New Coalition in South Africa’s Political Landscape: Implications for the 2026 Local Government Elections
The 2024 general election marked a clear rupture in South African politics. For the first time since 1994 the African National Congress (ANC) lost its outright parliamentary majority, ushering in an era of coalition politics at the national and provincial levels. The election held on 29 May 2024 delivered a fragmented legislature in which multiple parties such as the ANC, the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and a growing set of smaller and new entrants had to negotiate working arrangements to govern. That outcome has real and immediate implications for the 2026 local government elections, where municipal coalitions and voter behavior will be shaped both by the successes and the failures of national-level coalition governance.
This op-ed maps how the new coalition reality affects political calculations going into 2026. It considers (1) the institutional and political precedents set by the post-2024 coalition arrangements, (2) the policy- and governance-level signals that will influence local voters and municipal actors, (3) strategic behaviour among parties and small formations at municipal level, and (4) the broader democratic opportunities and risks that coalition politics present for local governance.
1. Institutional precedents and the normalization of coalitions
Coalition politics at national and provincial levels since 2024 have changed expectations about how power is won and exercised in South Africa. Parties that historically competed in adversarial, zero-sum ways have been forced into pragmatic bargains; sometimes across ideological divides to secure governing majorities. Those deals inevitably create templates for municipal-level bargains: who can partner with whom, the sorts of concessions likely to be traded (cabinet/Mayoral posts, policy priorities, municipal appointments), and the degree to which coalition agreements are formalized and enforced. Political actors at municipal level will watch national arrangements closely and imitate either the coalition architecture or the governance safeguards they see working (or failing).
The more coalitions become normalized nationally, the more voters and civic actors will expect negotiated governance at local level and thus expect transparency around coalition contracts, portfolios and deliverables. Conversely, if national coalitions are perceived as unstable or as transactional vehicles for patronage, voters may punish the parties who broker such deals in 2026. Analysts and civil-society organizations have flagged both possibilities: coalition governance can innovate through compromise, but it can also magnify fragmentation and local-level instability if not carefully managed.
2. Policy outcomes and the fiscal-politics signal to municipalities
One of the earliest, highly visible tests of coalition governance has been fiscal policy. In the post-2024 environment coalition fault-lines have already affected major national decisions: for example, a proposed VAT increase was dramatically scrapped after intra-coalition rifts and political pushback, producing a large budget shortfall and public debate about coalition discipline and policy-making under shared power. Such episodes send a clear signal to municipal governments and voters: coalition compromises will shape the fiscal space available to municipalities, influence national transfers and conditional grants, and determine how national priorities translate into local service delivery budgets.
For municipal actors, the fiscal consequence is direct. Municipalities already operating with constrained budgets and service backlogs will be highly sensitive to whether national coalitions can deliver predictable revenue and policy coherence. If coalition agreements at national level produce repeated U-turns or unpredictable fiscal choices, municipal governments formed by similar alliances risk being blamed for service failures even when the causes lie at higher levels of government. This will make municipal coalitions politically vulnerable and heighten the salience of competent financial management as a campaign theme in 2026.
3. Voter behaviour: re-evaluating party choice under coalition uncertainty
A key cleavage heading into 2026 will be how voters adapt their behaviour in a system where single-party dominance is no longer guaranteed. There are two plausible, competing dynamics:
a) Strategic voting and consolidation: Voters disillusioned with fragmentation may consolidate behind larger opposition options perceived as able to deliver stable local governments or conversely return to the ANC in municipalities where the party still offers credible local leadership. Polling and post-election analyses from 2024 suggest voters are increasingly pragmatic; willing to punish incumbents for poor service and to support coalitions that promise tangible improvements.
b) Punishment of perceived opportunism: If national coalitions are widely seen as transactional or failing to improve living conditions, voters may punish coalition parties, especially smaller kingmakers whose leverage is interpreted as self-serving. Small parties that enabled dysfunctional municipal administrations in previous cycles could find themselves targeted by voters seeking accountability, amplifying anti-fragmentation sentiment. Reporting and analysis of municipal failures underscore the risks small parties face if they fail to deliver locally; 2026 could see a backlash against micro-parties that appear to trade power for patronage without improving services. Which dynamic dominates will depend on local context: municipalities with competent administrators and visible service improvements under coalition rule could reward their new local alliances; places where coalitions lead to paralysis will likely see electoral retribution.
