with 8.33 points on the electoral process and pluralism, is ranked sixth regionally and 65th globally (EIU, 2024). Ghana's democracy has proven stable, with an uninterrupted transition from one democratically elected government to another since 1992 (CJID, 2024; EIU, 2024). Nigeria, on the other hand, is ranked as a hybrid democracy with an overall democracy index score of 4.23, and a 5.17 index score for electoral process and pluralism (EIU, 2024). Nigeria's

2023 general elections suffered from credibility issues and massive voter apathy, with a 26.72% voter turnout (Amata, 2023). Nigeria has maintained its regional ranking at number 19 since 2022. Equally, while patterns of successful political transitions have been recorded in some African countries (Mungai, 2014; Songwe, 2016), Nigeria and Ghana possess certain unique qualities that deserve special attention. For instance, both nations, (Nigeria in 2015 and Ghana in 2017) experienced a transfer of power, from a sitting president who was seeking re-election, to an opposition party (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b). Ghana, having experienced the smoothest transfer of power from a sitting president to the opposition, is ahead of other West African countries in this regard (Songwe, 2016).

Despite these noted successes in political transition between the two nations, there are notable challenges that obscure their efforts towards total commitment to democratic principles. For instance, the impact of ethnic diversity and struggles for power control have had detrimental impacts on smooth political power transition and consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Green, 2021; Sefa-Nyarko, 2021; Idowu, 2021a; Aliyu & Ambali, 2021). Furthermore, election credibility, corruption and embezzlement of public funds have also continued to hinder the two nations' efforts towards embracing democratic principles (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Idowu, 2021a; Aliyu & Ambali, 2021; Ndu-Anunobi et al., 2024). With these challenges being typical of most African nations, this chapter explores how Ghana and Nigeria, two prominent nations on the African continent, navigate these challenges. The discussion in this chapter, therefore, uncovers the strategies used and offers recommendations to overcome the ensuing challenges, and corresponds to the main research question that states;

> How Ghana and Nigeria mitigate the challenges threating collaborative efforts as far as political leadership transition is concerned?

To respond to this question, the chapter examines strategies employed in navigating political transitions by drawing insights from the experiences of Ghana and Nigeria. The discussion draws a comparative analysis of challenges experienced by the two nations and identifies strategies employed by each to navigate the challenges. The chapter contributes to the wider body of knowledge on political leadership in Africa. Moreover, the findings inform not only policy

but also practice for other African nations on the potential challenges related to political transitions.

The study adopts a descriptive research approach within the context of a qualitative research design. The approach gives an in-depth understanding of the themes and trends within the discourse of democratic transitions in Nigeria and Ghana. The study applies a desktop documentary analysis by reviewing relevant academic literature, government structures, and reports related to political leadership transition in Africa, and in Ghana and Nigeria in particular. A desktop documentary analysis involves a guided scanning of literature, data collection from existing sources, synthesis, interpretation and presentation of findings (Eichler & Schwarz, 2019). Consequently, the study relies on the critical review of existing relevant literatures pertaining to democracy, political leadership transition, election, government structures and social political dynamics of the two countries. The literature consulted included peer-reviewed articles, books, and periodicals of international organisations indicating historical events globally, in Africa and in Ghana and Nigeria. Publicly available data were accessed from various search engines such as Scopus, Google Scholar, PubMed and also from reliable government websites for relevant government structures and policy documents related to democratic processes and political leadership. The methodological approach adopted, that is, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, is not aimed at triangulating, considering the multiple sources itemised, but rather focuses on expressing and justifying the reliability of the information discussed.

Overview of Political Systems

A political system generally refers to the civil aspect of statehood, the formal and informal structures and functions that manifest a state's sovereignty over a territory and people (Verney, 2013; Thomson, 2022). While there is a tendency to view a political system as an abstract of inputs and outputs, functions and institutions (Bang, 2020), it also reflects a balance between individuals, that is, their competing interests and capabilities, and reflects a specific status quo. A political system is also a balance of powers through a definition of authoritative roles, laws and norms, an allocation of rights and duties with those fulfilling the roles, and implies that political elites have the right to command others (Verney, 2013; Thomson, 2022;

Bang, 2020). Therefore, a political system, by definition, is a set of different institutions established politically, to ensure the free and fair distribution of resources within a given society.

Reflecting on political systems in Ghana and Nigeria, both nations operate a presidential system, yet differ in their government structures (Nte et al., 2020). Nigeria operates a federal republic system of government with three tiers, that is, federal, state and local, with the president being the head of state and government, elected for a maximum of two four-year terms. Ghana, on the other hand, operates a unitary republic divided into regions and districts with the president being both the head of state and government, serving a maximum of one four-year term. In Ghana's unitary government, all powers of the government are vested in the central government, while in Nigeria's federal government, powers are divided between the centre, the federal government and the units, including the state and local. Both nations have a multiparty system, with presidential and parliamentary elections being held after a tenure period of four years (Idowu, 2021a). Nigeria has several political parties, with the two major ones historically being the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All-Progressives Congress (APC). Other notable parties include the All-Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Ghana has an equally diverse political landscape, with parties such as the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) being the major players. Other parties, like the Convention People's Party (CPP) and the Progressive People's Party (PPP) also contribute to the political landscape. The institutional framework in both nations includes an independent judiciary, legislature, and executive branches, in Nigeria at both federal and state levels and in Ghana at state, regional and district levels. While Ghana has made tremendous efforts in strengthening its institutions, such as the judiciary and anti-corruption agencies, in Nigeria profound concerns regarding judicial integrity, corruption and delays judiciary proceedings have been raised over the years (Idowu, 2021a; Nte et al., 2020).

Nigeria has faced challenges related to election transparency, including allegations of voter fraud, irregularities, and violence during elections. Efforts to improve transparency and credibility have been ongoing. Ghana is often cited as a model for electoral transparency in Africa, with generally peaceful elections and a commitment to democratic principles. However, concerns about voter registration and occasional disputes have surfaced. Nigeria has grappled with

challenges such as political instability, corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, and weak institutions. These issues have impacted governance effectiveness and hindered socio-economic development. While Ghana has made strides in democratic governance, it still faces challenges such as corruption, youth unemployment, and infrastructural development gaps. Efforts to address these challenges are ongoing. Overall, both Nigeria and Ghana have vibrant political systems with democratic structures, albeit facing distinct challenges and strengths in their governance processes.

Democratic Consolidation and Political Leadership Transition

Democratic consolidation is a process through which democratic norms or 'rules of the game' become accepted by all powerful stakeholders, such as labour, faith-based organisation (FBOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business communities and the military without any contemplation of a return to dictatorship by any important political actor (Obiagu, Udeji-Okpalaku, & Udeh, 2021). Elections are viewed as the litmus test for democratisation, especially within the predominance of liberal democracy that has reduced democratisation to multipartism and election (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b). Democracy is explained in terms of essential procedures governing the elections and behaviour of government officials; consequently, it is inconceivable to contemplate democracy outside the context of elections. Elections, as an important symbol of democracy, are an important aspect of modern political leadership transition. Elections have become the single most important indicator of democracy, and equally a mechanism upon which democratic transition can be realised. However, as elections remain significant to modern representative government, it is crucial to note that several institutions play a crucial role in enabling a smooth and lawful leadership transition. Institutions like the judiciary, legislative and executive branches, electoral commission, civil society organisations (CSOs), political parties, media, and international observers, influence the quality of the election process and equally the political power transfer between parties (Idowu, 2021; Musa, 2022). Therefore, reflecting on elections and the corresponding institutional structure within a country signifies an important yardstick for assessing democracy and political leadership transfers.

