Assessing prospects for sustaining the GNU ahead of two major potential turning points
Closing the ANC’s recent National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting, President Cyril Ramaphosa announced a decision to invite other parties into an expanded Government of National Unity (GNU). The move is widely seen as an attempt to “DA-proof” the GNU - counterbalancing the Democratic Alliance’s (DA) influence and “opposition” tactics and cementing the ANC’s self-assumed role of de facto government for which the GNU is just a temporary tactical adjustment.
By its own admission in its recent NEC statement, the ANC states that “the NEC reminds our structures that the GNU is not a permanent structure but a tactical necessity to safeguard South Africa’s progressive agenda amidst a fractured electoral mandate”.
To briefly recap, when Cyril Ramaphosa replaced Jacob Zuma in 2017–18, South Africans hoped for a decisive break with state capture, corruption and economic decline. By 2024 those hopes had dramatically diminished: the ANC’s vote share plunged from roughly 57% to about 40%, ending 30 years of uninterrupted majority party rule and forcing a governing coalition with the DA and several smaller parties. The GNU’s immediate achievement has been political continuity—keeping the ANC nominally in power—but a year on the arrangement has struggled to deliver broad reforms or sustained credibility. South Africa again seemed to be on the cusp of a major disappointment.
However, some progress has been concentrated mainly in DA- and IFP-led portfolios while the ANC managed to push through its more radical agenda; elsewhere, governance is shaped by repeated ANC–DA clashes, tactical capitulations, and a growing perception that the GNU is being used to preserve ANC influence despite minority status.
Then came the cat among the pigeons. Ramaphosa and the NEC’s recent announcement seemed to be aimed at drawing in other parties such as ActionSA, Build One SA, the National Coloured Congress, African Transformation Movement, and possibly some others. Potentially it could also include the radical uMkhonto we Sizwe Party (MKP) and Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) – both of which have so far shown no interest in joining while the DA remains in the GNU. This also flew directly in the face of the DA’s very raison d'être for being part of the GNU in the first place – namely, keeping these radical parties out of government and ensuring political and economic stability.
Following some 15 months of successive acrimonious confrontations and crises, mostly over policies and legislation, between the ANC and the DA that every time ostensibly threatened the future of the GNU in its current configuration, this seemed to be the latest challenge to the DA and the GNU’s resilience. With local elections looming and political dynamics constantly shifting, the GNU’s stability and future direction remain highly uncertain. So, what will indeed be likely to happen and what will be the consequences for South Africa?
The ANC, apparently in consultation with other parties, has yet to reveal clear motives, objectives, or timelines, though some developments are expected by the time of the party’s National General Council (NGC) in December. Notably, the DA, the ANC’s largest GNU partner, has not been formally consulted yet which seems to underpin suggestions that it is the apparent target of the move.
The medium-term outlook
The GNU has weathered its first year of existence, but now two major political milestones may determine its sustainability: the ANC’s NGC in December and the local government elections due within 90 days of 2 November 2026. These markers frame the medium-term horizon for assessing progress, coalition stability and political risk. But of course, developments could occur at any time, even before December, that could redirect the GNU’s current trajectory.
It should also be noted that opinions about the GNU in both the ANC and the DA are divided. In the DA it appears there is a small but growing lobby in favour of pulling out and returning to an active opposition role, while those aligned with party leader John Steenhuisen are said to be in favour of remaining in the GNU. But for now, it seems the DA members serving in the Ramaphosa executive are toning down on confrontational language, keeping their heads down and getting on with their jobs. It may be a decisive adjustment, or it may be just a tactical retreat before the next storm.
In the ANC there is a strong faction on the NEC – driven largely from Gauteng and said to be aligned behind people like Deputy President Paul Mashatile and Gauteng Premier Panyaza Lesufi – who want the DA out and other parties like the EFF in. The fact that the expansion option was adopted by the recent NEC meeting, suggests this faction is gaining ground against the more pragmatic or moderate faction aligned with Ramaphosa.
The fact that despite all these ructions the GNU continues to function on its wobbly political legs, may be attributed to the potential adverse international and market reactions and possible governance instability that may follow the GNU’s collapse. It’s likely that neither the ANC nor the DA want to be seen or blamed for pulling the plug in that regard, especially with local elections looming.
So, what motivated the ANC decision at this time?
Formed in June 2024, the GNU rests on a Statement of Intent and a Basic Minimum Programme of Priorities: an adjusted strategic economic direction, inclusive growth, job creation, and a National Dialogue aligned with the National Development Plan included, among others. Representation was proportional to vote shares; decision-making was to rely on consensus or “sufficient consensus” (agreement by parties representing 60% of MPs). But this has not happened.