4. Party strategy and coalition formation at the municipal level
Parties preparing for 2026 will approach municipal coalition-building with lessons from national experience. We can expect several tactical and strategic adaptations:
(i) Pre-electoral signaling: Parties will increasingly use manifestos and pre-election statements to signal potential coalition partners or red lines. Some observers have argued for greater transparency; voters should know beforehand which parties are open to partnering and parties are likely to calibrate manifestos to either broaden appeal or make coalition choice clearer. My Vote Counts
(ii) Formalized coalition agreements: To minimize instability, municipal actors will try to draft more robust, legally framed coalition agreements that outline policy priorities, division of portfolios, performance metrics and dispute-resolution mechanisms. The experience of volatile municipal coalitions in the past decade has shown that loose, informal bargains are more prone to collapse. More formal agreements are thus likely to appear in competitive municipalities in 2026.
(iii) Targeting swing wards and kingmaker seats: Parties will focus resources on ward-level battles where a handful of seats can decide mayoral coalitions. Local campaigns will be hyper-targeted, with an emphasis on credible local candidates who can form trustworthy local coalitions not just national celebrities.
(iv) Cross-party candidate selection and local pacts: In some municipalities, parties may negotiate not only post-election coalitions but pre-election electoral pacts (candidate non-competes, joint lists). These tactics will be politically fraught but could reduce fragmentation and present voters with clearer governing alternatives.
5. Governance implications: service delivery, accountability and corruption risk
Coalition governments can either improve governance by forcing compromise and oversight, or make governance worse by diffusing accountability. Municipal coalitions will face three structural governance challenges:
(i) Diffuse accountability: When multiple parties share power, voters may struggle to identify who is responsible for failures in water, electricity, waste removal or roads making electoral accountability harder unless coalitions clearly assign and publicize responsibilities.
(ii) Patronage and appointments: Coalition bargaining over municipal appointments can create opportunities for patronage if oversight is weak. This risk is acute where smaller parties demand key positions as the price of coalition support.
(iii) Policy coherence and technical capacity: Municipalities require technical capacity to translate policy into delivery. Coalitions that emphasize political deals over administrative competence will struggle, while those that prioritize merit-based appointments and professionalized municipal administrations can use performance to legitimize coalition governance.
Civil-society monitoring, stronger municipal finance oversight, and voter demand for service delivery can help discipline coalition partners. The 2024-25 debates and studies about coalition performance underscore the importance of these mediating mechanisms for the success of coalition-run municipalities. Mistra
6. Opportunities: pluralism, checks and balances, and renewed competition
Despite the risks, coalition politics offer democratic opportunities. Where coalitions force compromises across ideological lines, they can produce more pluralistic policy-making and embed checks and balances that were absent in one-party-dominant contexts. Local coalitions may introduce innovative policy mixes tailored to municipal needs, expand political participation by smaller groups, and incentivize performance to maintain inter-party support. For example, joint oversight committees and cross-party budgeting practices could strengthen fiscal discipline at municipal level if parties prioritize institutional reform over short-term gain. Analysts and think-tanks have argued that coalition politics can reinvigorate South African democracy if parties shift from transactional coalitionism to programmatic coalition-building. Chatham House
7. Practical takeaways for stakeholders ahead of the 2026 local elections
i. For parties: Invest in credible local candidates, formalize coalition commitments now (so voters can assess them), and prioritize demonstrable municipal competence. Parties that present clear, implementable local plans and transparent coalition rules will have a competitive advantage.
ii. For voters and civil society: Demand transparency, publish coalition agreements, budgets, and appointment processes. Local watchdogs and community groups should be empowered to hold coalitions to account through budget analysis and service-delivery monitoring.
iii. For municipal administrators: Build technical capacity early, insulate key service-delivery positions from political bargaining, and push for performance-based coalition agreements that link roles to outcomes.
iv. For national actors: Recognize that national coalition behavior creates spillovers into municipal politics; predictable, transparent national policy-making and budgetary discipline reduce municipal volatility and improve the prospects for stable local governance.
Conclusion
The shift to coalition politics in South Africa following the 2024 elections is not merely a high-level curiosity: it reshapes incentives, strategies and expectations down to the municipal ward. The 2026 local government elections will be a critical test of whether coalition arrangements can deliver improved services and accountable governance or whether fragmentation and transactionalism will lead to further voter disillusionment. The balance will depend on the degree to which parties institutionalize coalition norms (transparency, formal agreements and meritocratic appointments) and whether voters and civil society successfully insist that coalitions translate political compromise into tangible local improvements. If parties learn the hard lessons of the national experience that voters reward competence and punish opportunism , 2026 could mark the consolidation of a new, more plural but more accountable municipal politics in South Africa
Dr. Lizzy Oluwatoyin Ofusori is an academician and a researcher. She writes in her capacity.