The judiciary plays a critical role in resolving election disputes and upholding the rule of law during leadership transitions. Courts may adjudicate on matters such as election petitions, disputes over electoral processes, and constitutional interpretations related to transitions of power (Audu, 2020). The legislative body, such as the parliament or congress, is involved in leadership transitions through various mechanisms. For example, in parliamentary systems, the composition of the legislature may change following elections, impacting the balance of power and government formation. The electoral commission is responsible for organising and conducting elections, by overseeing voter registration, polling, vote counting, and announcing election results. The executive branch, led by the incumbent president or prime minister, is directly involved in facilitating a smooth transition of power. This includes cooperating with incoming leaders, providing access to government resources and information, and ensuring continuity of essential government functions. Political parties are key players in leadership transitions, especially in multiparty systems. Winning parties or coalitions then form the new government, appointing leaders to executive positions and influencing policy direction. CSOs, including election monitoring groups and advocacy organisations, play a vital role in ensuring transparency, fairness, and accountability during leadership transitions. They monitor electoral processes, raise awareness about democratic principles, and advocate for free and fair elections (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a). The media plays a crucial role in informing the public about election processes, candidates' platforms, and election results. Independent and responsible media coverage contributes to transparency and public trust in the electoral process. International organisations, such as the United Nations, African Union, and regional bodies like ECOWAS, often observe and monitor elections to ensure they meet international standards. Their presence helps enhance the credibility and legitimacy of leadership transitions. Security agencies, including police forces and military units, play a role in maintaining peace and security during elections and potential transition periods. Their presence is essential to prevent violence and maintain public order. These institutions work together to uphold democratic principles, ensure the legality and legitimacy of leadership transitions, and promote political stability and governance continuity.

Political transition is more than a mere handover of power between the incumbent and the elected government, but a totality of transformation of a country's sociocultural, political and economic

values, experiences and processes under a social change (Audu, 2020). According to Ebong and Ozinegbe (2020), political transition entails grafting of new values or an aversion of new values and defence of the old ones in an extant social system. It involves a change in leadership elements, with or even without any meaningful socio-political or economic reconstruction. Especially between rival parties, political transition under a democratic set-up has always been a momentous event. In Ghana and Nigeria, the situation is the same, given the chaos and confusion associated with political power struggles and transitions. The dispensation of power between the incumbent government and the upcoming regime, especially if it involves different political parties, has been the greatest challenge to democratic consolidation. Lamentably, the two nations are marked by unprecedented and massive embezzlement, corruption, and looting of public funds meant for employment opportunities and developmental projects. Corruption and governance issues have plagued both countries, affecting the smooth transition of power and the effectiveness of new leadership. Consequently, the two nations face mass unemployment, poverty, increasing crime waves and deplorable living conditions. Given this backdrop, the numerous challenges pertaining to political transition and equally numerous strategies in overcoming these challenges are noted and presented in the following sections.

Political Leadership Transition in Ghana and Nigeria - Challenges

A review of relevant literature reveals challenges hindering political transition that are common to the two nations, clustered into three groups: military coups and political instability; ethnic and regional politics; and election credibility. Several military coups in Ghana and Nigeria have occurred (Idowu, 2021a; Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Obiagu, Udeji-Okpalaku, & Udeh, 2021). The shared history of military coups between Ghana and Nigeria includes the experience of political turbulence and instability. While both nations have transitioned from military regimes to democractic political leardership, traces and the possibily of military coups have always clouded their political transitions. Diverse ethnic and regional political dynamics equally hampers political transitions in Ghana and Nigeria (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Green, 2021; Sefa-Nyarko, 2021; Rustad, 2008; Idowu, 2021a). Ethnic diversity and regional politics have historically exhibited significant influences on political transitions, resulting

in adverse tension and regional conflicts (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Okeke & Ahmed, 2023). Equally, while elections are still regarded as the appropriate vehicle for democratic power transition, the credibility of the election process has remained a challenge in Ghana and Nigeria. Corruption and allegations of rigging the election results have continued to characterise election practices in the two nations (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a; Sefa-Nyarko 2021; Idowu, 2021a; Aliyu & Ambali, 2021). Table 3 below presents the common challenges faced by Ghana and Niger.

Table 3: Challenges to Political Transition in Ghana and Nigeria

	Challenge	**Literature Source**
1.	Military coups and Political instability	Akinola & Makombe (2024); Musa (2022); Idowu (2021a); Obiagu, Udeji-Okpalaku, & Udeh (2021); Idowu & Mimiko (2020b)
2.	Ethnic and Regional Politics	Idowu & Mimiko (2020b); Green (2021); Sefa-Nyarko (2021); Rustad (2008) Idowu (2021a)
3.	Election Credibility	Idowu & Mimiko (2020a); Sefa-Nyarko (2021); Idowu, (2021a); Aliyu & Ambali, (2021)

Military coups and instability have predominantly defined political power transitioning in Ghana and Nigeria. Historically, both nations experienced periods of military rule and coups, leading to instability and disruptions in governance. While Ghana underwent coups in 1966, 1972 and 1981, Nigeria experienced several coups and military regime changes, most notably in 1966, 1975, 1983, with prolonged military rule from 1985 to 1999 (Idowu, 2021a). Following its independence, Nigeria was under military rule for almost 30 years, with the exception of the period 1979 to 1983. Ever since the Biafran civil war, Nigeria has had extensive low-intensity and intercommunal conflicts, with escalating corruption and political violence. However, Okeke and Ahmed (2023) attest that there is a clear correlation between the historical pattern of military governance and coup risks. Consequenlty, the increased volatility and resurgence of military coups in the West African bloc increases the likelihood of Ghana and Nigeria to succumb to military coups (Akinola & Makombe, 2024; Brooke-Holland, 2023).