Deadlock-breaking mechanisms were promised but have largely not been used. Fifteen months of practice show the GNU surviving through tactical compromises rather than collaborative governance. Apart from a shaky start to the National Dialogue, none of the other major minimum priorities have been addressed.
The ANC’s justification for seeking to expand the GNU now is not very clear, other than the widely held view that it wishes to squeeze the DA out or at least reduce its role. As mentioned, neither party wants to be seen pulling the trigger on the GNU, so it seems instead the ANC seems to be opting for pressuring out the DA by other means… a kind of constructive dismissal to borrow a labour relations term.
Perhaps emboldening the ANC has been its claimed membership growth and some polling recovery; yet the polls are contradictory — some suggest ANC support is back near 40%, after falling to 30%; DA internal polling indicates support below 30% in some metros but has not been confirmed. And the ANC’s latest membership claims are open to interrogation.
The ANC says it has rebuilt branches and recruited members, but internal audits and precise provincial gains are seemingly unavailable. Strategically, however, expansion could be an effort to dilute DA influence ahead of internal ANC contests and the electoral calendar. Politically, it could shore up the ANC if polls are accurate; or, if numbers are exaggerated, it could be a risky patronage exercise.
GNU Prospects up to December 2025 and thereafter
In the short run, however, the GNU appears likely to hold together until the ANC’s NGC, with about an 80-90% probability. The ANC and its coalition partners – notably the DA and IFP – share an overriding interest in avoiding premature collapse. Disputes over cabinet portfolios, economic reform, and foreign policy direction continue, but they remain contained within institutional processes rather than escalating into open rupture.
There are some very compelling stabilising factors that may keep the current GNU safe for now:
· Mutual dependence: The ANC requires coalition partners to maintain legitimacy and remain de facto in power, while smaller parties gain influence and resources.
· Electoral timing: No party benefits from triggering instability ahead of the NGC, where Ramaphosa will most likely seek to consolidate support for the GNU experiment running up to the local government elections.
· Economic fragility: Investors, business leaders, and global partners remain wary. A GNU breakdown would compound already fragile confidence.
The ANC’s NGC represents the first stress test. Factional resistance to the GNU, especially from those excluded from cabinet, other top positions, or politically and ideologically opposed to cooperation with the DA, could intensify. Should Ramaphosa face serious pushback, the GNU’s potential policy coherence and governing cooperation may weaken, with ANC leaders forced to make concessions to their internal opponents. The decision by the SA Communist Party (SACP) to contest the elections on its own effectively pitting it against its decades-long formal alliance partner, the ANC, still has to be factored in. A strong faction in the SACP also opposes the ANC’s current GNU partnership with the DA.
In the above regard, some of the key risks may include:
· Factional realignment: Dissenting ANC factions may use the NGC or what evolved from it to challenge GNU compromises, especially on issues such as land reform, racial transformation, privatisation, and fiscal discipline. Note, however, that the NGC does not set policy or elect people – it is consultative and concerned with assessing progress and direction regarding policies and programmes and may make recommendations for the next national conference. But its weight is important especially if it embraces new directions that may favour one faction or agenda over another.
· Policy deadlock: Disagreements in the GNU could sharpen, stalling progress on energy, labour reform, and state-owned enterprise reform, among others.
· Populist pressures: A weakened ANC leadership post-NGC would embolden the EFF, MK, and others, raising the risk of more radical economic and land policies resurfacing as the ANC’s left-wing seeks to match their pressures.
The second critical marker comes after 2 November 2026, when local government elections must be held within 90 days. These elections will act as a de facto referendum on the GNU. A strong showing by GNU parties would stabilise the coalition, while electoral losses could trigger recriminations and fragmentation, with a 50-70% probability of the GNU surviving this marker.
If GNU parties perform poorly, the ANC may suffer losses in spite of the GNU and not because of it. But smaller partners may question whether alignment with the ANC is electorally costly, while the DA in particular risks alienating its base by appearing too close to the ANC. If populist parties gain, especially the EFF and MK, pressure for radical economic redistribution, rapid racial transformation, land reform, and a tougher stance on Western powers will intensify. Any of these potential developments may be decisive for the future of the GNU if it is still in place at this point.
On balance, the GNU is likely to remain intact through December 2025, sustained by ANC leadership calculations and the self-interest of coalition partners. However, risks mount significantly thereafter. The NGC will most likely shape the internal ANC consensus or disagreement around the GNU; failure to secure broad buy-in could weaken Ramaphosa’s hand. By late 2026, the local elections will present the greatest challenge yet, as electoral outcomes recalibrate power dynamics and test whether the GNU is a durable governing model or merely a stopgap arrangement.
Stef Terblanche is an independent Cape Town-based political risk analyst and journalist.