Equally, ethnic and regional politics have continued to frustrate political transition in Ghana and Nigeria. The two nations' searches for a sustainable government structure, whether federal or unitary, has been complicated by vulnerabilities associated with ethnicity, among other factors. The diverse ethnic and regional dynamics often influence political transition and power struggles in the two nations, sometimes leading to tension and conflict during leadership changes (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Green, 2021). While outlawing ethnicity in politics, the constitutions and political structures in the two nations provide for other depoliticised outlets for expressing diversity, especially through decentralisation and legitimisation of chieftaincy institutions. While silencing ethnicity party politics, the constitutions have instead legalised alternative avenues for ethnic expression – actualised through the Local Government Act and Chieftaincy Act. For instance, Ghana's provisions in Articles 55, 248 and 276 of the 1992 constitution curtails extreme ethnic politics through the limit it places on ethnicity in party politics (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021). Likewise, Sections 14(3) and 14(4) of the 1979 constitution, which are repeated verbatim in Sections 15(3) and 15(4) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, recognise the multi-ethnic and multi-religious characteristic of the population (Rustad, 2008). Despite these safeguarding provisions, political power has remained in the hands of a few ethnic groups in the two states. Political institutions in the two nations have traversed decentralised parliamentary regionalism, presidential consociationalism and a rotational presidency, aimed at accommodating the interests of dominant ethnic groups. The Asantes and Ewes have consistently taken entrenched political positions in Ghana since 1992 (Idowu, 2021a; Sefa-Nyarko, 2021). Likewise, in Nigeria, political power has been predominantly exchanged between the three prominent ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo (Ibo) (Rustad, 2008; Idowu, 2021a). The governmental structures of the federal republic for Nigeria and the corresponding unitary republic in Ghana both promote ethnic groups through chieftaincy, although with some limitations on political powers (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021). While the countries have experienced some successful (and several failed) coups d'état, ethnicity remains a thorny issue, and a hotbed for both conflict and consensus building. However, ethnic tensions have not pervaded the politics of Ghana as perniciously as they have in Nigeria.

As free, fair and credible elections continue to be elusive in developing nations, Nigeria and Ghana are no exceptions. Electoral challenges have also plagued both countries. Over the years, both

Nigeria and Ghana have faced electoral challenges related to electoral processes, including allegations of rigging, violence during elections, and disputes over electoral outcomes (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a). Election-related violence, including intimidation, harassment, and even physical attacks, have been a concern in both Nigeria and Ghana (Aliyu & Ambali, 2021). Violence instigated by political actors, supporters, or other groups seeking to influence the outcome of the elections have dominated the election processes in Nigeria and Ghana. Equally, electoral fraud, irregularities and malpractices such as ballot stuffing, vote-buying, and result manipulation undermine the fairness and credibility of elections and ultimately the democratic transition process (Idowu, 2021). Institutional factors, institutional choices and the ensuing administrative and political behaviour with regard to election management contribute both to the transition and the consolidation of new democracies. Resource constraints and weaknesses in the legal and regulatory frameworks, coupled with corruption, contribute to disputes, legal challenges and a lack of public trust in election outcomes, impacting democratic power transitions.

Political Leadership Transition - What Worked in Ghana and Nigeria

Political transition and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Ghana have faced numerous complex challenges as a result of long-term military involvement in African politics, corruption, and questionable election governance even after the return of democracy. While far from being perfect, these challenges have not deterred political transition and democratic consolidation in Ghana and Nigeria. Ghana stands as one of the most highly-ranked stable democracies in Africa (CJID, 2024; EIU, 2024). Equally, Nigeria, as a hybrid democracy, although suffering from election credibility and massive voter apathy, demonstrates a promising rise in democracy rankings among African nations. Consequently, Ghana and Nigeria offer a number of insights into what works in the context of African nations. Below is an account of lessons learnt from the experiences of the two nations with regard to facilitating political transitions and democratic consolidation.

Strengthening democratic institutions such as independent electoral commissions, judicial systems, and legislative bodies is instrumental in facilitating political transition and democratic

consolidation. A strong institutional framework ensures a fair electoral process, legal recourse for disputes, and checks and balances within the government. Ghana and Nigeria have permanently established electoral management bodies whose structures, organisation and composition manifest their outputs and levels of citizen confidence (Aliyu & Ambali, 2021). The Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana are duly established by the country's respective constitutions; the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, and are thus based on legal foundations. These are permanent institutions that conduct elections in various offices in the country. Both constitutions have stipulated that these electoral commissions are not subject to any person, group or authority. Likewise, the constitutions provide for and guarantee their autonomy, due to their strategic position in respect of their body polity (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a). Consequently, INEC and EC are autonomous bodies, independent from any interference. The permanency of establishment of both INEC and EC as public institutions further provides for the firm grounding of their operations with regard to voter registration, education and awareness (Idowu & Mimiko, 2020a; Idowu & Mimiko, 2020b; Aliyu & Ambali, 2021), unlike the intermittent electoral bodies found in some countries. Equally, both electoral bodies possess very important prerogative powers and functions. Both have the power to register and control the activities of political organisations; control and supervise all public elections and referendums; define the polling sites; print ballot papers; recruit and train staff, and accredit both domestic and international observers, among other duties.

While ethnicity still remains a challenge, the two nations have made tremendous strides in eliminating this factor from politics. Through their respective constitutions, ethnicity in politics is outlawed. First, in Article 55(4) (7), the constitution of Ghana outlaws any ethnic, regional or faith-based political practices; similarly, Article 276 (1) of the constitution of Ghana and Articles 15(3) and 15(4) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, while recognising ethnic diversity and legitimising the chieftaincy, depoliticises these factors by limiting their involvement in active politics (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021; Rustad, 2008). Despite devolving some executive powers to the local assemblies, the constitutions prohibit all party politics from local elections. Article 248 (2) of the constitution of Ghana stipulates that no political party shall endorse, sponsor, campaign or offer a platform to a candidate seeking election at a district assembly or

any lower government unit (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021). Furthermore, the most senior local government official, the District or Municipal Chief Executive, gets appointed by the president of Ghana, in order to limit political choices from being based on benefits directly accrued to voters. Critics might argue that silencing ethnic, religious and regional voices would only exacerbate ethnic tension, but the two nations provide alternative avenues for ethnic expressions through the Local Government Act of 1993 and the Chieftaincy Act of 2008 in Ghana. For instance, Article 462 of the Local Government Act devolves some executive powers to the local assemblies. Likewise, the Chieftaincy Act establishes Chieftaincy as a dual political institution with customary authority. Consequently, there are several local assemblies and regional houses of chiefs, each accorded customary privileges to exercise their authority without meddling in party politics. While implementation challenges exist, these provisions and practices have been instrumental in complementing the two countries' governance structures. The provisions have enabled Ghana's unitary governance system to decentralise authority to accommodate social and political diversity, while alienating ethnicity from electoral politics; a condition that has arguably contributed to successful political transition (Sefa-Nyarko, 2021; Arthur, 2009).

Another aspect that represents a strength of the electoral institutions is the procedure for removing the electoral bodies' chairperson and appointed members. In Nigeria, the chairperson's appointment and removal is a constitution matter. The procedure requires a joint effort between the executive and the legislature. While the removal decision originates from the president, it requires endorsement by a two-thirds majority of members of the senate (Aliyu & Ambali, 2021). This procedural rigidity offers protection to the process. However, in Ghana, while the process is also a joint effort, it is more of a consultative effort between the executive and the judiciary. The removal of the EC chair and the deputies has remained significantly influenced by the appointing authority, generally the president.

Conclusion

The forgoing evidence clearly attests to the unique position of the two countries, from sharing historical past events in political transitions to facing similar challenges in the current democratic regimes. Elections are a crucial process in competitive politics and the preferred

mechanism for transitioning political power in contemporary liberal democracies. Evidence from the two nations depicts elections as a central process for every democratic transition. Consequently, election management is a crucial aspect for ensuring democratic transitioning of political power. This chapter has highlighted the various challenges impeding democratic transition, and equally it has drawn some lessons learnt from the conduct of elections in Ghana and Nigeria. While common challenges such as ethnicity and regional politics continue to frustrate African nations, Ghana and Nigeria have experimented in mitigating strategies, with some success. Recognising ethnicity and regional politics as a parallel arm of governance, while limiting their political influence, attest to the success of democratic transition in the two nations. The provisions for the constructive expression of social and geographic diversity in the two nations contribute significantly towards sustaining political stability. Transparency in election management, a solid democratic culture in Ghana, and the personality of the incumbent in Nigeria, have been instrumental in aiding political power transitioning and democratic process in the two nations.

While the two nations enjoy this unique position, allegations of corruption, embezzlement, looting of public funds, voter fraud, irregularities, and violence during elections, remain, tarnishing the credibility of democratic transitions. The root cause of these vices needs to be addressed. To address the root cause of violence in elections, both nations need to further eliminate the impact of ethnic fights to control the presidency, and combat religious fanaticism, poverty, and the willingness of people to become political thugs. Moreover, Nigeria should reduce the absolute dependency of success on the central government. As Ugwuoke et al. (2020) recommend, to suppress ethnic or religious groups' struggles for resource control, both nations should strive towards a true unitarianism or federalism with considerable independent states where sizeable economic and security independency exists for the states and the local government. Consequently, each group should focus on itself to build, grow and prosper, while elections remain an activity for those truly passionate about governance, as opposed to a mere route for survival or path to supremacy for any one ethnic or religious group. Moreover, since local chief executives form the local government and are thus accountable to local communities, they should be elected. However, elections should remain apolitical, to conform to the provisions of the constitution in depoliticising local governance. This factor

has proven to be associated with sustained political stability in the two nations.

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Chapter Six

Impact of Political and Civil Leadership on Political Changes and Transitions in North Africa: Egypt and Tunisia Case Studies

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Introduction

Political and civil leadership play important roles in shaping societies. Political leadership refers to the individuals or groups that hold positions of power and authority within a government or political system, while civil leadership refers to individuals or groups within civil society who take on leadership roles to address societal issues, promote social justice, and contribute to positive change (Potluka, 2021). North Africa consists of several countries, including Egypt and Tunisia, that have experienced periods of authoritarian rule, often characterised by a concentration of power in the hands of a few political figures (Hecan & Farhaoui, 2021). Political stability has, however, been a priority, and some leaders have maintained control through various means, including security apparatuses. The leaders face challenges in addressing economic grievances and implementing reforms; therefore, economic issues, including high unemployment rates, income inequality, and corruption, have been common sources of discontent and social unrest (Barakat & Fakih, 2021). Activists often resort to the use of social media and other platforms to mobilise public opinion and organise protests.

Egypt and Tunisia have faced hurdles in fostering effective political and civil leadership. Egypt has witnessed changes in political leadership, notably the removal of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, followed by subsequent transitions (Koussa, 2023). In contrast, Tunisia has seen a more successful transition towards democracy since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 (Erdogan, 2021). While these challenges have posed threats to cohesive political and civil

leadership efforts, both countries have managed to address them through diverse approaches.

The summary above therefore poses the question, "What is the effect that political and civil leadership has on political outcomes?" In addressing this question, the chapter aims at determining the impact of political and civil leadership on political changes and transitions in North Africa, taking Egypt and Tunisia as case studies, examining their roles, and exploring factors affecting their relationships and their impact on political outcomes.

Role and Impact of Political and Civil Leadership on Political Changes and Transitions

The roles of civil society evolve according to the stage of the political transition process, including pre-transition, liberalisation, transition, and consolidation. During each phase, civil society adapts its activities to the changing political landscape, from underground dissent to active participation in democratic governance (Marchetti & Tocci, 2020; Smith & Hamel, 2023). Civil society plays a crucial role in the consolidation of democracy by promoting political norms, values, and civic engagement that underpin democratic competition. It provides a platform for citizens to participate in governance, express their interests, and hold public officials accountable (Martin, 2021). A few of the other roles and impacts of civil society are listed below.

Manufacturing Political Consent: Civil society plays a crucial role in manufacturing political consent, which is essential for the legitimation of state power (Toepler et al., 2020). Through various institutions and activities, civil society creates a consensus among the populace regarding the legitimacy of the ruling elite.

Opposition and Critique: When citizens perceive abuses of power by ruling elites, civil society can serve as a platform for oppositional critique. Brave individuals may initiate criticism, which can then be popularised through informal social movements and institutional leaders, leading to a separation of domination and hegemony (Hudáková, 2021). Civil society also widens participation in public life by mobilising marginalised groups, including the poor, women, and minorities, into civic engagement.

Checking Excesses: Civil society acts as a buffer against state overreach by monitoring human rights abuses, corruption, and

other forms of misconduct. It serves as a watchdog to hold the state accountable for its actions (Ali, 2021).

Guaranteeing Political Accountability: Political accountability, a hallmark of democracy, is ensured through the functions of communication, representation, and negotiation performed by civic institutions. These mechanisms ensure that citizen preferences are heard and acted upon by the government (Mlambo et al., 2020).

Challenges and Revival: Despite its importance, civil society faces challenges during democratic consolidation, including co-optation by political elites, demobilisation of citizens, and internal divisions (Toepler et al., 2020). Reviving civil society as a force for democratic governance becomes essential for sustaining and strengthening democratic institutions over the long term.

The roles and impact of political leadership stem from the legitimisation of state power. Political leaders actually derive legitimacy from civil society, as the right to exercise state power ultimately depends on popular acceptance (Fröhlich & Skokova, 2020). Effective governance therefore relies on the consent manufactured by civil society institutions, thereby establishing a complementary relationship between the state and civil society. Political leaders play a crucial role in fostering responsive and effective government, which can only be built on a foundation of civic community. They must recognise the importance of promoting democratic institution-building within civil society to maintain long-term legitimacy. Itemised below are some of the roles of political leadership.

Promotion of Democratic Governance: Political leaders prioritise the promotion of democratic governance in civil society, even if it means addressing increased social demands. They have the responsibility to facilitate the development of associations and institutions that support democratic values and practices (Van Rooy & Robinson, 2020).

Transition Management: During periods of political transition, political leaders navigate the process of establishing new political rules and norms. They play a pivotal role in shifting the initiative of democratisation from civil society to political society, especially during critical moments such as competitive elections (Herrfahrdt-Pähle et al., 2020).

Neutralising Opposition: Political leaders may seek to neutralise opposition within civil society by co-opting or silencing

civic leaders who challenge their authority (Ghanem, 2022). This can occur through offering leadership positions within government or party institutions, effectively diminishing the influence of dissenting voices.

Sustaining Political Engagement: Political leaders face the challenge of sustaining political engagement among citizens, especially after the initial enthusiasm of democratic transition wanes (Sørensen, 2020). They may deliberately seek to manage expectations and contain political energies to maintain stability.

Fostering Civic Engagement: Despite the potential demobilising consequences of political transition, leaders must foster civic engagement over the long term (Hyde et al., 2023). They should support the reinvigoration of civil society as a force for democratic governance, recognising its essential role in providing political legitimacy and holding governments accountable.

Renewing Political Legitimacy: Political leaders must constantly renew their political legitimacy, as it is a scarce resource that can be easily dissipated. This requires ongoing efforts to engage with civil society, address societal needs, and build support for governance initiatives (Tsourapas, 2021; Mittiga, 2022).

Factors Influencing Political and Civil Leadership Relationship

The relationship between political and civil leadership in Egypt has been complex and often contentious, particularly in the context of the country's modern history. For much of Egypt's modern history, political leadership has been centralised and authoritarian, with power concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or institutions, such as the president and the military (Brooks & White, 2022). This centralised political authority has often limited the autonomy and influence of civil society and grassroots organisations. Under authoritarian regimes, civil society organisations have faced significant restrictions, including government surveillance, harassment, and limitations on freedom of assembly and expression (Toepler et al., 2020). This has constrained the ability of civil leaders to advocate for political reform, human rights, and social justice. Political leaders in Egypt have often sought to co-opt or suppress civil leadership that poses a challenge to their authority. Civil society activists, human rights defenders, and independent journalists have been subject

to intimidation, arrest, and imprisonment for their advocacy work (El-Ghobashy, 2023). Periods of political upheaval, such as the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, have seen temporary shifts in the relationship between political and civil leadership. During such moments, civil society organisations and grassroots movements have played a prominent role in mobilising mass protests and demanding political change. The Egyptian military has historically played a significant role in politics and governance, often acting as a power broker between political leaders and civil society. Military interventions, such as the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and President Mohamed Morsi in 2013, have shaped the balance of power between political and civil actors (Droz-Vincent, 2020). Despite periodic elections and the existence of multiple political parties, Egypt has struggled to establish genuine political pluralism. Political leadership has often sought to control or manipulate electoral processes, limiting the ability of civil society and opposition groups to challenge incumbents through democratic means (Erdogan, 2020). Following the 2011 revolution and subsequent political transitions, Egypt has experienced shifts in governance dynamics, with varying degrees of openness and repression towards civil society. The government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has implemented restrictive laws targeting civil society organisations, further constraining their activities (Laloux, 2023). Overall, the relationship between political and civil leadership in Egypt has been characterised by a struggle for power, with political leaders often seeking to maintain control and limit the influence of civil society. Despite challenges, civil society organisations and grassroots movements continue to play a vital role in advocating for social and political change in the country.

The relationship between political and civil leadership in Tunisia has undergone significant changes, particularly following the country's 2011 revolution, which marked the beginning of the Arab Spring. Before the revolution, Tunisia was ruled by an authoritarian regime under President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, characterised by limited political freedoms, censorship, and repression of civil society (Brooks & White, 2022). Political leadership was highly centralised within the ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), with little room for opposition or independent civil leadership. Civil society played a crucial role in mobilising protests and advocating for political change during the 2011 revolution. Grassroots movements, human rights organisations, labour unions, and other civil society groups came together to demand an end to authoritarian rule, leading to the overthrow of President Ben Ali (Hudáková, 2021). Following

Ben Ali's ouster, Tunisia entered a transitional period marked by political uncertainty and instability. During this time, activists and civil society organisations, including the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), played a pivotal role in mediating political dialogues as well as a key role in shaping the country's political future, participating in debates over the new constitution, electoral reforms, and the transition to democracy (Sigillò, 2023). Tunisia embarked on a path of democratic transition, characterised by the emergence of political pluralism and competitive elections. Civil society organisations played a vital role in monitoring elections, promoting voter education, and advocating for transparency and accountability in the political process (Tobich, 2022). The relationship between political and civil leadership in Tunisia has often been characterised by partnership and dialogue, particularly during the transitional period. Political leaders recognised the importance of engaging with civil society to build consensus, promote democratic values, and address the country's socio-economic challenges (Sigillò, 2023). Despite progress, tensions in form of criticisms have arisen between political and civil leadership in Tunisia, particularly around issues of accountability, transparency, and the role of the state in governance. Civil society organisations have sometimes criticised political leaders for failing to fulfil their promises or for backsliding on democratic reforms. Civil society continues to play an active role in Tunisia's political landscape, advocating for human rights, social justice, and democratic governance. Political leaders have recognised the importance of engaging with civil society as partners in the country's democratic development (Refle, 2022). Generally speaking, the relationship between political and civil leadership in Tunisia has evolved significantly since the 2011 revolution, with civil society playing a central role in shaping the country's transition to democracy. Despite challenges and tensions, both political and civil leaders have recognised the importance of collaboration and dialogue in advancing Tunisia's democratic aspirations.

The relationship between political and civil leadership can be influenced by a variety of factors, which can shape the dynamics and outcomes of their interaction. Several key factors include:

Political System and Governance Structure: The type of political system and governance structure in a country can significantly impact the relationship between political and civil leadership. In authoritarian regimes, political leaders often exert tight control over civil society, limiting the autonomy and influence of civil leaders

(Hudáková, 2021). In contrast, in democratic systems, there may be greater opportunities for collaboration and partnership between political and civil leaders (Kövér, 2021).

Historical Context and Legacy: Historical experiences, including past conflicts, colonial legacies, and previous authoritarian rule, can shape the relationship between political and civil leadership. Countries with a history of repression may have a more adversarial relationship between political and civil leaders, while those with a tradition of civic engagement and social activism may have a more cooperative relationship (Milton, 2022).

Level of Democratisation: The stage of democratisation in a country can influence the relationship between political and civil leadership. In transitioning or newly democratised countries, civil society may play a more active role in holding political leaders accountable and advocating for democratic reforms (Natil, 2020). Conversely, in established democracies, civil society may have a more institutionalised and collaborative relationship with political leaders (Sellers et al., 2020).

Legal and Institutional Frameworks: The legal and institutional frameworks governing civil society can shape the relationship between political and civil leadership. Laws regulating freedom of association, expression, and assembly can either facilitate or hinder civil society's ability to engage with political leaders and influence policy decisions (Natil et al., 2020).

Economic and Social Factors: Socio-economic conditions, including poverty, inequality, unemployment, and social unrest, can impact the relationship between political and civil leadership. Economic crises or social grievances may lead to increased activism and pressure from civil society, influencing the behaviour of political leaders (Ong & Rahmad, 2024).

Media and Information Environment: The media and information environment can influence the relationship between political and civil leadership by shaping public discourse and mobilising public opinion. Independent media can provide a platform for civil society voices and hold political leaders accountable, while state-controlled media may suppress dissent and promote government narratives (Schirch, 2021).

International Actors and External Influences: External actors, including foreign governments, international organisations, and

non-governmental organisations (NGOs), can also influence the relationship between political and civil leadership. International support for civil society can bolster its capacity to engage with political leaders and advocate for change, while interference or pressure from external actors may exacerbate tensions (Smith & Hamel, 2023).

Cultural and Social Norms: Cultural and social norms, including attitudes towards authority, participation, and activism, can shape the relationship between political and civil leadership. Societies with a strong tradition of civic engagement and social activism may have more collaborative relationships between political and civil leaders, while those with a history of deference to authority may experience greater tension or repression (Sørensen, 2020).

Relationships Between Political and Civil Leadership and State Security Agencies and Their Impact on Political Outcomes

The relationships between political and civil leadership with state security agencies can vary significantly, depending on the context, political system, and historical factors. In Egypt, the military has enormous influence, vast power, and considerable public support. In Tunisia, the military is small and is excluded from political power, but is also well regarded. In Libya, the military needs to be rebuilt as a result of the civil war. Some possible dynamics are highlighted below:

Collaboration and Coordination: In some cases, political and civil leaders may work closely with state security agencies to maintain law and order, protect national security, and address threats to public safety. This collaboration may involve sharing information, coordinating operations, and implementing security measures to address common challenges (Rigby et al., 2022).

Control and Oversight: Political leaders often have authority over state security agencies and are responsible for setting policies, priorities, and budgets related to national security. Civil leaders may also play a role in overseeing the activities of security agencies, ensuring they operate within the bounds of the law and respect human rights (Williams, 2024).

Tension and Conflict: Tensions between political and civil leadership and state security agencies can arise when there are disagreements

over security policies, strategies, or tactics. Civil leaders may push for greater transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights within security agencies, while security agencies may resist civilian oversight or prioritise security concerns over civil liberties (Madden, 2021).

Repression and Abuse of Power: In authoritarian regimes or periods of political repression, state security agencies may act as instruments of political control, suppressing dissent, and targeting civil leaders, activists, and opposition figures. Political leaders may use security agencies to intimidate or silence political opponents, restrict freedom of expression and assembly, and maintain their grip on power (Tanneberg, 2020).

Security Sector Reform: In transitional or democratic contexts, political and civil leaders may engage in security sector reform efforts aimed at professionalising security agencies, strengthening civilian oversight mechanisms, and promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law. These efforts may involve legal reforms, training programmes, and institutional changes to improve the accountability and effectiveness of security agencies (Shah & Dalton, 2020).

Public Perception and Trust: The relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies can be influenced by public perception and trust. Positive interactions and effective collaboration may enhance public confidence in both political leaders and security agencies, while abuses of power or violations of rights may erode trust and undermine legitimacy (Rogers & Mawdsley, 2022).

External Influence and Assistance: External actors, including foreign governments, international organisations, and NGOs, may also play a role in shaping the relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies. International assistance programmes aimed at promoting democratic governance, human rights, and security sector reform can provide support and leverage for civil leaders seeking to strengthen oversight and accountability mechanisms within security agencies (Donais & Barbak, 2021).

Overall, the relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies is complex and multifaceted, influenced by a range of factors including political dynamics, institutional structures, public attitudes, and external influences. Effective collaboration, transparency, and accountability are key to ensuring that security agencies serve the interests of the state and its citizens while upholding democratic principles and human rights.

The impact of the relationship between political and civil leadership with state security agencies on political outcomes can be profound and far-reaching. Here are several key ways in which this relationship can influence political outcomes:

Democratic Governance: A constructive relationship between political and civil leadership with state security agencies can contribute to the consolidation of democratic governance. When security agencies operate within the bounds of the law, respect human rights, and are subject to civilian oversight, it enhances public trust in democratic institutions and promotes political stability (Hope, 2021).

Rule of Law: The relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies can affect the rule of law. When security agencies are accountable to elected officials and operate according to legal norms and procedures, it reinforces the rule of law and prevents arbitrary use of state power (Galavís, 2020).

Political Stability: Collaborative and coordinated efforts between political leaders, civil society, and security agencies can contribute to political stability. Addressing security threats, maintaining public order, and resolving conflicts peacefully helps to prevent political crises and social unrest (Ong & Rahmad, 2024; Smith & Hamel, 2023).

Human Rights and Civil Liberties: The relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies can impact human rights and civil liberties. When security agencies engage in abuses of power, repression, or violations of rights, it can undermine political freedoms, erode public trust, and lead to social discontent (Carriere et al., 2022).

Accountability and Transparency: Effective oversight mechanisms and accountability mechanisms are crucial for ensuring that state security agencies operate in the public interest. When political and civil leaders have the ability to hold security agencies accountable for their actions, it promotes transparency, reduces corruption, and enhances public confidence in government institutions.

Elections and Political Participation: The behaviour of state security agencies can influence electoral processes and political participation. In some cases, security agencies may interfere in elections, suppress opposition voices, or intimidate voters, undermining the credibility and fairness of electoral outcomes. Conversely, when security agencies remain neutral and facilitate free and fair elections, it

fosters democratic legitimacy and political inclusivity (Ali & Ali, 2022).

Public Perception and Trust: The relationship between political and civil leadership and state security agencies can shape public perception and trust in government institutions. Positive interactions, respect for human rights, and adherence to democratic norms enhance public confidence in political leaders and security agencies, fostering social cohesion and national unity (Rogers & Mawdsley, 2022).

In general, the relationship between political and civil leadership with state security agencies plays a critical role in shaping political outcomes, determining the quality of governance, and safeguarding democratic values and institutions. Effective collaboration, transparency, accountability, and respect for human rights are essential for promoting positive political outcomes and ensuring the long-term stability and prosperity of societies.

Political Governance Challenges and External Influences on Political Change and Transition

Political governance faces a multitude of challenges, varying in nature and intensity across different contexts. Some of the key challenges include:

Corruption and Cronyism: Corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments, erodes public trust, and diverts resources away from essential services. Cronyism, where political leaders favour their associates or supporters for government positions or contracts, can exacerbate corruption and weaken governance systems (Basu, 2023).

Weak Institutions: Inadequate institutional capacity, lack of transparency, and ineffective rule of law can hinder effective governance. Weak institutions struggle to enforce laws, deliver services, and uphold the rights of citizens, leading to governance failures and perpetuating inequality and injustice (Brinks et al., 2020).

Authoritarianism and Lack of Accountability: Authoritarian regimes or leaders who resist democratic norms and accountability mechanisms concentrate power in the hands of a few, limiting political participation, stifling dissent, and fostering a culture of impunity. Lack of accountability can lead to human rights abuses, corruption, and political repression (Shen & Jiang, 2021).

Political Polarisation and Divisiveness: Polarisation along ideological, ethnic, or regional lines can undermine political stability, impede decision-making, and hinder cooperation among political actors. Divisive politics can deepen societal rifts, weaken social cohesion, and hinder efforts to address pressing challenges (Bednar, 2021).

Economic Inequality and Poverty: Economic inequality and poverty exacerbate social tensions, fuel resentment towards political elites, and undermine social cohesion. Governments face challenges in addressing socio-economic disparities, providing essential services, and ensuring inclusive growth (Islam & McGillivray, 2020).

Conflict and Security Threats: Conflict, terrorism, and security threats pose significant challenges to political governance. Instability and violence disrupt governance processes, displace populations, and strain resources. Weak governance can also exacerbate security threats, creating a cycle of instability and insecurity (Sperling & Webber, 2020).

Ethnic and Religious Tensions: Ethnic and religious diversity can be a source of strength, but it can also fuel tensions and conflicts if not managed effectively. Governments must navigate complex identity politics, promote social inclusion, and address grievances to prevent escalation into violence or instability (Oucho, 2021; Hensel, 2021).

Globalisation and Transnational Issues: Globalisation brings interconnected challenges such as climate change, migration, and pandemics, which require coordinated responses from governments. Failure to address these transnational issues can have far-reaching consequences for political stability, economic prosperity, and social well-being (Greven, 2020).

Technological Disruption and Information Warfare: Rapid advancements in technology present both opportunities and challenges for governance. Disinformation, cyber attacks, and information warfare can undermine trust in institutions, manipulate public opinion, and disrupt democratic processes, posing challenges for political governance (Taddeo, 2020; Whyte & Mazanec, 2023).

Environmental Degradation and Sustainability: Environmental degradation, including pollution, deforestation, and climate change, poses significant challenges to governance. Governments must adopt sustainable policies, promote environmental stewardship,

and address the impacts of climate change to ensure long-term prosperity and stability (Newig et al., 2020).

Addressing these challenges requires comprehensive and inclusive approaches, including strengthening democratic institutions, promoting transparency and accountability, fostering social cohesion, addressing inequality, and building resilience to external shocks. Collaboration among governments, civil society, the private sector, and international partners is essential to overcoming these challenges and advancing effective political governance.

External influences play a significant role in shaping political change and transitions in various countries and regions around the world. These influences can come from a range of actors, including other governments, international organisations, NGOs, and multinational corporations. The following are some of the ways in which external influences impact political change and transition:

Diplomatic Pressure: Foreign governments and international organisations may exert diplomatic pressure on authoritarian regimes or governments facing political crises to promote democratic reforms, respect for human rights, and adherence to international norms and standards. Diplomatic pressure can include diplomatic interventions, sanctions, and diplomatic isolation (Seyfi & Hall, 2020).

Foreign Aid and Assistance: Foreign aid and assistance from donor countries and international organisations can support political change and transition by providing financial resources, technical expertise, and capacity-building programmes. Aid may be conditional on democratic governance, respect for human rights, and anti-corruption measures, incentivising political reforms (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2020).

Economic Sanctions and Trade Policies: Economic sanctions and trade policies imposed by foreign governments or international organisations can influence political change by exerting economic pressure on governments to change their behaviour. Sanctions may target individuals, entities, or sectors linked to human rights abuses, corruption, or repression, aiming to induce political concessions or regime change (Portela, 2021).

International Intervention and Peacekeeping: International intervention and peacekeeping operations can facilitate political transitions and conflict resolution in post-conflict or crisis situations. External actors may deploy peacekeeping forces,

mediate negotiations, and provide technical assistance to support the establishment of democratic institutions, rule of law, and reconciliation processes (Caplan et al., 2024).

International Norms and Standards: International norms and standards, including human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, influence political change and transition by shaping global expectations and norms of behaviour. Governments and political actors may face pressure to comply with international standards and commitments, leading to reforms and institutional changes (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2020).

External influences on political change and transition are multifaceted and can have both positive and negative impacts depending on the context, intentions, and strategies of external actors. While external support can promote democratisation, human rights, and stability, it can also exacerbate conflicts, undermine sovereignty, and fuel geopolitical rivalries. Effective coordination, collaboration, and respect for national sovereignty are essential for ensuring that external influences contribute to positive political change and transition processes.

Mitigation Strategies

Mitigation strategies are essential for addressing challenges and minimising negative impacts in various contexts, including political change and transition. Below are some key mitigation strategies that can be employed:

Dialogue and Negotiation: Facilitating dialogue and negotiation among stakeholders can help resolve conflicts, bridge differences, and build consensus on political reforms. Engaging in inclusive and transparent dialogue processes promotes understanding, trust-building, and cooperation, reducing the risk of violence and instability.

Conflict Prevention and Resolution: Proactive conflict prevention measures, such as early warning systems, mediation, and peacebuilding initiatives, can help prevent the escalation of tensions and violence. Investing in conflict resolution mechanisms and building capacities for dialogue and mediation strengthens resilience to political crises and promotes peaceful resolution of disputes.

Institutional Strengthening: Strengthening democratic institutions, including electoral commissions, judiciary, parliament, and civil

service, enhances governance capacity and resilience to political challenges. Building robust, transparent, and accountable institutions promotes the rule of law, safeguards democratic principles, and fosters political stability.

Civil Society Engagement: Empowering civil society organisations, including NGOs, advocacy groups, and community-based organisations, strengthens their ability to monitor government actions, advocate for political reforms, and hold authorities accountable. Supporting civil society engagement promotes transparency, fosters citizen participation, and strengthens democratic governance.

Promotion of Human Rights: Upholding human rights principles and protecting fundamental freedoms are essential for promoting political stability and social cohesion. Prioritising human rights promotion, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, protects vulnerable populations, safeguards democratic values, and mitigates risks of repression and conflict.

Transparency and Accountability: Promoting transparency and accountability in governance processes, including public finance management, procurement, and decision-making, fosters public trust, reduces corruption, and strengthens democratic institutions. Establishing mechanisms for accountability, such as independent oversight bodies and anti-corruption agencies, enhances governance integrity and resilience.

International Cooperation: Strengthening international cooperation and partnerships fosters collective action and mutual support in addressing political challenges and promoting democratic governance. Collaboration among governments, international organisations, civil society, and other stakeholders facilitates knowledge exchange, resource mobilisation, and coordinated responses to common challenges.

Socio-Economic Development: Addressing socio-economic inequalities, poverty, and exclusion promotes inclusive development and reduces vulnerabilities to political instability. Investing in education, healthcare, infrastructure, and social protection programmes fosters economic opportunities, social cohesion, and resilience to political shocks.

Risk Assessment and Management: Conducting comprehensive risk assessments and developing contingency plans enables governments and stakeholders to anticipate potential challenges,

mitigate risks, and respond effectively to crises. Proactive risk management measures, including early response mechanisms and crisis management protocols, enhance preparedness and resilience to political uncertainties.

Employing these mitigation strategies enables governments, civil society organisations, and international actors to promote political stability, democratic governance, and sustainable development, while mitigating risks and challenges associated with political change and transition.

Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions

Civil society legitimises state power by fostering popular acceptance, playing a crucial role in the stability and functioning of democratic governance. It challenges ruling elites by mobilising informal social movements that critique governance structures. It widens political participation, protects against state excesses, and ensures political accountability through communication, representation, and negotiation. The roles of civil society evolve across different stages of political transition (pre-transition, liberalisation, transition, and consolidation), impacting regime change and democratic consolidation.

Relationships between political and civil leadership in Egypt have been characterised by tension and conflict, with civil society often constrained by authoritarian practices. The 2011 revolution highlighted the potential of civil society to drive political change, though subsequent political dynamics have seen a reassertion of state control. However, relationships between political and civil leadership in Tunisia represent a more successful case of collaboration, especially during the 2011 revolution and subsequent transition to democracy. Civil society organisations played a critical role in mediating conflicts and ensuring a peaceful transition.

Factors influencing the relationship between political and civil leadership include the political environment, where authoritarian versus democratic regimes significantly influence the dynamics between civil and political leadership. Legal and institutional frameworks enhance cooperation and the effectiveness of civil society. Historical events and past experiences also shape the trust and interaction between political and civil entities. External influences

such as international support and pressure can either bolster or hinder the relationship between civil and political leadership.

The interplay between civil society, political leadership, and state security agencies significantly shapes political outcomes and governance. Constructive relationships foster democratic governance and stability, while adversarial interactions can lead to repression and instability. Effective mitigation strategies involve promoting inclusive dialogue, strengthening institutions, and prioritising human rights to navigate political change and transition successfully.

The following are recommendations based on the impact of political and civil leadership on political changes and transitions:

Foster Inclusive Dialogue: Encourage inclusive dialogue and cooperation among diverse stakeholders, including political leaders, civil society organisations, and citizens, to build consensus and address challenges collectively.

Strengthen Democratic Institutions: Invest in strengthening democratic institutions, such as an independent judiciary, electoral commissions, and anti-corruption agencies, to uphold the rule of law, ensure accountability, and safeguard democratic principles.

Promote Civic Engagement: Promote civic engagement and participation by empowering civil society organisations, supporting freedom of expression, and creating opportunities for citizens to contribute to governance processes.

Prioritise Human Rights: Uphold human rights principles and protect fundamental freedoms to ensure the dignity and well-being of all individuals, regardless of political affiliation, ethnicity, or socio-economic status.

Enhance Transparency and Accountability: Promote transparency, accountability, and integrity in governance processes through measures such as open data initiatives, whistleblower protection, and public oversight mechanisms.

Invest in Education and Capacity Building: Invest in education, skills development, and capacity building programmes to empower citizens, government officials, and civil society actors with the knowledge and skills necessary for effective governance and civic participation.

Strengthen International Cooperation: Strengthen international cooperation and partnerships to address shared challenges, promote

democratic governance, and uphold human rights standards at the global level.

Support Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution: Support peacebuilding efforts and conflict resolution mechanisms to mitigate tensions, prevent violence, and foster reconciliation in post-conflict or fragile settings.

Address Socio-economic Inequalities: Address underlying socio-economic inequalities and disparities to promote inclusive development, reduce marginalisation, and build resilience to political instability.

Uphold the Rule of Law: Uphold the rule of law, respect for constitutional principles, and adherence to democratic norms to ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of governance institutions.

By implementing these recommendations, stakeholders can navigate political change and transition effectively, promote democratic governance, and contribute to sustainable development and peace.

Conclusion

Navigating political change and transition is a complex process that requires careful consideration of various factors, challenges, and mitigation strategies. Throughout this journey, the interactions between political and civil leadership, as well as their relationships with external actors and state institutions, play pivotal roles in shaping outcomes and determining the trajectory of governance. Civil society emerges as a critical force, providing checks and balances, advocating for democratic principles, and mobilising citizens towards positive change. Its roles in widening participation, protecting rights, and ensuring accountability contribute significantly to the legitimacy and effectiveness of political governance. However, civil society's effectiveness can be influenced by external factors, including support from international partners and the broader geopolitical context. Political leadership, on the other hand, holds the responsibility of fostering inclusive governance, promoting transparency, and upholding democratic values. Effective political leadership is characterised by responsiveness to citizen needs, commitment to the rule of law, and willingness to engage in dialogue and compromise. When political leaders engage constructively with civil society and prioritise the interests of the populace, they can facilitate peaceful transitions, promote stability, and advance democratic governance.

Nevertheless, challenges abound, ranging from corruption and authoritarianism to socio-economic inequality and external interference. Mitigation strategies such as dialogue, institutional strengthening, and international cooperation are essential for overcoming these challenges and building resilient governance systems. By investing in democratic institutions, empowering civil society, and promoting human rights, stakeholders can foster environments conducive to political stability, social cohesion, and sustainable development. In essence, effective political governance requires a delicate balance between state authority and citizen participation, between internal dynamics and external influences. By recognising the interconnectedness of these elements and embracing collaborative approaches, societies can navigate political transitions with resilience, uphold democratic principles, and strive towards a more just and prosperous future.

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Concluding Remarks

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A few questions have been asked about books in general and what they hope to achieve once they are published. Knud Erik Jorgensen once asked the following questions: "Are textbooks simply supposed to reproduce simple popular images and well-established certainties? Are they supposed to reproduce 'box' theoretical richness into simple formats or reduce diversity to Mickey Mouse unity….?" Such questions point to the value of books in society.

The idea of compiling a book on civil and political leadership focusing on Africa was a noble one. It was both timely and necessary for different reasons. Cries about leadership deficits in Africa are becoming louder. Some leaders lack vision and promote self-serving interests. Others seem clueless on how to lead. There are also those who have the requisite skills and knowledge but who serve their handlers, especially Africa's erstwhile colonisers, rather than the people they lead. The few leaders who are determined to advance African interests and embrace Afrocentric ideas are usually frowned upon and ridiculed at best, or ostracised and isolated at worst.

The problems enumerated above are compounded by lack of cooperation between civil and political leadership. If these two types of leadership do not sing from the same hymn book, the African continent is doomed. Issues which have engulfed the African continent such as lack of development, stagnant national economies, intermittent deadly wars, high unemployment rates, increased crime statistics, rampant inequalities, and many other issues are linked to leadership issues, the type of leadership, and lack of cooperation among different leaders. If there is a leadership crisis, everything else in a country is bound to disintegrate and eventually collapse.

The approach used in this book was cogently thought through and elegantly executed. Instead of ventilating on leadership issues from a general or theoretical perspective, a deliberate decision was taken to use real case studies to breathe life into the theoretical assumptions. Moreover, a very conscious decision was taken to cover different parts of the African continent. This decision was predicated on the understanding that Africa is not a homogeneous

continent. The fact that Africans were colonised by the French, British and Portuguese means that some people still define it in terms of Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone states.

While it is true that this compartmentalisation of Africa in the manner explained above is not far-fetched, it is equally true that there are similarities on how civil and political leadership in different African countries operate. It is also true that regardless of the geographical location of an African country or the identity of its former coloniser, where the civil and political leadership do not sing in unison, problems inevitably arise. Therefore, individually and collectively, the various authors in this book have captured key issues which the African continent continues to wrestle with. To address these issues, civil and political leadership must pull in the same direction. Failure to do so would see Africa's challenges continue indefinitely.

What is commendable about the authors of the different chapters in this book is that they did not simply dwell on the past, nor focus only on the present situation. Instead, these authors drew from the past, considered the present African predicaments, and charted the way forward. This provides a holistic approach to the theme of the book and confirms its utilitarian role.

The issues discussed by various authors in this book implore the African civil and political leadership to revisit their modus operandi and relate to each other better. If not for their own sanity and dignity, they should at least do this for the sake of the African continent. Transition or succession and political reform, the socio-economic impact of lack of cooperation between civil and political leadership, and other themes discussed in this book, demonstrate to the African people the growth potential that the continent has. However, the implicit message is that this potential will never come to fruition unless the African continent enjoys a leadership that sees the bigger picture and does not suffer from political parochialism. Importantly, the book places emphasis on the need for the civil and political leadership to work together so that more can be achieved for the betterment of the African continent and its people. Any adversarial relationship between the two types of leadership is not good for Africa.

This is the clarion call that the book makes. Its editors have demonstrated foresight and vision by conceptualising this book's title. The various authors have embraced this vision and articulated

it well in their various chapters. It is now up to the readers to absorb the content. Most importantly, the call is on both the civil and political leadership to prioritise Africa.



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